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A B S T R A C T. Students of Article III have so far failed to resolve a fundamental tension in the
theory of federal adjudication. On the one hand, Article III has been said to limit the federal
courts to the resolution of concrete disputes between adverse parties, one of whom seeks redress
for an injury caused by the other's conduct. On the other hand, Congress has repeatedly con-
ferred power on the federal courts to hear ex parte proceedings in which the petitioner sets up a
claim of right without naming an opponent. Such proceedings, dating from the nation's forma-
tive years and still extant today, call upon the federal courts to play an inquisitorial role that
seems hard to square with the nation's commitment to an adversary system.
In this Article, we catalog these ex parte proceedings and offer the first general theory of
how they fit within our largely adversarial federal judicial system. We argue that Article III em-
braces two kinds of judicial power: power over disputes between adverse parties, which was
known in Roman and civil law as "contentious" jurisdiction, and power over ex parte and other
uncontested proceedings, which was described in Roman and civil law as voluntary or "non-
contentious" jurisdiction. Non-contentious jurisdiction allows a party to seek a binding determi-
nation of a claim of right without identifying an injury in fact or naming an adverse opponent; it
was taken up by courts of equity and admiralty and promptly introduced into the federal judicial
practice of the early Republic. In working to situate non-contentious jurisdiction within Ameri-
ca's broader legal inheritance, we offer a theoretical account of continuing practices that many
view as aberrational. Our new account calls for a thorough reconsideration of the nature of the
judicial power of the United States, and a reexamination of the Supreme Court's gloss on Article
III's case-or-controversy requirement.
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ARTICLE III, ADVERSE PARTIES, AND NON-CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
For students of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's encounter with
the adverse-party requirement in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) case,
United States v. Windsor, was both overdue and disappointing.1 The Court has
long held that federal courts can hear only "definite and concrete" controversies
that touch upon "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."2
But the Court has failed to provide a coherent account of this "adverse-party
requirement" or of how such a requirement can coexist with a variety of non-
adverse or ex parte proceedings that have worked their way onto the docket of
the federal courts. Since the 1790s, Congress has assigned pension claims, nat-
uralization proceedings, and a surprisingly broad range of other matters lack-
ing an adverse party to the federal courts. For example, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), a subject of recent controversy, requires the
government to obtain an ex parte federal-court order to conduct certain kinds
of electronic surveillance but makes no provision for an adverse party ever to
contest the government's application.3 Aside from a decision some ninety years
ago addressing the power of the federal courts to naturalize aliens,4 the Court
has failed to wrestle with the constitutionality of non-adverse and ex parte pro-
ceedings.
Windsor, unfortunately, did little to clarify matters. Doubts as to the pres-
ence of adverseness had arisen early on, when the government insisted on en-
forcing DOMA but agreed with its nominal opponent, Edith Windsor, that the
law violated her constitutional rights by denying her the beneficial federal tax
treatment she would have received had she been the surviving spouse of a man
instead of a woman.' Yet the opinion by Justice Kennedy for a five-Justice ma-
1. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013) (invalidating section 3 of the De-
fense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 11o Stat. 2419 (1996)).
a. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (citations omitted).
3. On the operation of ex parte proceedings before the FISA courts, see In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717, 737-41 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); Note, Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil
Liberties by Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial Approval, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2200, 2206-07
(2008); Spencer Ackerman, FISA Chief Judge Defends Integrity of Court over Verizon
Records Collection, GUARDIAN (London), June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2o13/jun/o6/fisa-court-judge-verizon-records-surveillance [http://perma.cc/6F4-BsX6];
and Glenn Greenwald, FISA Court Oversight: A Look Inside a Secret and Empty Process,
GUARDIAN (London), June 18, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2ox 3/jun
/19/fisa-court-oversight-process-secrecy [http://perma.cc/AsRV-UV8E].
4. Tutunv. United States, 270 U.S. S68 (1926).
s. Recognizing that party agreement posed a jurisdictional hurdle, the Court appointed an
amicus curiae to argue the matter. See Brief for Court-Appointed Arnica Curiae Addressing
Jurisdiction, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 315234
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jority announced that the federal government's agreement with Windsor did
6not deprive the Court of power to reach the merits. For the majority, the re-
quirement of "concrete adverseness" was a prudential element of standing doc-
trine, one that appropriately informed the Court's discretion but did not inflex-
ibly compel party opposition as a jurisdictional prerequisite at every stage of
every case.7 The Court did not offer much by way of support for its conclusion
that such a requirement existed or, if it did, why it might merely be a matter of
prudence; the Court took no notice of the many instances in which the federal
judiciary, without first consulting constitutional limitations or prudential con-
siderations, proceeds in the absence of party adverseness.
8
Justice Scalia's sharply worded dissent also added little to our understand-
ing of the adverse-party requirement. To be sure, Justice Scalia viewed the rule
not as a "'prudential' requirement that we have invented," but as "an essential
element of an Article III case or controversy."9 Moreover, Justice Scalia at-
tempted to connect the adverse-party restriction to the text of Article III, plac-
ing some emphasis on the fact that the term "controversy" connotes a live dis-
pute between opposing parties.'" But Justice Scalia did not address the mean-
meaning of Article III's grant of "judicial power" or of its reference to "cases";
both terms have suggested to others, including possibly Chief Justice John
Marshall and Justice Joseph Story, that federal courts may do more than simply
resolve disputes between adversaries."
As for history, Justice Scalia depicted Article III's case-or-controversy limits
as reflecting the traditional notions of adjudication inherited from early Ameri-
cans and our "English ancestors,""2 an echo of Justice Felix Frankfurter's earlier
contention that the federal judicial power extends only to the forms and actions
of the English courts at Westminster. 3 This emphasis on England and the
(arguing that the United States had no standing to appeal from the decision below once it
concluded, in agreement with Windsor, that DOMA was unconstitutional).
6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-89 (evaluating the adverse-party requirement).
7. Id. at 2685-88.
8. For a catalog of many such proceedings, see infra Part I.
9. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1o. Id. at 27O ("The question here is not whether, as the majority puts it, 'the United States re-
tains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction,' the question is whether there is
any controversy (which requires contradiction) between the United States and Ms. Wind-
sor." (citation omitted)).
ii. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions
of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460-65 (1994).
12. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("Judicial power
could come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at
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practice of the (mostly common-law) courts at Westminster, however, not only
overlooks the fact that the English Court of Chancery, a non-common law
court sitting at Westminster, exercised jurisdiction over certain ex parte and
non-adverse matters; it also tends, in its focus on the common law, to obscure
the range of alternative sources on which the Framers drew in crafting Article
III.' It was mainly in the equity, admiralty, and probate courts of the eight-
eenth century, where judges rather than juries bore primary responsibility for
fact-finding, that the Framers were to encounter the range of ex parte proceed-
ings that made their way onto federal court dockets in the early Republic."5 Jus-
tice Scalia's common-law traditionalism thus brought us little closer than did
Justice Kennedy's prudentialism toward resolving the tension between the the-
ory of the adverse-party requirement and the reality of federal court practice.
Few scholars have attempted to address the tension by exploring the textual
and historical underpinnings of the adverse-party requirement. 6 Fewer still
Westminster .... "); see also Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 290 (1928)
(noting in Justice Brandeis's majority opinion that a resort to equity when no case or con-
troversy existed was "a proceeding which was unknown to ... English... courts").
14. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, I4 HARV. L. REV.
1613 (2011) (arguing that the focus of American legal scholars on Blackstone and the hori-
zontal structure of the English judiciary may have obscured the extent to which the hierar-
chical structure of the Scottish judicial system influenced the structure of the Article III judi-
cial system).
15. See infra Part III.A.3. Although the High Court of Chancery, which exercised the equitable
jurisdiction of the Crown, and the Court of Exchequer, which heard cases at law and equity,
see JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 120-22 (2oo9), sat in Westminster Hall, along with the
courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, most civil-law courts sat outside Westminster.
Thus, the High Court of Admiralty, which followed civil-law forms of action, sat at Doctors'
Commons in London, at least during the eighteenth century, and heard claims by civil law-
yers admitted to the College of Advocates. See G.J. FOSTER, DOCTORS' COMMONS: ITS
COURTS AND REGISTRIES, WITH A TREATISE ON PROBATE COURT BUSINESS 6, 11 (London,
Reeves, Son & Co. 1869); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 547 (7th
ed. 1956); see also STEVEN L. SNELL, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY AND THE COMMON LAW: ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 112-13 (2007) (reporting that
the civilians occupied quarters from 1671 to 1858 that were popularly known as Doctors'
Commons). The ecclesiastical courts, which handled probate and family-law matters in the
first instance, sat in dioceses throughout the realm. See 1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND: THE CANON LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION
FROM 597 TO THE 1640S, at 396-97 (2004) (describing the "widely dispersed" jurisdiction
over probate matters, with records held by "rural deans, archdeacons, and cathedral preben-
daries").
16. See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 548,
552 (2006) (noting that neither courts nor scholars have devoted sustained attention to the
theoretical underpinnings of the adverse-party requirement and arguing that an analysis of
the foundations of the requirement had not been previously "undertaken by jurist or schol-
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have considered the requirement in light of the non-adverse practices of the
federal courts. To be sure, some students of constitutional history have called
attention to certain early ex parte or non-adverse proceedings that appear very
much at odds with an adverse-party requirement." Others have identified
more modern examples of departures from our adversary ideal, such as certain
actions in bankruptcy administration, consent decrees, and settlement class ac-
tions."' Still others have attempted to justify particular ex parte practices, such
as search and arrest warrants, by highlighting the possibility that related ad-
verse-party litigation might ensue.' 9 Yet, to our knowledge, no one has con-
ducted a comprehensive assessment of the non-adverse proceedings of the fed-
eral courts or attempted to situate them within a coherent theoretical
framework. Instead of attempting to develop a theory that can account for the
federal courts' willingness to hear both adverse-party disputes and non-adverse
proceedings, most scholars who have confronted the issue tend to treat the
non-adverse practices they discover as aberrational vestiges of an earlier day,'
or as anomalies that have become too entrenched to question.'
ar"). Some important works on federal judicial power do not address the adverse-party re-
quirement as such. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 3o6-1o (3d ed. 2009)
(treating adverse-party issues as encompassed by the prohibition against the issuance of ad-
visory opinions).
17. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,
1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 824-25 (1994) (noting the "difficult" jurisdictional ques-
tion presented by the assignment of ex parte naturalization claims to federal courts); id. at
827 & n.311 (contending that the assignment of remission and mitigation duties to the dis-
trict courts put them in the position of exercising administrative functions and issuing advi-
sory opinions); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
YALE L.J. 1363, 1373-74 (1973) (remarking upon the lack of an adverse party in various federal
court proceedings, including petitions for naturalization); Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Ac-
tivities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 132-36 & n.61 (describing such ear-
ly non-contentious forms as naturalization and pension petitions, application for mitigation
of forfeitures, and shipwreck, salvage, and safety issues, but treating these as instances of ex-
trajudicial activity that do not present a "case or controversy"). We consider these proceed-
ings infra Part I.
18. See Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title ii: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 397,
449-5o (1996) (bankruptcy administration); Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or
Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases,
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014) (consent decrees); Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16 (set-
tlement class actions).
19. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 587 n.157; cf Avery, supra note 18, at 417-18 n.137
(rejecting Tutun as a precedent that justifies non-adverse bankruptcy proceedings).
20. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 18, at 668-69 (arguing that the role of federal courts in natural-
izing citizens "is a largely historical appurtenance").
21. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 84-85 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 6th].
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Beneath the surface of this judicial and scholarly neglect lies a deeply in-
grained set of assumptions about the adversarial character of the judicial sys-
tem of the United States. In an adversary system, the parties maintain substan-
tial control over the development of the legal issues and evidence bearing on
the resolution of their dispute. Judges play a more passive role as neutral arbi-
ters of disputes presented to them by the parties.' This passivity contrasts with
the more active role of judges in European and other civil-law inquisitorial sys-
tems. There, judges develop the factual record of the case and enjoy some con-
trol over the legal issues to which they will most closely attend. The attorneys
stay on the sidelines to some degree, particularly during the fact-finding pro-
cess.
Although the contrast between the Anglo-American adversary system and
the inquisitorial systems of continental Europe may be slightly overdrawn,23
American lawyers and judges are steeped in the adversarial ideal,' and courts
in the United States mainly continue to profess adherence to the adversarial
model.2" Indeed, one can sense that the adversary ideal has come to be per-
22. Lon Fuller, the scholar perhaps most closely associated with the adversary conception of the
judicial role, explained that the system works best when the judge bases her decision "whol-
ly on the proofs and argument actually presented to [her] by the parties." Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978). See generally STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICA-
TION (1988) (outlining the traditional, adversary conception of the judicial role); Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380-86 (1982) (same).
23. See 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw ch. 1, § 28, at 31 (Mauro Cap-
pelletti ed. 1987) (discussing the "clear" error committed by "many common law jurists" who
view the "inquisitorial" traditions of the civil law and the "adversary" traditions of the com-
mon law as if they were "mutually exclusive") (emphasis in original); Amalia D. Kessler,
Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to
the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1181 (2005) (reclaiming a forgotten inquisitorial prac-
tice).
24. For example, in a paper cautiously celebrating the inquisitorial features of developments in
the management of mass tort litigation, Howard Erichson recognized that the culture of
American adjudication remains decidedly adversarial and may not easily support a shift to a
more inquisitorial model. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Jus-
tice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2010-15 (1999).
25. One important exception- and one which is in some tension with the Court's celebration of
the adversary ideal in criminal procedure - is plea bargaining, in which the prosecutor serves
as the de facto judge of guilt or innocence. Indeed, the Court's tendency to celebrate the ad-
versarial ideal in the criminal context may appear slightly ironic to those who have observed
the inquisitorial process of plea bargaining become the cornerstone of the American criminal
justice system. Judge Gerard Lynch puts it this way:
To me, the essence of this practice, and what radically distinguishes it from the
adversarial litigation model embodied in textbooks, criminal procedure rules, and
the popular imagination, is that the prosecutor, rather than a judge or jury, is the
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ceived as yet another feature of American exceptionalism - that is, as a deliber-
ate departure from and improvement upon the practice of European countries
of which Americans should be justly proud.26 As Amanda Frost has noted, in-
quisitorial judging has become something of an "epithet among American
judges," most of whom seek to avoid even a "whiff of its judge-dominated pro-
cedures."27
This devotion to the adversary tradition tends to encourage strong state-
ments of the adverse-party requirement and to cast doubt on the power of fed-
eral courts to entertain ex parte and non-adverse proceedings. After all, in
many of these proceedings, the courts determine petitions for recognition of a
right or benefit-such as naturalized citizenship-in almost the same way as
administrative agencies oversee applications for Social Security benefits or im-
migration status. To rule on such a petition, the judge must investigate the fac-
tual and legal justification for the relief sought, often without the appearance of
an adverse party. Such uncontested proceedings present a challenge, especially
central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbiter of most legal
issues and of the appropriate sentence to be imposed). Potential defenses are pre-
sented by the defendant and his counsel not in a court, but to a prosecutor, who
assesses their factual accuracy and likely persuasiveness to a hypothetical judge or
jury, and then decides the charge of which the defendant should be adjudged
guilty. Mitigating information, similarly, is argued not to the judge, but to the
prosecutor, who decides what sentence the defendant should be given in ex-
change for his plea.
Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?., 55
STAN. L. REv. 1399, 1403-04 (2003). Somewhat ironically, the Supreme Court most fre-
quently celebrates the adversary ideal in the context of criminal procedure. See Greenlaw v.
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (declaring the norm of the adversary system in civil
and criminal cases to be one of reliance on the parties "to frame the issues for decision" and
on courts to play "the role of neutral arbiter"); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357
(2006) (distinguishing adversary from inquisitorial systems of procedure in respect of the
rules governing procedural default); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring) (implying that the rule imposing a procedural default may have a consti-
tutional underpinning in that it distinguishes "our adversary system of justice from the in-
quisitorial one"); cf Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (distinguishing the adversary
proceedings of courts from the inquisitorial approach of benefit agencies, such as the Social
Security Administration, at which no party opposes the claim for benefits).
26. Two exceptional features, American devotion to the jury trial and punitive damages, remain
a sore spot for European countries confronting suits to recognize and enforce sizable Ameri-
can judgments. See Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 710 (2005) (listing "pleading, broad discovery, ju-
ry trial, limited cost shifting, potentially remarkable awards for pain and suffering or puni-
tive damages" as some features of American procedural exceptionalism). A third, the exer-
cise of "doing business" jurisdiction over firms with their corporate seat elsewhere, was
recently curtailed. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
27. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DuKE L.J. 447, 460 (2009).
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for federal judges who lack the training, administrative support, and inclina-
tion to conduct their own investigations. Modern observers justifiably view
such inquisitorial ex parte practices as inconsistent with the adversary ideal.
Consider, for example, the thorough critique of settlement class actions offered
by Martin Redish and Andrianna Kastanek.8 The two authors argue that set-
tlement class actions violate Article III's adverse-party requirement, which they
view as a "logical outgrowth of the nation's commitment to an adversary sys-
tem."29 Yet, non-adverse proceedings account for a significant part of the dock-
ets of federal courts.
In this Article, we offer a solution to the puzzle of why federal courts, lim-
ited by Article III and guided by the adversary ideal that animates so much of
American procedural exceptionalism, may properly entertain ex parte and cer-
tain other non-adverse proceedings. We suggest that the answer lies in recog-
nizing that federal courts may constitutionally exercise not one but two kinds of
judicial power: power to resolve disputes between adverse parties and power to
entertain applications from parties seeking to assert, register, or claim a legal
interest under federal law. The first power, familiar to those practicing within
an adversary system, was known in ancient Rome and to civil-law lawyers of
the eighteenth century as "contentious" jurisdiction and extended to the reso-
lution of disputes between parties. The second, less familiar power, was known
in Roman and civil law as "voluntary" or "non-contentious" jurisdiction and
extended to the registration of contracts, the application for legal benefits, and
the recordation of a legal status or interest. Much like federal courts hearing ex
parte proceedings today, Roman tribunals and the civil-law European courts
that succeeded them often exercised non-contentious jurisdiction in the course
of performing administrative functions on an ex parte or consensual basis. The
existence of a genuine dispute between adversaries was not essential to the ex-
ercise of non-contentious jurisdiction; indeed, parties appeared before the
court either alone or in openly feigned contests, seeking a decree that would le-
galize a transaction or help them structure their affairs.
On our view, the evidence supports an inference that the Roman-law tradi-
tion of non-contentious jurisdiction was taken up by the civilian lawyers in
28. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16. They support their findings with evidence from the so-
cial-political practice of litigation as it has developed in the courts of the United States.
29. Id. at 572-73. For Redish and Kastanek, party adverseness ensures a "well-developed record"
on which to base a decision and conforms to a liberal democratic model of litigation that
presupposes private control of the litigation process. Id. at 571-72. While we do not address
the settlement class actions that animated the Redish and Kastanek study, and we disagree
with their bottom-line view of the constitutional force of the adverse-party requirement, we
have found their work, as well as their willingness to grapple with the complexities of the
adverse-party requirement, extremely illuminating.
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continental Europe and Britain, made its way to the American colonies, and
came to characterize a variety of proceedings familiar to the Founding genera-
tion. Proceedings in probate and admiralty jurisdiction in England and the col-
onies were governed by civil law, and both proceedings featured elements of
non-contentious jurisdiction. Bankruptcy proceedings, an outgrowth of estate
administration by the ecclesiastical courts and courts of equity, included ad-
ministrative chores that did not invariably feature adverse parties. English and
Scottish law books in the eighteenth century described the difference between
contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction.30 Even Blackstone's Commen-
taries described non-contentious forms of practice, distinguishing "voluntary"
from "contentious" jurisdiction in the probate of wills and granting of admin-
istration.31 Justices of the peace, the workhorses of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century American adjudication, resolved disputes and handled a range of legis-
lative and administrative chores at the county level.32 All these forms of non-
contentious jurisdiction were part of the complex and cosmopolitan legal world
in which the lawyers of the Framers' generation practiced law, and many of
these forms found their way onto the dockets of the first federal courts.
Evidence from the early Republic also suggests that the Framers viewed the
judicial power with which Article III courts were invested as encompassing the
exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction. Article III extends the judicial power
to "cases" arising under federal law and to "controversies" between specified
parties.33 Whereas the latter term connotes a dispute between opposed parties
(and does much of the textual work in arguments for an adverse-party re-
quirement), the former term has proved more elusive. Some scholars have ar-
gued, despite the tendency of the Supreme Court to conflate the two terms,
30. See, e.g., 1 JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 27-28 (photo. reprint
2010) (James Badenach Nicolson ed., Bell & Bradfute 1871) (1773); 4 THOMAS WOOD, AN
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 499 (photo. reprint 1979) (3d ed. 1724) ("The Jurisdic-
tion of these [Ecclesiastical] Courts is either Voluntary or Contentious. 1. Voluntary, or
where there is no Opposition; which consists in visiting Churches, the Clergy and Church-
wardens of several Parishes or Districts; in Granting Sequestrations, Institution and Induc-
tion to Benefices, Licenses and Dispensations, Ordering Real Compositions, Granting Pro-
bates of Wills, Letters of Administration, Letters ad Colligendum etc. 2. Contentious, or
where there is a Plaintiff and Defendant; which consists in Hearing and Determining the
following Causes: Apostacy, Blasphemy, Idolatry ... .
31. See 3 WILLUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98.
32. See SAMUEL BAYARD, AN ABSTRACT OF THOSE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH RELATE
CHIEFLY TO THE DUTIES AND AUTHORITY OF THE JUDGES OF THE INFERIOR STATE COURTS,
AND JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, THROUGHOUT THE UNION 17-18 (New York, printed for the au-
thor 1804) (describing both ministerial and judicial finctions of justices of the peace); see al-
so infra text accompanying notes 284-287 (describing the administrative functions served by
local colonial and state courts).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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that the term "case" confers a broader power than simply that of dispute reso-
lution.' Non-contentious jurisdiction may partly explain why the Framers
chose to distinguish between cases and controversies in Article III. As we argue
below, the term "case" includes not just disputed adverse claims, but also cer-
tain petitions brought on an ex parte basis by a party seeking to assert claims
within the bounds of the law. Indeed, such early exponents of federal jurisdic-
tion as Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story defined the term "case" capa-
ciously enough to include ex parte submissions, thereby giving voice to a prin-
cipled distinction between such "cases," on the one hand, and "controversies"
arising between adverse parties and subject to federal diversity jurisdiction, on
the other.3"
The insight that the federal court system can consciously exercise both con-
tentious and non-contentious jurisdiction without violating constitutional
strictures or historical norms strikes us as surprisingly useful but profoundly
unsettling. On the useful side of the ledger, the recognition of non-contentious
judicial power provides a novel solution to a serious problem of coherence in
the workaday world of the Article III judiciary by explaining how federal courts
can hear both adversary disputes and certain ex parte and non-adverse pro-
ceedings. The proposed dual-power solution also fits well with the text, struc-
ture, and history of Article III, and it nicely explains admiralty and equity prac-
tices at the time of the Framing. In addition, by formulating a theory for the ex
parte matters already entertained by federal courts, we hope to provide a
framework for evaluating those proceedings' compliance with necessary juris-
dictional predicates.
On the other hand, few notions seem more central to our conception of Ar-
ticle III courts than that they serve as tribunals for the resolution of concrete
disputes between adverse parties and perform their law-exposition functions
best in that setting. Recognition of non-contentious jurisdiction challenges this
familiar conception of the Article III judiciary and forces courts and scholars to
confront the inadequacy of current doctrines, such as the adverse-party re-
quirement and the injury-in-fact test for standing. In addition, the recognition
of non-contentious jurisdiction poses a potential risk to the rights of third par-
ties. Finally, one might worry that the formal recognition of the propriety of
non-contentious jurisdiction will encourage Congress to assign new adminis-
trative chores to the federal courts, burdening them with matters that that they
are not institutionally equipped to adjudicate or that could be better handled by
administrative agencies and other non-Article III actors.
34. See infra notes 364-365.
35. See infra Part III.B.i.
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In putting forward a theory of non-contentious jurisdiction, we propose to
achieve greater coherence without calling for a dramatic transformation of the
work of the Article III judiciary. We therefore suggest that the federal courts
maintain a distinction between their contentious and non-contentious jurisdic-
tion. On the contentious side, federal courts should continue to insist, in the
main, on concrete disputes between genuine adversaries.36
On the non-contentious side, we develop a set of guidelines to which feder-
al courts should adhere as they entertain the administrative or ex parte matters
that Congress has assigned to them. They should, for example, continue to ap-
ply elements, some familiar, some adapted, of the case-or-controversy rule and
of standing doctrine. Thus, while no adverse party need appear in non-
contentious proceedings, federal courts should exercise jurisdiction only if the
party invoking federal power has a concrete interest in the recognition of a legal
claim. In a revision of the traditional standing test, courts should decide a
question of law only if the party's entitlement to recognition of the right
sought necessarily turns on resolution of that question. The courts also should
exercise non-contentious jurisdiction only where they have been called upon to
employ judicial judgment in the application of law to the facts and only where
their decisions will enjoy the finality long viewed as essential to the federal ju-
dicial role. The courts must be especially mindful of the potential for cases
heard on the non-contentious side of their dockets to affect the rights of absent
parties, and due process will continue to require that third parties receive no-
tice of, and an opportunity to participate in, matters that concern them. We de-
rive these guidelines from practice and use them to review, critique, and refine
the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction in the courts of the United States.
We begin in Part I with a catalog of the ex parte and other non-contentious
matters that have been assigned to federal dockets. Part II shows that scholars
have not sufficiently accounted for the appearance of these proceedings, even as
the Supreme Court has quietly validated them as proper objects of judicial
power. Part III proposes to reconcile theory and practice, offering a historical
account of contentious and non-contentious judicial power and suggesting that
both modes of proceeding were proper subjects of federal judicial cognizance.
In particular, Part III shows that non-contentious jurisdiction made an early
36. As Windsor demonstrates, there may be some instances in which courts will exercise juris-
diction despite the disappearance of adverseness from an originally contentious suit. The
Supreme Court has yet to consider how its reliance on prudential considerations in Windsor
comports with its later suggestion that prudential doctrines have a reduced role to play in
justiciability law. See Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377
(2014) (recharacterizing both the zone-of-interests test and the generalized grievance rule in
light of a distrust of prudential standing doctrines holding that judges may refrain from
hearing matters concededly within federal jurisdiction).
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appearance in federal practice in the United States in the form of naturaliza-
tion, pension, warrant, and other applications and helps to explain the distinc-
tion between "cases" and "controversies" as used in Article III." 7 Part IV devel-
ops our theory of non-contentious jurisdiction, proposing a further distinction
between what we call "original" and "ancillary" non-contentious proceedings
and setting forth guidelines for their adjudication. Part TV also examines the
broad range of puzzles that our theory can help to solve. We show that the con-
cept of non-contentious jurisdiction assists in the evaluation of current ex parte
practices; provides a new understanding of the injury-in-fact requirement; bet-
ter defines and limits the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction; and helps
to clarify the contested boundaries between judicial, administrative, and minis-
terial work.
I. NON-CONTENTIOUS PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Scholars and jurists widely accept the proposition that the federal judicial
power can be exercised only when a court is presented with a concrete dispute
between parties possessed of adverse legal interests. 38 This "adverse-party re-
37. A word on methodology: although we spend a good deal of time with arguments based on
the text and history of Article III and believe that non-contentious jurisdiction was em-
braced in the Framers' conception of federal judicial power, we do not follow a self-
consciously originalist line of argument. Instead, as we have done in earlier work, see
Pfander & Birk, supra note 14, we set out to recover a feature of America's legal inheritance
that has been obscured from view by a post-New Deal emphasis on the adversary system as
it evolved in the English common-law courts at Westminster Hall. The common-law model
for resolving disputes over mine and thine (meum and teum) continues to shape modern
conceptions of the federal judicial function, but the nation's legal inheritance also includes
(as Article III confirms) cases in law and equity as well as cases of admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction. It was in these contexts (as well as in the practice of the church courts) that Eng-
land drew on non-contentious modes of procedure, and it was these contexts that intro-
duced non-contentious work to the courts of America. While history explains the arrival of
non-contentious jurisdiction in America, continuing practice explains the need for a theory
of judicial power that can account for non-adversarial proceedings today. For us, then, the
lessons of history provide a framework for a contemporary understanding of the ex parte
cases currently heard by federal courts, but those lessons are the beginning, not the end, of
our investigation.
38. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2011); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); see also, e.g., HART & WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 84-85;
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459, 469 (2008) (stating that a
"dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two sides, each of which has a stake in
winning"); Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 567 & n.8o ("The Court has widely held
that the case-or-controversy language of Article III mandates litigant adverseness."); Jona-
than R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEx. L. REv. 73, 77 (2007) (describing as part of
fundamental justiciability doctrine the principle that "courts will act only on a matter in-
volving adverse parties").
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quirement" complements other justiciability doctrines that limit the constitu-
tional or prudential jurisdiction of federal courts, such as finality, standing,
mootness, and the prohibitions on issuing advisory opinions and addressing
political questions. 39 Many believe that the adverse-party requirement serves to
circumscribe the role of federal courts by preventing them from interfering
with the prerogatives of the states and of the political branches of the federal
government unless required to do so by the presence of a live dispute.4 ° Ad-
verseness is also said to protect the interests of absent third parties and to ena-
ble courts to make decisions with the benefit of a full record and a comprehen-
sive understanding of the arguments bearing upon questions implicated by the
case.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated decisions rendered without full
adversarial briefing as entitled to less precedential weight than decisions ren-
dered on fully developed records.4'
But the adverse-party requirement sits uneasily with the reality of federal
judicial practice. In fact, since their establishment, federal courts have enter-
tained a wide variety of ex parte and other proceedings lacking an adverse party
and have consistently upheld the judicial role in such proceedings against chal-
lenges to their propriety under Article III of the Constitution. Moreover, non-
contentious proceedings often call upon the courts to exercise core judicial
functions, such as fact-finding, the determination of questions of law, and the
application of the law to the facts of the case.43 To provide a sense of the sheer
39. Just how solid a place the adverse-party requirement occupies was cast into some doubt by
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). The Court stated in that case that "concrete
adverseness" is merely a prudential requirement rather than a limitation contained in Article
III and also suggested that the lack of an adverse party could be mitigated by the presence of
an amicus curiae advancing an adverse argument. Id. at 2687 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Justice Scalia strenuously objected to the Court's characterization. See
id. at 2701-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 18, at 665; Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 582-83.
41. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (stating that, to have standing to sue, a litigant must possess
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions").
42. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623-24 (2008) (dismissing the reasoning of
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), because the defendants in that case did not ap-
pear or present argument and so did not offer a "counterdiscussion" of the government's
position on the history of the right to bear arms -"reason enough, one would think, not to
make [Miller] the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second
Amendment"); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (characterizing
"drive-by jurisdictional rulings" as entitled to no precedential weight).
43. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-09 & n.2 (1997) (characterizing the role of the
courts under the 179o Naturalization Act as "quintessentially adjudicative"). But see id. at
136o
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scope of the gap between the adverse-party requirement in theory and the di-
verse reality of federal court practice, the sections that follow catalog many of
the non-contentious proceedings overseen by the Article III judiciary.' As we
will see, some non-contentious matters begin with an original application for
relief, while others unfold in proceedings ancillary to a dispute between parties
with opposing interests.
A. Government Benefits
We begin with ex parte court proceedings as a method for the determina-
tion of government benefit claims in the early Republic. 4 Congress apparently
chose to rely on the federal courts to hear such claims in part because-of the ab-
sence of the sort of federal administrative apparatus available today. Aside from
the postal service, customs collectors, district attorneys, marshals, and light-
house keepers, early Congresses had little administrative capacity at their dis-
posal46 and understandably turned to the federal courts to evaluate benefit
claims.
1. Naturalization Proceedings
Applications for citizenship appeared on federal dockets shortly after the
adoption of the nation's first naturalization statute in 1790. The 179o Act pro-
vided for an applicant to submit a petition for naturalization to "any common
law court of record."47 This formulation was broad enough to encompass both
state and federal courts, and federal judges issued naturalization judgments
949-51, 952 n.i (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the judicial character of naturalization
proceedings).
44. Although the catalog provided here is lengthy, there likely are many other instances of fed-
eral non-contentious proceedings that we have overlooked. This catalog also focuses on the
non-contentious dockets of federal courts and thus omits practices unique to state courts.
4s. In a later Part, we will evaluate the scholarly treatment of these early examples of ex parte
practice. See infra Part II.
46. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 199-200
(1948). For a comprehensive account of the executive and administrative organs of the fed-
eral government in the early Republic, see JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
29-78 (2012).
47. See Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). On the framing of the Constitu-
tion's Naturalization Clause and the drafting of the 179o Act generally, see James E. Pfander
& Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospec-
tivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REv. 359 (2010).
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under its authority;4s later, the 1795 Act expressly conferred concurrent author-
ity on the state, lower federal, and territorial courts to entertain naturalization
petitions.49 Along with the petition, the applicant was required to submit evi-
dence sufficient to satisfy the court of the applicant's good character and resi-
dence in the United States."° Assuming the applicant made these showings, the
Act called upon the "court," not the judge, to administer an oath in which the
applicant pledged to support the Constitution."1 Finally, the Act provided for
the clerk to record the application and the proceedings, memorializing the
court's conclusion. 2 The Act made no provision for the prospective citizen to
name the government (or its officers) as an opposing party. Nor did it specifi-
cally allow for the government to intervene or seek the cancellation of a natu-
ralization judgment. 3
The failure to require or even provide for the appearance of an adverse par-
ty does not appear to have raised doubts in the minds of legislators or judges as
to the judicial nature of the naturalization proceeding. Indeed, the Act's referral
of these matters to "courts of record" tends to underscore their judicial quality.
Courts of record enjoyed a special status in Anglo-American law: they conduct-
ed open proceedings on "court" days,' and their judgments, part of the court's
48. See Pfander & Wardon, supra note 47, at 394 n.155.
49. See An Act To Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and To Repeal the Act Hereto-
fore Passed on that Subject, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414 (1795) (repealed 1802) (authorizing
naturalization proceedings before any "supreme, superior, district, or circuit court" of the





53. These features were added in 19o6, apparently after Congress grew concerned that federal
courts were applying an insufficiently searching standard of review to naturalization peti-
tions. See Naturalization Act of 19o6, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 11, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed by the
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137).
54. During the eighteenth century, court sessions occupied a few days each month, often corre-
sponded to market days, and attracted a good deal of public participation. Not only would
the local press (if any) attend and report on the proceedings, but members of the public
would also attend-both as spectators and as potential jurors. On the public quality of court
days in colonial and early statehood America, see A.G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom:
The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater Virginia, 1720 to 1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q 29 (198o). See
also RHys IsAAc, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-179o, at 90 (2d ed. 1999) ("In
the monthly concourse at the courthouse the male part of Virginia county society became
visible to its members in a manner similar to that observed at the parish church."). For press
accounts of the early federal circuit courts, see DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW
NATION 35 (1971) (quoting a newspaper account of the parade that accompanied the open-
ing of the circuit court in Boston).
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formal record, were considered conclusive unless modified through some spe-
cial proceeding."s The Supreme Court has long treated the ex parte considera-
tion of naturalization petitions as an appropriate exercise of judicial power. In
Ex parte Fitzbonne, an unreported decision from 18oo, the district court re-
solved an issue of law that had arisen in a naturalization proceeding, namely,
whether a statutory prohibition on the naturalization of citizens of a country at
war with the United States applied to French citizens during the quasi-war
with France. 6 The district court decided that the countries were at war, and
Alexander Dallas, the Court's reporter and the attorney for the petitioners,
sought review by petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus.5 7
The Court agreed to hear the matter and ordered the district court to proceed
with the naturalization proceeding, apparently concluding that French citizens
were eligible for naturalization in the federal courts."
55. See Arthur M. Alger, What Is a Court of Record?, 34 AM. L. REV. 70, 71 (1900) (observing
that, while a variety of factors have been associated with a court's of-record status, including
the power to fine and imprison for contempt, the "important consequence... was the con-
clusiveness of its judgments"); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *24-25 (discussing the
features of courts of record); cf. S.E. Thorne, Courts of Record and Sir Edward Coke, 2 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 24, 48-49 (1937) (concluding that Coke developed the construct of the court of
record as a way to bolster claims of judicature by the Houses of Commons and Lords and
placing these developments in the context of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth
century). Writs of coram nobis operated to reopen and correct factual errors in the judgment
of a court of record. See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1914). Writs of scirefaci-
as were used in England to contest letters patent. See JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 330-31 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son
1820); THOMAS CAMPBELL FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF ScIRE FAcIAS 244-77 (Lon-
don, V.R. Stevens & G. S. Norton 1851). In the United States, courts tended to rely instead
on equitable proceedings, rather than the writ of scirefacias, to cancel letters patent. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864) (describing the suit in equity as a more con-
venient remedy to cancel a wrongly issued patent in a land case than the writ of scirefacias).
The Court eventually approved the congressionally authorized use of equitable proceedings
to cancel a naturalization obtained by fraud or mistake. See Johannessen v. United States,
225 U.S. 227 (1912).
56. For an account of Ex parte Fitzbonne, see 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT: 1789-18oo, at 389-90 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2007) [hereinafter DHSC], which de-
scribes the litigation and the import of the Court's decision to issue the writ directing the
naturalization to proceed.
57. On Dallas's defense of the rights of those seeking naturalized citizenship, see James E.
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1862 (2010). For an overview of the
Court's supervisory powers, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme
Court's Power To Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1433 (2000).
58. The Court upheld the naturalization of French citizens, having concluded, in effect, that the
quasi-war between the United States and France did not make the French citizens enemies
of the United States within the meaning of the naturalization laws. On the quasi-war, see
Pfander & Hunt, supra note 57, at 1877-8o. On the war's impact on naturalization legislation,
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2. Revolutionary War Pension Claims and Hayburn's Case 9
The oft-told story of Hayburn's Case begins in 1792, when Congress as-
signed the federal circuit courts responsibility for reviewing the pension appli-
cations of disabled war veterans." The statute called for the claimant to file a
petition with the court, along with supporting evidence of military service,
rank, and related information. 6 ' The statute did not, however, require the vet-
erans to join the government as an opposing party. In passing on these peti-
tions, the circuit courts were to conduct a physical examination of the veteran,
assess the extent of the injury, and prepare an opinion as to the degree of disa-
bility and the proper compensation. 62 The court's decision, together with the
veteran's supporting evidence, were to be forwarded to the Secretary of War
for review.6" Assuming there was no "imposition or mistake" -as adjudged by
the Secretary and reviewed by Congress - the petitioner would be added to the
pension list for submission to Congress. 6' Hayburn's Case reports that three
circuit courts rejected the pension scheme, in part because the Secretary's revi-
see Pfander & Wardon, supra note 47. Although one might consider them "drive-by" juris-
dictional rulings today, in view of the absence of any discussion of jurisdictional issues, see
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512-13 (20o6) (refusing to treat a prior ruling as de-
cisive on a jurisdictional issue over which the parties had failed to "cross swords"), these ep-
isodes nonetheless suggest that ex parte proceedings were consistent with notions of the ju-
dicial power held in the early Republic. In Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926), the
Supreme Court specifically considered and rejected an argument that ex parte naturalization
petitions do not present a cognizable judicial "case" under federal law. See infra Part II.B.
59. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
6o. Disabled veterans began filing legislative petitions as soon as Congress convened in 1789,
seeking benefits they had been promised by the old Congress under the Articles of Confed-
eration. See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the
First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 179oS, at 29, 47-56 (Kenneth R.
Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002) (describing the petitions of invalid veterans). For
an account of the legislation, see James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of
judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34-40 (20o8), which sketches the
1792 controversy over the assignment of pension claims to the federal circuit courts.
61. An Act To Provide for the Settlement of the Claims of Widows and Orphans Barred by the
Limitations Heretofore Established, and To Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, ch. ii,
§§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (1792).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 4.
64. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411-14 (quoting letters from the judges of circuit
courts).
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sion power rendered the courts' decisions non-final, and in part for reasons
that have been the cause of frequent speculation.6 s
3. Remission and Mitigation of Forfeitures
Tucked away in the history of revenue collection in the early Republic, a
curious provision for the mitigation or remission of penalties and forfeitures
appears to blur the lines of separation between the departments of government.
The revenue laws of 1789 imposed duties on imported goods as well as a fee on
the "tonnage" of the vessels engaged in the carrying trade.66 Congress assigned
collection of these taxes to a group of federal collectors, surveyors, and naval
officers, all appointed by the President to work one of many revenue districts
along the coast. 67 The revenue laws imposed strict rules of transparency: mer-
65. We consider the mystery of Hayburn's Case in more detail infra Part III.B.2. Two other
grants of non-contentious jurisdiction appeared in the 1790s. See An Act for the Relief of the
Refugees from the British Provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia, ch. 26, 5 3, 1 Stat. 547, 548
(1798) (providing for the judges of the district and supreme courts of the United States to
take "proof of the several circumstances" entitling refugees from Canada to pursue land
claims under the Act); An Act for the Government and Regulation of Seamen in the Mer-
chants Service ch. 29, § 3, 1 Stat. 131, 132 (authorizing a crew to contest a vessel's seaworthi-
ness by petition to the district judge of the district and directing the district judge to com-
mission a report by knowledgeable citizens and, after receiving the report, to "adjudge and
determine.., whether the said ship or vessel is fit to proceed on the intended voyage"); cf.
MASHAW, supra note 46, at 74 (opining that the seaworthiness procedure "effectively made
courts (both state and federal) into administrators"). The latter grant of authority appears to
have derived from the practice by which the colonial vice-admiralty courts, following the
"custom of all trading nations," ordered surveys to ascertain the condition of vessels. See
CHARLES ANDREWS, 4 THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 253 & n.1 (1938) (de-
scribing a colonial practice in which a captain whose ship had grown unseaworthy would
submit a "public instrument of protest" against the ship in the vice-admiralty courts, asking
for a warrant of survey that could result in the sale of the ship and its cargo by court order).
One might argue that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05, provided
for judges of the district or circuit courts of the United States to exercise non-contentious ju-
risdiction in authorizing the return of fugitive slaves on the basis of oral testimony or affida-
vits submitted on an ex parte basis by the captor. But see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 616 (1842) (characterizing the practice under the Act as giving rise to a controversy
between adverse parties and a case under the laws of the United States).
66. An Act To Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships
or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported into the United States, ch. S, S
1, 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
67. Id. 5§1-2. On the history of the customs service, see WHITE, supra note 46, at 199-20o, de-
scribing the duties of "the collector, naval officer, and surveyor," who were employed to "as-
sess[] customs and tonnage dues." See also LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, INSTITUTE FOP,
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 33, THE CUSTOMS SERVICE: ITS HISTO-
RY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 6 (19z4) (reporting that the President in 1789 appointed
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chants involved in the import business were obliged to declare the goods they
proposed to import and to pay the specified duties.68 If they failed to do so, or
if they attempted to smuggle goods into port, they were subject to fines and
penalties enforced by the admiralty courts.6 9 Most dramatically, informers
were encouraged to bring suit for violations of the revenue laws against the of-
fending vessels, seeking a forfeiture of ship and cargo for the use of the United
States.7' Informers were entitled to keep a portion of the value of any forfeited
property. 7'
Concerned with the relative harshness of these punishments, Congress
adopted legislation in 1790 that conferred power on the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to mitigate or remit penalties and forfeitures.' These powers came into
play when, in the Secretary's opinion, the violation had occurred without "wil-
ful negligence or any intention of fraud."' The decision was to be made on the
basis of a record assembled by the federal judge in the district where the forfei-
ture occurred.74 To apply for relief from the forfeiture, the petitioning party
was required to submit a petition for remission to the district court, along with
a statement of the pertinent "circumstances." '75 Upon submission, the district
judge was directed to notify interested parties, conduct a summary (that is,
non-jury) inquiry into the matter, and attach a statement of the facts to the pe-
tition for transmission to the Secretary.76 Although interested parties (usually,
the customs officers who had a financial interest in the proceeds) could appear,
their presence was not required; the district judge could proceed to assemble a
some "fifty-nine collectors, thirty-three surveyors, and ten naval officers" to staff fifty-nine
customs districts).
68. An Act To Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law, ch. 5, §§ 13, 19-20, 1 Star.
at 39-42.
69. On the role of federal admiralty courts in revenue collection cases, see William R. Casto, The
Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J.
LEGALHIST. 117, 149-51 (1993).
70. See An Act To Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law, ch. 5, § 38, 1 Stat. at
48.
71. Id.
72. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122.
73. Id. § i, 1 Stat. at 122-23. For an account of practice under the remission statute, see ANDREW
DUNLAP, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN CIVIL CAUSES OF
MARITIME JURISDICTION; WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING RULES IN THE ADMIRALTY COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND A FULL COLLECTION OF PRACTICAL FORMS 281-88 (New York,
Jacob R. Halsted, 2d ed. 185o).
74. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. at 122.
75. Id. (directing the judge, on petition for remission or mitigation of a forfeiture, to "inquire in
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factual record even where no adverse party came forward to contest the petition
for remission.7 As with naturalization petitions, federal courts have treated pe-
titions for remission or mitigation as falling within the judicial power of the
United States.
78
B. Transfers of Property
The federal courts also exercised jurisdiction over ex parte and non-
contentious transfers of property. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
before the advent of contemporary due process protections,79 in rem proceed-
ings in probate and admiralty were commonly brought in English and Ameri-
can courts to secure a transfer of title to property that was regarded, in the col-
orful parlance of the day, as binding on "all the world. " 's Often, these in rem
proceedings began and even continued on an ex parte basis. Probate in the
"common form" began with an application for the admission of a will to pro-
bate by the party named as the will's administrator. 8 Similarly, the captors of a
vessel claimed as prize would initiate proceedings by filing a petition (or "li-
bel") with the admiralty court.s2 While the probate and admiralty courts wel-
comed the appearance of adverse parties, the court's power to transfer title in
the property did not depend on their presence."s It was possible, therefore, that
77. Id.
78. See The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1815). For a
more detailed discussion, see infra Part lII.B.1.
79. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to impose an
obligation on fiduciaries to give notice "reasonably calculated" to inform the beneficiaries of
events pertaining to the administration of a trust. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 3o6, 318 (1950). In addition to imposing this notice requirement,
modern due process forbids a state from adjudicating claims involving non-residents unless
they have the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum state. See Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Courts can no longer bind non-residents simply by
asserting power over property located in the state; they instead must show that those with
an interest in the property have such minimum contacts. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
8o. Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 319, 342 (1844).
81. On the English history of probate in the common (or non-contentious) form and in the sol-
emn (contentious) form, see LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW,
INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE 388-91 (1946).
8z. See infra notes 9o-96 and accompanying text.
83. Issuance of letters testamentary empowered the executor to collect the decedent's assets, pay
off the debts, and distribute the legacies, often on the basis of little by way of judicial pro-
ceeding and often without contestation. SIMES & BASYE, supra note 81, at 390. On the power
of the admiralty courts to decree good prize without a judicial contest, see also infia note
248, discussing remarks of Justice Story and archival research of Kevin Arlyck.
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an ex parte disposition could foreclose the claims of interested parties who had
not received any personal notice of the pendency of the proceeding. 4 Yet the
courts nonetheless took the position that such dispositions were conclusive
judgments, binding in the absence of fraud.8s
1. Prize and Salvage Cases
Although the "probate exception" kept - and keeps - most personal estate
proceedings out of the federal courts, 86 federal courts sitting in admiralty pos-
sessed a considerable docket of often non-contentious property transfer actions
in the form of prize and salvage cases. Prize claims were a commonplace of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century seagoing warfare; governments authorized
both the officers of their navies and certain duly licensed privateers to intercept
and claim as prize the merchant ships and naval vessels of opposing nations.
The administration of prize claims occupied the lion's share of the dockets of
84. As recently as 1945, Lewis Simes, a law professor and the reporter of the Uniform Probate
Code, published a spirited defense of the traditional conception of probate as an in rem pro-
ceeding. See Lewis M. Simes, The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem,
43 MICH. L. REV. 675 (1945).
85. Two cases from the nineteenth century illustrate the conclusive quality of proceedings in the
probate courts. In one case, arising in the Wisconsin Territory, the administrator of the de-
cedent's estate filed an ex parte petition with the local court, requesting the court to approve
the proposed sale of the decedent's land to satisfy the estate's debts. See Grignon's Lessee, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 319. The court duly granted its approval in an ex parte proceeding and issued
what the Supreme Court described as a "license to sell." Id. at 340. Heirs of the decedent lat-
er moved to unwind the sale and to reclaim the land. But the Court concluded that the li-
cense to sell qualified as the judgment of a court of record that immunized the sale from
subsequent challenge. Id. at 343-44. A similar result obtained in a case arising in Pennsylva-
nia. An ex parte decree of the orphan's court, authorizing the sale of a decedent's land to
support his children, was viewed as conclusive. See McPherson v. Cunliff, 11 Serg. & Rawle
422 (Pa. 1824). Conclusive quality also was ascribed to proceedings in admiralty over title to
vessels captured or salvaged at sea and claimed as lawful prize. See id. at 430; Grignon's Les-
see, 43 U.S. at 338 (noting that, as in rem proceedings, probate sales "are analogous to pro-
ceedings in admiralty").
86. See generally James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67
VAND. L. REv. 1533 (2014) (describing and analyzing the probate exception to federal juris-
diction).
87. See Casto, supra note 69, at 123-24. For an overview of English practice in prize cases, de-
scribing the use of privateers and government naval vessels to intercept enemy commerce
and the reliance on colonial vice-admiralty courts in British North America, see SNELL, supra
note 15, at 171-77. See also Pfander & Hunt, supra note 57, at 1916 (noting that naval captains
were compensated for taking prizes during the quasi-war with France in 1798-1800); Kevin
Arlyck, Forged by War: The Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age of Revolution 234
(Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors)
(noting the reliance of the United States on privateers during the War of 1812).
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the colonial vice-admiralty courts and, later, of the state admiralty courts and
the federal Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture under the Articles of Confed-
eration and the federal admiralty courts of the early Republic. 88 Salvage was
awarded to a crew that helped to save a stranded or damaged vessel or re-took
a friendly ship that the enemy had claimed as prize.8
9
Much like probate proceedings, prize and salvage claims began with the ex
parte submission of a petition (again, here called a "libel") to the proper court,
seeking an order that would institute the condemnation process, an inquisitori-
al process - characteristic of admiralty proceedings - in which the court would
demand all of the ship's records and issue commissions to take deposition tes-
timony from those involved in the vessel's capture.90 If, on the basis of the evi-
dence collected, the court found that the vessel qualified as one subject to cap-
ture or salvage, the court would enter a decree authorizing the sale of the vessel
and its cargo. 9' The legal effect of prize decrees did not depend on the appear-
ance of any opposing party, and indeed section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
recognized that no adverse party might even be named;9" on many occasions,
presumably, the captured vessel was so obviously a good prize that no one
bothered to contest the fact. But the court would nonetheless proceed to decree
in such a case. 93
While the task of administering probate estates fell to the state courts, fed-
eral courts were assigned jurisdiction over claims of prize and capture. 94 Rules
88. See Casto, supra note 69, at 123-29, 149-53; see also Frederick Bernays Wiener, Notes on the
Rhode Island Admiralty, 1727-1790, 46 HARV. L. REy. 44, 47 (1932) (describing the heavy prize
business in the Rhode Island colonial court of admiralty during King George's War with
France). On the role played by the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, see HENRY J.
BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787 (1977).
89. ANDREWS, supra note 65, at 253; SNELL, supra note 15, at 16o n.128, 16o-6i (2007).
go. See DUNLAP, supra note 73, at 368-76.
91. See id.
92. An Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 89
(1789).
93. See Arlyck, supra note 87, at 264 ("[P]rize proceedings were largely nonadversarial; that is,
in most cases the only parties to the proceedings were the captors seeking condemnation of
the vessel and cargo as good prize."). Arlyck attributes the lack of adverse-party presenta-
tions to the simple notion that the owners had nothing to litigate. Id. For descriptions of
prize condemnation proceedings in England and the American colonies, see Matthew P.
Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM.
323, 329 (1996); and L. Kinvin Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 256 (1962).
94. Casto, supra note 69, at 140. The frustrating experience of the Court of Appeals in Cases of
Capture, which heard appeals from state courts adjudicating prize cases under the Articles of
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of procedure promulgated by the First Congress declared that "civil law" pro-
cess was to govern proceedings in federal courts of admiralty (as well as in suits
brought in equity). 9 Federal courts sitting in admiralty accordingly followed
the inquisitorial model customary of admiralty proceedings in English and
continental civil-law courts, decreeing good prize and ordering the sale of cap-
tured vessels. 96 Given the widespread view that such matters of prize and cap-
ture were proper subjects of federal adjudication, no one appears to have raised
doubts about the power of the federal courts to adopt an inquisitorial model or
to entertain the proceedings on an ex parte basis.97 Indeed, providing disposi-
tive legal decrees regarding naval captures played a crucial role in national de-
fense and international relations in the early Republic, 98 and the fact that this
task was assigned to federal district courts sitting in admiralty (as it was as-
signed to the admiralty courts in England) suggests that the Framers expected
the federal courts to play a role in the administration of law beyond mere dis-
pute resolution.
2. Trademark Seizure Orders
Although prize cases have fallen by the wayside, Congress has relied on
federal courts to exercise similar functions in contemporary forfeiture proceed-
ings. In 1984, for example, Congress amended the Lanham Act to authorize
federal courts to issue ex parte seizure warrants aimed at the sellers of goods
infringing on a valid trademark.99 Exercising this power, federal courts have
Confederation, may have motivated Congress's decision to assign such cases to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See BOURGUIGNON, supra note 88, at 39-100.
95. An Act To Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 94
(1789).
g96. For example, in his treatise on admiralty, Dunlap observes that the admiralty court in Bos-
ton promptly adopted the civil law practice on letters rogatory in the course of seeking to
procure relevant evidence in other countries. See DUNLAP, supra note 73, at 200-02.
97. Early admiralty courts adopted rules of procedure designed to facilitate an inquisition into
prize and capture claims. See id. at 368-82 (setting forth rules of the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York that required early notice to the court in cases of prize
and capture, judicial collection of relevant papers, and an inspection of the vessel, all before
any libel had been filed).
98. See Casto, supra note 69, at 133-34.
99. See Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 19 84 , Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat. 2178, 2179; 15
U.S.C. 5 1i16(d) (2012). See generally Daniel Grobman, Note, Preemptive Ex Parte Seizure
Orders and Substantive Relief: A Far Cry from Congressional Intent, 33 CARDozo L. REv. 1185
(2012) (describing the background and operation of trademark seizure orders). The statute
specifies that "the court may, upon ex parte application, grant an order under subsection (a)
of this section pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit
marks." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(a) (2012).
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issued broad ex parte seizure orders authorizing the owners of a trademark to
take counterfeit goods off the market in the days surrounding major events. ' °
The statute contemplates post-seizure proceedings during which the target
of the seizure order may contest the order'0 ' and provides for the award of
compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees in cases of wrongful
seizure." 2 But many such seizures are never contested. A close student of the
practice reports that many successful trademark owners use the seizure order
simply to get the counterfeit goods off the street and never pursue claims for
damages against the sellers of the offending goods (who also never show up to
claim them). 3
C. Bankruptcy
The administration of an estate by courts exercising equitable powers has
long featured a combination of both adverse and non-adverse proceedings. 4
One can see this combination reflected in the wide range of familiar forms of
estate administration, including the probate matters discussed above, equity
receiverships, equitable trust supervision, and federal bankruptcy.' 5 Although
loo. See Grobman, supra note 99, at 1191-93.
ol. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8) (2012).
1o2. See 15 U.S.C. § l116(d)(11) (2012).
103. See Grobman, supra note 99, at 1194-95. On the availability of appellate review of ex parte
seizure orders, see Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 1991), which holds that an
order denying an application for a 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) seizure order constitutes a denial of a
form of injunction and is immediately appealable. The Ninth Circuit arrived at the opposite
conclusion in In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F. 3d 982, 989 (9 th Cit. 2004), dismissing the
plaintiff's appeal of the denial of its ex parte seizure application for lack of subject-matter ju-
risdiction. But see NBA Props. v. Does, No. 97-40609, 1997 WL 271311 (ioth Cit. May 21,
1997) (reversing the district court's denial of an ex parte trademark seizure application).
104. In probate, for example, courts commonly distinguish between their power to administer
the estate on an ex parte basis and their power to resolve disputed or "inter partes" matters.
See, e.g., John F. Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB. L.J. 77, 84-85
(1997). The so-called probate "exception" to the jurisdiction of federal courts has been in-
terpreted to apply to administrative matters but leaves the federal courts free to hear dis-
putes between parties. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 310 (2006) (declaring that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to "probate a will or administer an estate" but ultimately up-
holding their power to adjudicate controversies arising out of probate proceedings (quoting
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946))).
105. On the mixed quality of bankruptcy cases, see Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743, 837 n.352 (2000), which recognizes that a "case commenced under the Bankruptcy
Code differs substantially from a typical civil action commenced in state or federal court to
resolve a two-party dispute" (quoting Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 676-77 (1985)). As Brubaker reports,
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
these forms have evolved in different directions, they apparently spring from
common roots in the civil or canon law, and all feature administrative and ex
parte elements in addition to formal adverse-party disputes.
6
1. Initial Appointment
Most estate proceedings begin with a petition that commences the adminis-
trative process through the appointment of an individual who will bear a fidu-
ciary obligation to manage the affairs of the estate.1 °7 The names of these fidu-
ciaries vary: trustees oversee estates, including those in bankruptcy;
administrators conduct intestate successions; guardians serve on behalf of mi-
nors; receivers manage an equitable receivership; and executors handle the
probate of wills and the distribution of the testators' property.o
the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules described "the bankruptcy case" as some-
thing different from "litigation involving a legal dispute in the traditional sense." Id. (quot-
ing COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON PRE-
LIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY
PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 5 (1998)); see also Avery, supra note 18, at
450 (noting that, in bankruptcy, courts often act as "administrators of a congressionally
mandated system rather than arbiters of disputes between litigating parties").
1o6. On the ecclesiastical, estate-administration origins of English bankruptcy, see R.H. HELM-
HOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 292 (1987), which reports that records of the
English church courts "show conclusively that English bankruptcy practice has antecedents
and perhaps even roots in the canon law administered by the Church courts." On the Eng-
lish precursors to early American bankruptcy statutes, see Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary"
Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Mar-
shall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 123-25 (2012).
107. See JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF RECEIVERS 5 1, at 2 (Chicago, Callaghan &
Co. 3d ed. 1894) (describing the receiver as a person "appointed by the court to preserve the
property or fund in litigation pendente lite when it does not seem reasonable that either party
should hold it"); WILLIAM M. McGOvERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING
TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 571-72 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining that the powers of per-
sonal representatives, such as trustees and executors, are acquired by court appointment);
SIMES & BASYE, supra note 81, at 388-91 (describing the appointment of executors and ad-
ministrators to handle the administration of decedents' estates). On the binding quality of
the discharge in bankruptcy, even where the creditor fails to contest, see FRANCIS HILLIARD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ch. 9, S 13, at 241 (2d ed., Phila-
delphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867), which notes that creditors may be concluded by an in-
solvent's discharge where they have notice but fail to appear and contest and further observ-
ing that notice will be presumed). For a discussion of the fiduciary duties imposed on
trustees, see McGoERN ET AL., supra, at 53o-624, which describes fiduciary duties such as
the duties to remain loyal, to adopt a prudent investment strategy, and to account for the as-
sets of the trust.
1o8. Despite the difference in titles, the responsibilities of these fiduciaries overlap to a degree.
They typically owe a duty of loyalty to the estate; they all must manage its affairs for the
benefit of its participants, heirs, legatees, or beneficiaries; and they must all avoid conflicts
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Petitions for judicial involvement may be contested, but they need not be
contested in order for the court to begin the proceeding and appoint a fiduci-
ary. In bankruptcy, for example, the submission of an uncontested or voluntary
petition may be filed in the absence of any dispute and will initiate the proceed-
ing and occasion the creation of a bankruptcy estate.' °9 In such an uncontested
proceeding, the court has the power to distribute the non-exempt assets (if
any) among the creditors.11° If there are no assets, and no creditors appear, the
court nonetheless has power to provide the debtor with a discharge (and fresh
start).'"
of interest that might cast doubt on their loyalty to their fiduciary obligations. See GEORGE
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 1 (6th ed. 1987) (defining a trust as a fiduciary relationship in which the
trustee holds title of property subject to an equitable obligation to administer it for the bene-
fit of another). In a departure from this model, the bankruptcy trustee represents the inter-
ests of the creditors, whereas the equity receiver acts on behalf of the court in administering
an equitable remedy. On the duties of the bankruptcy trustee, see DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STE-
VEN H. NICKLES, PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW § 1.5, at 24-26 (2007), which distinguishes
the bankruptcy trustee, as "the representative of the estate," from the United States trustee,
a federal official who shares in the work of overseeing bankruptcy administration. On the
duties of the equity receiver, see JOHN W. SMITH, THE LAW OF RECEIVERSHIPS 3 (2d ed.
19oo), which notes that the receiver "is not the agent... of either party to the action, but is
uniformly regarded as an officer of the court." On the power of courts of equity to appoint
guardians for minors, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5 1338,
at 926-27 (photo. reprint 2006) (London, Stevens & Hayes 1884), which states, "The Court
of Chancery [in England] will appoint a suitable guardian to an infant, where there is none
other, or none other who will, or can act... Guardians appointed by the court are treated as
officers of the court, and are held responsible accordingly to it." On the appointment of eq-
uity receivers, see HIGH, supra note 107, § 1, at 2.
log. Avery, supra note 18, at 419.
11o. See i1 U.S.C. § 726 (2013).
iii. See EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 1o8, § 16.9, at 219-20 (explaining that in the "typical"
case of an individual bankruptcy under chapter 7, no one objects and the discharge is grant-
ed); id. § 16.1o, at 223 (describing an illustrative "no-asset" case in which the court proceeds
to enter a "pro forma" discharge); see also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY
§ 10.28, at 995 (3d ed. 2014) (observing that the bankruptcy court issues an automatic dis-
charge of the individual's debts in the absence of objection); id. S lO.1, at 937 (linking the
fresh start and discharge as the goals of voluntary bankruptcy petitions). A similar proce-
dure obtained in probate proceedings. On the difference between contested and uncontested
proceedings in probate, see Winkler, supra note 104, at 84-85, which distinguishes between
ex parte "common form" proceedings and disputed, or inter partes, "solemn form" proceed-
ings.
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2. Administrative Fees
The judicial administration of bankruptcy cases often entails the issuance of
orders approving the payment of administrative fees.'1 2 Fees may be due to the
trustee or to professional advisors (lawyers, investment managers, and ac-
countants) hired to assist with the estate's management and may generally be
paid from the estate if "reasonable." 1" 3 In many situations, no party to the es-
tate's administration has an incentive to contest these fees.114 Perhaps as a re-
sult, bankruptcy law holds that the court has an independent duty to examine
the fees, even in the absence of a specific challenge."5 In some respects, the dy-
namic surrounding the approval of such fees resembles the dynamic triggered
by a proposed settlement of a class action and raises similar concerns."'
3. Contract and Plan Approval
During the course of bankruptcy proceedings, courts grant formal approval
to a variety of business decisions by debtors-in-possession that are agreed to in
advance by interested parties." 7 For example, the parties may wish to adopt a
pre-petition contract that has been profitable for the debtor and the bankruptcy
estate." 8 In such a situation, the federal bankruptcy code requires the court to
approve the contract before it can be given legal effect." 9 In addition, court ap-
proval of the debtor's reorganization plan requires satisfaction of a laundry list
of conditions.'20 The court must hold a hearing on the plan's confirmation and
take evidence and make findings on each item, regardless of whether the item
has "been placed in issue by the parties."'21
112. In bankruptcy, administrative fees are accorded a relatively high priority for payment by the
estate. See ii U.S.C. § 507 (2012) (conferring priority on payment of administrative fees,
which include the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate); DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7-11, at 463 (1993) (noting that administrative fees include
attorneys', accountants', and investment bankers' fees).
113. See 1 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2o13).
114. See Avery, supra note 18, at 434 (explaining that "each creditor individually has little reason
to object" based on a consideration of the costs of objection and the likely recovery).
115. See id. at 433.
116. See infia notes 198-2o6 and accompanying text.
117. Avery, supra note 18, at 422, 437.
118. See id. at 422-23.
iig. See id.
12o. See id. at 437.
121. Id.
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D. Government Investigations
In a variety of situations, the government must secure the approval of the
federal judiciary before completing one or more phases of its investigatory pro-
cess, such as conducting a search or seizure or issuing a subpoena. We summa-
rize these proceedings in this section, recognizing that the rule of prior judicial
approval does not apply to warrants and subpoenas issued under the aegis of
grand jury proceedings (which have themselves been described as operating on
an inquisitorial, rather than an adversarial, model).'22
i. Warrant Applications
The Fourth Amendment assumes that courts and magistrates will conduct
ex parte proceedings in the course of evaluating arrest and search warrants.
The well-thumbed terms of the Amendment prohibit "unreasonable searches
and seizures" and further declare that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."" 3 Although scholars debate the
meaning of the Warrant Clause and its connection to the ban on unreasonable
searches," and although the Court has tugged and pulled at the Clause over
time,'25 key features seem relatively clear for our purposes. First, jurisprudence
regarding the Warrant Clause contemplates the submission of an application to
a "neutral and detached magistrate," typically in an ex parte proceeding in
which a government officer offers sworn testimony in support of the proposed
warrant. 26 Second, the issuance of a warrant had genuine legal consequences
122. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (distinguishing the "ju-
dicial power" to obtain evidence in the context of an adversary proceeding from the grand
jury's "power of inquisition"); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 1.4(c)
n.94 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that the characterization of the investigatory stage as "inquisito-
rial" reflects the government's ability to gather evidence without making a showing before a
magistrate). On the grand jury, see Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the
Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265 (20o6), which describes
the tension between the judicial and prosecutorial models of the grand jury.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
124. Much has been written about the warrant requirement and the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791 (2009); Thomas Y. Da-
vies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984) (recognizing a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule).
126. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975) (emphasizing the importance of transferring
the judgment from the prosecutor to "a neutral and detached magistrate"); Johnson v. Unit-
ed States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding that probable cause must be determined by a "neu-
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at common law, in that a lawful warrant immunized an officer who stayed
within its bounds and the bounds of the law from subsequent civil liability.'
27
In the early Republic, representatives of all three branches of government
appear to have presumed that warrant applications were proper in Article III
courts, as when Congress authorized "any court of the United States" to hear
warrant proceedings to enforce Alexander Hamilton's 1791 federal excise tax on
distilled spirits, which for obvious reasons did not provide for advance notice
to the warrant's target.128 Consider also the affair of Captain Barr6, a French
tral and detached magistrate"). See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 120 (1937)
(distinguishing between the "sober" judgment of a judicial official in issuing a warrant and
the perhaps ill-informed judgment of the "ministerial" officer who executes the warrant,
subject to the possibility of "civil and criminal liability" if he exceeds the authority con-
ferred). On the impact of English history on the rise of a judicial role in the issuance of war-
rants, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 178 (2014) (concluding,
on the basis of England's rejection of prerogative warrants, that the judicial power conferred
on Article III courts includes the power to issue binding orders and warrants; these "were
judicial and had to come from the judges"). It is not entirely clear whether the Framers un-
derstood the Fourth Amendment to require a judicial, rather than executive, official to issue
warrants. Practice before and after adoption of the Fourth Amendment sometimes involved
police and other executive officials claiming authority to issue warrants. See Akhil Reed Am-
ar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (1994).
127. In general, earlier judges understood that warrants in the eighteenth century, when valid,
conferred immunity from civil liability. See Amar, supra note 126, at 778. When overbroad or
general, however, such warrants conferred no immunity on the officers that executed them.
For recognition of such official liability in English cases, see Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 275, which imposed liability in connection with a search
undertaken pursuant to a general warrant. For an account of the claims brought in England
by John Wilkes and his supporters, see Davies, supra note 124, at 562-63 & 563 n.21, which
describes a successful attack on a general warrant, resulting in a substantial award of dam-
ages from the Secretary of State. Professor Davies shows that Americans likely learned of
these developments through newspaper accounts and pamphlets, rather than through for-
mal case reports. Id. at 563-65.
ua8. An Act Repealing, After the Last Day of June Next, the Duties Heretofore Laid Upon Dis-
tilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and Laying Others in Their Stead; and also upon Spir-
its Distilled Within the United States, and for Appropriating the Same, ch. 15, §32, 1 Stat.
199-207 (1791). On Hamilton's role in formulating the excise tax, see RON CHERNOW, ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON 342-43 (2004). Enforcement of the excise tax in Western Pennsylvania led
to the so-called Whiskey Rebellion. See WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:
GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHAL-
LENGED AMERICA'S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY 7-8 (2006); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986). Con-
gress's first customs tax, adopted in 1789, did not rely on the federal courts to issue search
warrants, but provided instead for applications to "any justice of the peace." An Act To
Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels,
and on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported into the United States, 1 Stat. 29, ch. 5, §
24 (1789). By choosing to assign the warrant-issuing authority to state officials, the customs
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sailor who apparently found life in the United States preferable to the vagaries
of the French Revolution. 29 Under a treaty with France, the United States had
agreed to arrest deserters from French vessels and deliver them to the French
consul for return to their country. 3 ' The French consul filed papers before
Judge John Laurance in the United States District Court for the District of New
York, seeking a warrant for Barre's arrest following his desertion from a French
ship. 3' Although the evidence tended to establish that Barr6 had in fact desert-
ed, Judge Laurance refused to issue an arrest warrant until the consul produced
evidence of Barr6's enlistment on the ship's register or roll (as apparently con-
templated in the language of the treaty).132 The consul, lacking the specific
proof demanded, sought help from the executive branch, which filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Laurance to issue the warrant.'33
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court refused to issue the requested
writ.34 Reasoning that Judge Laurance had acted in a "judicial capacity," the
Court said that it lacked power by way of mandamus to compel the judge to
decide "according to the dictates of any judgment, but his own.""' No one in-
legislation does not imply that Article III courts lacked power to conduct such proceedings.
Rather, it may simply reflect the lack of an existing federal option. Congress did not adopt
its system of lower federal courts and judges until September 1789, and President Washing-
ton made his first appointments to those courts in early 1790, several months after the cus-
toms law took effect. For an account of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see 4 DHSC, supra note 56,
at 22-35.
129. For accounts, see 6 DHSC, supra note 56, at 522-53; and Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of
the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,
1989 DUKE L.J. S61, 613-16.
130. See Convention Between His Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, for
the Purpose of Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Their Respective
Consuls and Vice-Consuls, U.S.-Fr., art. IX, Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. io6, 112; see also 6 DHSC,
supra note 56, at 522, 524-25 (specifying that proof was to be by "an exhibition of the register
of the vessel or ship's roll").
131. See United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 42-43 (1795). (The judge's name is styled
Lawrence in the opinion but is typically spelled Laurance.) The desertion likely had some-
thing to do with the changing politics of the French Revolution. When the famed Citizen
Genet fell from grace in February 1794, he left his position as minister and retired to a farm
in New York rather than return to France to face the guillotine. See William Casto, America's
First Independent Counsel: The Planned Criminal Prosecution of ChiefJustice John Jay, 1 GREEN
BAG (n.s.) 353, 357 (1998).
132. See 6 DHSC, supra note 56, at 523.
133. See Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42. For an account of the French consul's efforts to secure the
support of the executive, see Bloch, supra note 129, at 613-15.
134. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 53.
135. Id.
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volved in the affair questioned the power of either the district court or the Su-
preme Court to proceed on an ex parte basis."36
2. FISA Warrants
Warrant proceedings remain a commonplace feature of federal judicial
practice today. To be sure, much of the workaday review of applications for
search and arrest warrants now falls to federal magistrates rather than to Arti-
cle III judges. 37 But Article III courts continue to assess ex parte warrant appli-
cations in other areas. In the much-discussed context of national security, Arti-
cle III foreign intelligence surveillance courts consider ex parte applications for
warrants authorizing the government to conduct certain kinds of foreign sur-
veillance. 1"8 Created by FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (of-
ten called the FISC) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
employ judges from the Article III judiciary who have been designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States to serve for specified terms. 3 9 As in the case
of warrant proceedings associated with the 1791 excise tax, FISA makes no pro-
vision for notice to the targets of the application and provides them with no
opportunity to contest the showing made in support of the warrant. The gov-
ernment presents its case for surveillance in a closed-door, ex parte proceed-
ing. 4' In the event the FISC rejects the warrant application, FISA permits the
government to appeal on an ex parte basis without joining an adverse party.'4 '
136. Notably, Justice Wilson participated in the case, posing a question about the state of the fac-
tual record below. Id. at 49 n.*. His failure to raise doubts about the ex parte character of the
proceeding may lend a measure of support to the conclusion that such doubts did not un-
derlie his concern with the "judicial nature" of invalid pension claims in Hayburn's Case. See
infra Part III.B.2. Nor did the Court question the Attorney General's authority to seek a writ
on behalf of the French consul's application for the warrant. See Bloch, supra note 129, at
613-17 (contrasting the Court's willingness to entertain the Lawrence mandamus petition
with its refusal to hear Randolph's ex officio application in Hayburn's Case).
137. See Note, A Survey of the Qualifications of Magistrates Authorized To Issue Warrants, 9 VAL. U.
L. REV. 443 (1975); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (assigning the power to issue search war-
rants to magistrate judges, if they are available).
138. See Note, supra note 3, at 2201-03.
139. On the Chief Justice's role in designating members of the FISA courts, see Judith Resnik &
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (20o6), which explores the Chief Justice's
various powers and questions whether they should vest in a single Justice or be shared; and
Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the ChiefJustice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
341 (2004).
140. See Note, supra note 3, at 2206.
141. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2012).
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Both the ex parte proceedings before FISA courts and the ex parte trade-
mark seizure proceedings before federal district courts described in Part I.B.2
have been criticized for failing to satisfy the adverse-party requirement of Arti-
cle III. One prominent early critic of the FISC, Laurence Silberman, later a
judge on the D.C. Circuit, argued to Congress that the secret, non-adversarial
character of its proceedings is inconsistent with Article III's case-or-
controversy requirement. 42 And a district court, ruling before the practice was
codified in 1984, held that ex parte trademark seizure applications suffered
from the same defect. 4 3 As we shall see in Part II, some jurists have relied on
the possibility of post-warrant litigation in arguing that ex parte warrant pro-
ceedings satisfy the adverse-party requirement; depending on the circumstanc-
es, the party seeking the warrant might institute criminal proceedings against
the target or the target might seek civil damages in tort.
3. Administrative Subpoenas
On occasion, federal courts serve as adjuncts to enforce discovery occurring
in non-Article III tribunals or initiated in the course of administrative investi-
gations. The organic statutes of many administrative agencies include provi-
sions authorizing the agencies to invoke the subpoena power of the federal
courts in connection with their efforts to compel the production of evidence
and testimony by regulated parties.' In 1887, Supreme Court Justice Field,
riding circuit, held in In re Pacific Railway Commission that federal courts have
no power to play this adjunct role. 4 For Justice Field, the business of issuing a
subpoena was a distinctly judicial function to be undertaken by the federal
14a. See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearing on H.R. 5794, 9745, 7308, and 5632 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Legis. of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 9 5th Cong. 224
(1978) (statement of Laurence Silberman), http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance
/FISA/197osCongHearings/C_fisaollO78_part-xc.pdf [http://perma.cc/UFG4-5G87].
143. See Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 65-67 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (refusing to grant an
ex parte seizure order in advance of a Styx concert on the basis that there were no adver-
saries before the court). The Rock Tours court noted that in seeking the order for the pur-
poses of impounding the counterfeit materials, the plaintiffs described the prospects for an
eventual trial on the merits as small or non-existent. Id. at 66.
144. According to Robert A. Mikos, "Congress has passed more than 300 administrative subpoe-
na statutes grant[ing] some form of administrative subpoena authority to most federal
agencies." Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U.
PA. L. REv. 103, 117 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). For an
example of such laws, see 29 U.S.C. §5 161(1)-(2) (2012), which confers subpoena power on
the NLRB to compel testimony and the production of documentary evidence and authorizes
the NLRB to seek judicial enforcement in case of a refusal to comply with the subpoena.
145. 32 F. 241, 268 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
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courts only in service of proceedings before the courts themselves. 46 Adminis-
trative and legislative investigations were to be conducted without the aid of
federal courts,' 47 in keeping with Justice Field's belief that the federal courts
were barred from acting as administrative assistants to coordinate depart-
ments.'~ Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected Justice Field's view
and upheld the federal courts' role in issuing and enforcing subpoenas to fur-
ther an agency's investigation. 49
4. Immunized Testimony
When a witness claims her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, she triggers a mechanism that allows the government to grant
her immunity and compel her to testify. 5' Building on an approach first
adopted in 1954 to regulate immunized testimony in the national security are-
na,' Congress in 1970 created a three-step mechanism in which the witness
claims the privilege, the prosecutor or other government attorney procures
from higher-ups in Washington, D.C., a statement as to the importance of the
146. Justice Field thus distinguished the supervision of grand jury proceedings, which often lead
to the issuance of investigative subpoenas, on the basis that those proceedings were an in-
herent part of the process of adjudicating criminal charges against a certain class of offend-
ers and required judicial support and oversight. Id. at 257 n.2.
147. Id. at 257-59. For years, Congress enforced its own subpoenas by arresting those who re-
fused to appear as witnesses. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 205 (188o) (rec-
ognizing that while the legislative body enjoys immunity for the wrongful arrest of a pro-
spective witness, the executive officer of the body or sergeant at arms would face personal li-
liability for wrongful imprisonment).
148. Writing in Pacific Railway, Justice Field collected cases that he regarded as foreclosing judi-
cial administration. See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. at 258-59 (citing the circuit courts' han-
dling of veterans' disability claims in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), and Chief
Justice Taney's conclusion in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52-53 (1851),
that earlier decisions foreclosed the circuit judges from considering such disability claims in
their capacity as commissioners).
149. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894) (upholding the
power of an Article III court to issue a subpoena to enforce the obligation of a regulated rail-
road to comply with an agency's request for information).
1so. For an overview of the law governing immunized witness testimony, see Leonard N. Sos-
nov, Separation of Powers Shell Game: The Federal Witness Immunity Act, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 171
(2000).
i5. See Immunity Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 6oo, 68 Stat. 745. For accounts of the Act, see Robert
G. Dixon, Jr., The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes, 23 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 501 (1955); 0. John Rogge, The New Federal Immunity Act and the Judicial
Function, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 1o9, 127 (1957); and Comment, Immunization of Congressional
Witnesses Under the Compulsory Testimony Act: Constitutionality of the Function of the District
Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 (1955).
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testimony, and the federal district court then enters an order granting the re-
quested immunity."' 2 In many instances, the parties do not disagree: the wit-
ness and the government both prefer that the grant of immunity be extended,
and no one opposes the result."3 Therefore, a number of commentators once
questioned the constitutionality of the judicial role in such proceedings, argu-
ing that the absence of any case or controversy deprived courts of the power to
issue the immunity orders.' 4 In Ullmann v. United States, the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that no case or controversy existed.' 5 Although the decision
triggered a spirited dissent, no Justices questioned the majority's conclusion as
to the power of the federal courts to pass on an uncontested application for the
grant of immunity. ,6
E. Prisoner Litigation
Prisoners often contest the fact or duration of their imprisonment, the con-
ditions in which they have been confined, or, in death penalty cases, the man-
ner in which their execution will be conducted. Both the nature of these chal-
lenges and procedural hurdles enacted by Congress to regulate them frequently
give rise to ex parte proceedings in the federal courts. The familiar petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, for example, displays some non-contentious fea-
tures."' 7 Although the prisoner obviously has an interest adverse to the interest
of the custodian detaining him, petitions for habeas corpus begin in an ex parte
manner, and a court hearing the petition may reject it even before demanding
that the custodian file a return to the writ specifying the cause of confine-
152. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012)). For an overview and criticism of the 1970 law, see
Sosnov, supra note i5o, at 182-205.
153. Dixon emphasizes the fact of party agreement in the immunity cases, noting that the parties
often both agree about the need for the testimony and the wisdom of immunity. Dixon, su-
pra note 151, at 529-30 (describing the court's role as reduced to "ratifying the government's
request for an immunity order").
154. See, e.g., id. at 531-32 (arguing that a judicial immunity order cannot be a "case" under the
Constitution); Rogge, supra note 151, at 127, 132-33 (characterizing the act as imposing a
"nonjudicial function" on the courts in violation of Article III); Comment, supra note 151, at
671 (criticizing the judicial role on separation-of-powers grounds).
155. 350 U.S. 422, 434 (1956).
156. Id. at 44o (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. Habeas corpus, a judicial mode of securing a test of the legality of current detention, is im-
plied in the Constitution's Suspension Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2, and was in-
corporated into the practice of the state and federal courts. See Pfander, supra note 57, at
1443-44 & 1444 n.42. On habeas corpus in Britain, see PAUL D. HALLiDAY, HABEAS CoRVus:
FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010).
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ment., 8 Similarly, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995159 requires the fed-
eral district court to screen a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss any claim that is frivo-
lous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.16o Still
another example is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),161 which provides that a habeas petitioner seeking to appeal from the
district court's denial of habeas relief must first obtain a certificate of appeala-
bility (COA) from a "circuit justice or judge" but does not require the return of
an adverse party.162
Despite the initial absence of an adverse party in all such proceedings, fed-
eral courts are entitled to hear ex parte habeas applications as a prelude to the
determination of the merits.16 3 On appeal, however, matters grow more com-
plex. 64 In Hohn v. United States, the petitioner sought a COA as a prelude to
158. HALLIDAY, supra note 157, at 39-41-
159. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 8oi-81o, io Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996).
16o. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). The screening provision provides, in pertinent part:
"Screening.- The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a) (2o12). Wright and Miller report that the district courts have complied with their
screening obligation, dismissing frivolous petitions without demanding adverse presenta-
tions. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530, at
676-82 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
161. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214. For accounts of the legislation and its impact on federal
post-conviction review, see HART &WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 1157-58.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012).
163. Federal law authorizes prisoners to challenge their detention by filing applications for writs
of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (limiting relief
to state prisoners held in violation of the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States).
164. The complexity first arose in the Civil War-era case Ex panre Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), a challenge to the military trial of an Indiana politician in the waning days of the
Civil War. Milligan had petitioned for habeas review of his military conviction and death
sentence, but the two-judge federal circuit court divided as to whether the claim had any
merit and refused to issue the writ. The circuit court invoked the statute authorizing certifi-
cation of such divided questions to the Supreme Court for decision. Id. at 5-9. Government
counsel opposed the Court's power to hear such a certified question on the ground that the
ex parte proceeding did not become a "cause" to which the certification power applied until
after the writ issued and a return had been made. Id. at lo. The Court rejected that argu-
ment, upholding its jurisdiction and relying on its conclusion in an earlier opinion that a
(similarly ex parte) application for a writ of prohibition, albeit in a state court, was nonethe-
less a "suit" within the meaning of its appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 110-14. In that earlier
opinion, by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court explained that the term "suit" encompasses
"any proceeding in a court of justice, by which an individual pursues that remedy.., which
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pursuing review of his conviction for use of a firearm in violation of federal
law. 6, When the application was denied, he sought review in the Supreme
Court. 6 6 Invoking the habeas cases and other examples, the Court ruled that
his ex parte application for a COA was a "case" in the court of appeals within
the meaning of its statutory grant of certiorari jurisdiction. 1
67
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent, anticipating in certain respects his
dissent in Windsor. Justice Scalia viewed the application for a COA as a thresh-
old proceeding, separate from the dispute on the merits as to the propriety of
habeas relief, and he evaluated its justiciability by seeking elements of adverse-
party litigation:
An application for a COA, standing alone, does not have the requisite
qualities of a legal "case" under any known definition. It does not assert
a grievance against anyone, does not seek remedy or redress for any le-
gal injury, and does not even require a "party" on the other side. It is
nothing more than a request for permission to seek review.
168
For Justice Scalia, the COA did not seek to "remedy" any harm; instead, it op-
erated only as a "threshold procedural requirement that a petitioner must meet
in order to carry his § 2255 suit to the appellate stage. ",16 9 As a result, the appli-
cation for a COA did not constitute a "case" in the court of appeals within the
meaning of the provision for certiorari review.
170
The Court's intriguing response to Justice Scalia distinguished administra-
tive work from judicial work. Citing United States v. Ferreira and Gordon v.
United States, the Court acknowledged that it had previously refused to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of lower courts that it viewed as adminis-
the law affords him." Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. 449, 464 (1829). Sub-
sequent cases continue to confirm that parties may appeal from the judicial denial of ex parte
petitions for relief from detention. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (1942).
165. 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
166. Id. at 24o.
167. See id. at 241, 253. The relevant statute declares that "[c]ases in the courts of appeals" may be
reviewed via certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2o12).
168. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's adoption of this framework is
in some tension with his conclusion in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908 n.2 (1997),
that non-adverse naturalization proceedings were "purely adjudicative" in character and that
the dissent was wrong to contend that such work was non-judicial. See infra Part IV.C.
169. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 256-57.
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trative or legislative, rather than judicial, in character. 171 But petitions for COAs
were different:
Decisions regarding applications for certificates of appealability, in con-
trast, are judicial in nature. It is typical for both parties to enter appear-
ances and to submit briefs at appropriate times and for the court of ap-
peals to enter a judgment and to issue a mandate at the end of the
proceedings, as happened here.
172
The Court evaluated the judicial quality of COA applications in part by identi-
fying characteristics that they share with adverse-party proceedings, such as
the appearance of opposing parties and the submission of adversarial briefing.
Importantly, the Court also focused in part on the extent to which COA appli-
cations call upon the court of appeals to act within the usual forms of judicial
proceedings, such as by entering a judgment and issuing a mandate. 73
F. Public and Private Dispute Resolution
1. Default Judgments
Ex parte proceedings also occur in the context of the judicial resolution of
disputes between adverse parties. In perhaps the most familiar example, federal
courts have the power, based on longstanding practice before courts of law and
171. Id. at 245 (majority opinion) (citing Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702, 704 (1864);
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51-52 (1851)). In both cases, the Court de-
clined to review the determinations of legislative courts on the ground that the Supreme
Court cannot review decisions of special tribunals created by the legislature and dependent
on the legislature for the execution of their determinations.
172. Id.
173. As it did in Hohn, the Court recently found that an ex parte application for review of a dis-
trict court order remanding a class action to state court qualified as a "case" in the Tenth
Circuit for purposes of triggering the availability of its certiorari jurisdiction. See Dart Cher-
okee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (2o14) (application to appellate
court for discretionary review was a case within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction). Justice
Thomas dissented, arguing that such an ex parte application was inconsistent with the ad-
verse-party rule: "It does not assert a grievance against anyone, does not seek remedy or re-
dress for any legal injury, and does not even require a 'party' on the other side." Id. at 562
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the majority did not
respond to Justice Thomas's assertion, we regard the construct of non-contentious jurisdic-
tion offered in this article as affording a complete answer: Federal question "cases" do not
require adverse parties so long as the application for relief under federal law calls for the ex-
ercise of judicial judgment. See infra Part II.B (discussing the conclusion in Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926), that ex parte naturalization petitions were cases within the judi-
cial power).
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equity, to enter default judgments on an ex parte basis if satisfied that the de-
fendant has been duly served with process and that the plaintiff has a prima fa-
cie right to recover."74 This practice has been codified in Rule 55 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."'5 Rule 55 imposes some procedural safeguards, re-
quires the district court to exercise broad inquisitorial powers to investigate the
facts that bear on the proposed judgment,176 and prohibits the court from en-
tering the judgment unless the claim has been established through the submis-
sion of "evidence that satisfies the court."1" But the rule does not condition the
court's power to issue a judgment on party opposition.
174. Rule 55 was first adopted as a blend of default procedures then available in actions in law
and equity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee's note (1937). In proceedings at com-
mon law, failure to respond resulted in the entry of a default judgment; courts of equity en-
tered what were called decrees pro confesso. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885)
(describing the origin and evolution of the decree pro confesso and likening it to the common
law practice of default); ioA WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o, 5 2681, at 7. In both in-
stances, traditional practice called for the court to investigate the amount of damages if the
figure was not liquidated. Id. at 400. Today, as the text of the Rule confirms, a court may
conduct a hearing to determine whether to enter a default judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P.
55(c). As a leading treatise explains, "The hearing is not considered a trial, but is in the na-
ture of an inquiry before the judge." ioA WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o § 2688, at 58.
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
176. Rule 5S(b)(2) provides as follows:
The court may conduct hearings or make referrals -preserving any federal statu-
tory right to a jury trial -when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:
(A) conduct an accounting;
(B) determine the amount of damages;
(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
(D) investigate any other matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In cases of default at common law, the court would issue a writ of
inquiry to convene a special jury to fix the amount of damages. See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY
JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 45-79 (2006); cf.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452-53 (1793) (noting the availability in cases of
default of a "writ of enquiry" into damages).
17. FED. R. CIv. P. 55(d); see also ioA WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o, S 2702, at 184 (reading
Rule 5S to preclude procedural defaults and to require "in all cases" that the claims must be
proven on a prima facie basis). Courts sometimes refer to the assessment of damages in a
default case as an "inquisition of damages" to capture this investigative role. See Proceedings
of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 66
F.R.D. 233, 3o6 (1974) (recounting the magistrate's role in conducting "damage inquisition
hearings" in cases of default); Paul H. Aloe, Civil Practice, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 717, 730-31
(2OO) (noting the use of an "inquest to determine damages" following entry of default); see
also Thomson, 114 U.S. at 113 (explaining that "a decree pro confesso is not a decree as of
course according to the prayer of the bill, nor merely such as the complainant chooses to
take it; but that it is made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is proper to
be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true").
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2. Uncontested Equity Receiverships
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, with no federal bankruptcy law
in place until 1898, railroads and their creditors often turned to the equity re-
ceivership to restructure their affairs. 17s In theory, the receivership was de-
signed to protect the interests of creditors who could not otherwise enforce and
collect their debts.1 79 In practice, the railroads themselves often welcomed the
initiation of a receivership to secure the stay of litigation triggered by such a
proceeding and to secure an orderly administration and restructuring of their
debts. s
°
In one such proceeding, intervening parties contested the power of the fed-
eral court to entertain "friendly" receiverships'8S The Supreme Court found no
violation of the adverse-party requirement and upheld the friendly receiver-
ship, because the party initiating the receivership had an unsatisfied demand
against the railroad that was neither denied nor paid. 82 That failure to pay, the
Court held, was sufficient to ground the federal trial court's jurisdiction.8,
178. See Julie A. Veach, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy: Looking to the Railroads for
Answers, 72 IND. L.J. 1211, 1215 (1997). On the connection between bankruptcy and the stay
of proceedings in connection with the initiation of an equitable receivership, see Ralph Bru-
baker, An Administrative Expense Odyssey, 29 BANKR. L. LETTER, June 2009, at 6, which ex-
plains that "[a] federal bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction and its injunctive powers go
hand-in-hand" and that, "as a historical matter, the very concept of an automatic stay of an-
cillary proceedings was founded upon general principles of exclusive in rem jurisdiction."
See also In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 181 (1893) (recognizing the role of the federal receivership
court in controlling the degree to which other courts may entertain claims upon property in
the custody of the court); People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 261-62 (188o) (same).
For an argument that such stays complied with the requirements of the federal Anti-
Injunction Act, see James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the
Problem of Federal-State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1 (2013), which argues that
federal law blocked only original applications to stay state court proceedings and left federal
courts free to grant ancillary injunctive relief in receivership and other equitable proceedings
where they first obtained jurisdiction over the dispute and the property at stake.
179. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REy. 921, 930 (2001).
i8o. See Veach, supra note 178, at 1215-16.
181. As the Court explained, "[I]t is insisted now that there was no dispute or controversy in that
case within the meaning of the [diversity] statute, because the defendant admitted the in-
debtedness and the other allegations of the bill of complaint, and consented to and united in
the application for the appointment of receivers." In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S.
90, 107 (19o8).
182. Id.
183. Id. at io8; see also Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) ("When a plaintiff brings suit
to enforce a legal obligation it is not any the less a case or controversy upon which a court
possessing the federal judicial power may rightly give judgment, because the plaintiffs
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3. Consent Decrees
The Supreme Court also has found that the lower federal courts have the
power to enter consent decrees. s4 Typically, consent decrees represent the ne-
gotiated resolution of a dispute between adverse parties. Unlike purely private
settlements, however, the parties to a consent decree condition their agreement
on the willingness of the district court to enter the decree as part of their set-
tlement. The decree operates like an injunction. It specifies what the defendant
can and cannot do, and it often provides the district court with continuing au-
thority to oversee compliance with its terms, punishing or threatening with
contempt those who fail to comply with the decree. 5 Although scholars have
questioned the propriety of consent decrees under Article III, reasoning that
the parties' agreement as to the scope of relief lacks necessary adverseness,'5 6
the Court's sanctioning of consent decrees remains undisturbed.'
4. Guilty Pleas
Government enforcement proceedings often involve federal courts in the
approval of a pre-negotiated settlement between the government and the en-
forcement target. Consent decrees are one example of such involvement. Plea
agreements, which arose some 150 years ago as a capitulation to the demands
placed on criminal dockets by mass society, are another. s88 Critics identify
claim is uncontested or incontestable."); Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289 (1879) (ap-
proving the defendant's confession of judgment and the entry of judgment on the basis of
stipulated facts).
184. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
185. See Morley, supra note 18, at 647-52.
186. See id. (expressing doubt as to the justiciability of all consent decrees, whether negotiated in
advance of the filing of the lawsuit or after the litigation begins); Redish & Kastanek, supra
note 16, at 569-70 & n.ioo (accepting consent decrees that terminate litigation that was
properly adversarial when initiated, but treating the Court's approval of pre-negotiated de-
crees in Swift & Co. as "aberration[al]").
187. See Morley, supra note 18, at 666-67 (describing Supreme Court precedent upholding con-
sent decrees but questioning the scope of these holdings).
188. On the history of plea bargaining, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A His-
TORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003), which describes instances of plea bargaining
in nineteenth-century Massachusetts); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
13 L. & Soc'Y REV. 211 (1979), which argues that pleas became the primary method of dis-
posing of criminal cases after the Civil War; and George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph,
1O9 YALE L.J. 857, 859-61 (2000).
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flaws with the plea-bargaining system, 8 9 but most doubt that the criminal jus-
tice system can function in its absence.19 ° Plea bargaining represents, in the
words of federal judge Gerard Lynch, an "informal, administrative, inquisitori-
al process of adjudication."'191 In the typical case, the prosecutor and the de-
fendant have agreed in advance on the sentence or its parameters in exchange
for the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to a particular offense. 92 Need-
less to say, most guilty pleas do not occasion any adversary presentation to the
court; both the prosecutor and the defense seek substantially the same disposi-
tion. But the agreement alone does not suffice to ensure the effectiveness of the
plea bargain; the court must go along.' 93 Thus, the agreement will not be effec-
tive unless the district court first conducts a colloquy with the defendant to en-
sure that the plea and associated waiver of constitutional rights were knowing
and voluntary, enters a judgment of conviction on the basis of the plea, and
agrees to impose a sentence consistent with the plea agreement and the sen-
tencing guidelines.194
5. Crime Victims' Rights
Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, victims of federal crimes are afforded
certain rights during criminal proceedings and may assert or enforce those
rights through non-contentious proceedings. 95 The statute declares that a
crime victim or his representative may assert his rights by motion to the district
court and further provides that, upon the denial of such motion, the victim
189. Indeed, the Court has expressed a growing willingness to police the fairness of plea bargain-
ing by insisting on effective assistance of counsel at that stage of the process. See, e.g., Mis-
souri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
19o. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2010) (noting that plea bargaining accounts
for some ninety-five percent of the criminal matters closed in the courts of the United
States).
191. Lynch, supra note 25, at 1404; see also Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2118 (1998) (arguing that, because of plea bargaining, "the
American system as it actually operates in most cases looks much more like what common
lawyers would describe as a non-adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the
adversarial model they idealize").
192. For a summary of the process of accepting a guilty plea and imposing sentence, see 5 LAFAvE
ETAL., supra note 122, §§ 21.3(e)-21.4, at 145-92.
193. See id. § 21.3(e), at 145 (emphasizing that the judge must evaluate the plea bargain but does
not have to accept its terms).
194. See id. § 21.4(a)-(e), 21.4(g).
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2012) (conferring such rights as those to be notified of court pro-
ceedings, to be heard at public proceedings, to be treated with dignity and respect, and to
confer with the government's attorney).
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may petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals."96 The statute
does not call for the person claiming to be a victim to name an opposing party
in the motion, and although the victim's status or the extent of the rights to
which he is entitled might be contested by a target of the criminal proceedings
or even the government, 197 the statute does not predicate the judicial role on
the existence of a controversy.
6. Class-Action Settlements
Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court
must oversee and approve the terms of the settlement of any certified class ac-
tion.'9' Settlement approval protocols have grown increasingly elaborate, as
courts have come to recognize the threat that an inadequate settlement can
pose to the interests of absentees.' 99 In addition to the judicial role in approv-
ing the settlement of certified class actions, courts sometimes agree to entertain
what have come to be known as "settlement class actions," disputes that were
resolved by party agreement before any litigation had been instigated."°° When
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 37 7 1(d) (2012).
197. See Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims' Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 260-62
(2008).
198. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
199. Following certification and the associated finding that members of the class will be ade-
quately represented by the named plaintiff and class counsel, counsel has presumptive au-
thority to settle the case for the class as a whole. Scholars have raised important doubts as to
just how adequate in fact this representation often proves to be. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak,
Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. AmChem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv.
1045 (1995). These doubts have spawned a variety of proposals, including proposals for an
invigorated protection of the due process rights of individual litigants, see Martin H. Redish,
Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1573 (2007); for the encouragement of opt-out guarantees, see Alan Morrison & Brian
Wolfman, What the Shutts Opt-Out Right Is and What It Ought To Be, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV.
729 (2006); and for the imposition of limits on the preclusive effect of class settlements on
absentees, see Henry P. Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonres-
ident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148 (1998). In 2003, the Rules were amended to
require the district court to hold a hearing and approve the settlement only if the court is
satisfied that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e) ()(C). For an overview of the 2003 amendments to the Rules, see 7A WRIGHT & MIL-
LER, supra note 16o, § 1753.1, at 52-54. Some additional protections were added, at least in
connection with inter-state class actions based on state law, in the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005. See 28 U.S.C. § 1718 (2012). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fair-
ness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (2008)
(providing an overview of the Class Action Fairness Act).
2oo. See 7B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o, 5 1797.2, at 149-59 (describing settlement class
action practice).
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the parties agree, they may simultaneously file a complaint and a proposed set-
tlement, inviting the court to approve a resolution of the claims on terms upon
which they have previously agreed.2"1 Such settlement class actions pose well-
known threats of collusion and self-dealing, frequently advancing "only the in-
terests of plaintiffs' attorneys, not those of the class members."
20 2
Apart from the threat to the due process rights of individual litigants, such
settlement class actions have been described as violating Article III's adverse-
party requirement. 3 Redish and Kastanek draw a sharp line between pre-
certification agreements in such settlement class actions and more "traditional"
post-certification settlements . 4 They defend the judicial role in post-
certification settlements on the ground that the federal courts enjoy ancillary
power to dispose of a whole case following a settlement that renders the claims
in the case non-justiciable."5 However, they condemn settlement class actions
because the parties commence proceedings only to seek judicial approval of a
pre-arranged agreement and therefore have no adverse interests giving rise to a
justiciable controversy.6
7. Letters Rogatoty
Federal courts often play an ex parte role when parties to a foreign proceed-
ing seek discovery of facts in the United States. Under longstanding interna-
tional practice, parties to litigation in one country can apply through diplomat-
ic channels for "letters rogatory" ordering the collection of evidence in another
country.° 7 Today, many such evidentiary requests are handled through the
201. Although the Court refused to approve the pre-packaged settlement of asbestos claims in the
well-known case of AmChem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), it also refrained
from articulating a per se prohibition of settlement classes in that case.
2oz. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1343, 1348 (1995).
203. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 547, 563, 588-89, 614-15.
204. Id. at 590.
205. Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)). We em-
ploy an adaptation of this conception of ancillary power in explaining certain forms of non-
contentious jurisdiction in Part IV.
206. Id. at 590.
207. Letters rogatory, or letters of request, have deep roots in civil-law practice. For an overview
of historic practice with respect to letters rogatory, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION io6-18 (3d ed. 20o6), which describes the process by
which a request was forwarded through diplomatic channels to the ministry of justice for ul-
timate execution in the courts of the country where the evidence was located. See also Harry
Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 515 (1953) (offering a critical overview of the procedure that governed in the Unit-
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Hague Evidence Convention, which the United States joined as an original
signatory. 8 The Convention directs such requests to a country's designated
"Central Authority" for submission to the proper court.' ° 9 The application to a
court of the United States for letters rogatory typically proceeds on an ex parte
basis and may or may not lead to litigation, depending on the target's response
to the discovery request."' If the district court agrees with the evidentiary re-
quest, it will typically appoint a commissioner to take the deposition or collect
the evidence." While the target's opposition to the discovery in any particular
case can certainly create a measure of adverseness, many ex parte applications
for letters rogatory proceed without any contest."
II. SCHOLARLY REACTIONS TO EX PARTE AND NON-CONTENTIOUS
PROCEEDINGS
Existing scholarship on the adverse-party requirement has yet to confront
the widespread appearance of ex parte and non-contentious proceedings on the
dockets of the federal courts. Nor has it come to grips with the consistent line
ed States before 28 U.S.C. S 1782, the statutory provision that governs federal practice, was
updated in 1964); Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COL-
uM. L. REv. 1015, 1026-35 (1965) (describing the updated 28 U.S.C. § 1782). For an account
of current practice, see Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. 51782for Foreign and In-
ternational Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1990).
2o8. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Mar. i-July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231; cf. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987) (holding that the Hague Evidence
Convention does not provide an exclusive means of discovery, thereby leaving open the pos-
sibility that courts in the United States can compel discovery by a foreign party over which
they have obtained personal jurisdiction). See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 207, at io18
(describing practice under the Hague Convention); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Discov-
ery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239
(1986) (same).
2o9. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra
note 208, at art. II.
21o. Consider the description of the process in one apparently representative case. A criminal in-
vestigation in London of corporate misconduct had targeted an individual living in the
United States. Scotland Yard initiated a request for letters rogatory, which worked its way
through diplomatic channels to the Department of Justice. There, an attorney applied to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia on an ex parte basis for an order
authorizing discovery from a witness. The district court's order, in turn, named a Justice
Department attorney as commissioner to take the evidence. The target objected, moving to
quash the application on various statutory grounds. See In re Letter of Request from the
Crown Prosecution Serv., 87o F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2012); Stahr, supra note 207, at 627.
212. See Stahr, supra note 207, at 627-30.
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of Supreme Court decisions upholding such assignments. Of those few com-
mentators who have encountered an instance of non-contentious practice and
have identified a potential justiciability problem with the practice, some simply
have denied the legitimacy of the exception, viewing it as a violation of the ad-
verse-party or case-or-controversy requirements;' 3 others have dismissed the
practice as an isolated departure or one that lies beyond the scope of their spe-
cific project."' We consider arguments against the legitimacy of non-
contentious proceedings in later sections of this Article. In this Part, we critical-
ly evaluate prior attempts to fit these proceedings within the judicial power as
it currently is understood.
A. Isolated Departures and Historical Aberrations
Scholarly treatment of ex parte proceedings often tends to occur in the con-
text of an encounter with a single non-contentious practice-for example,
bankruptcy or naturalization proceedings."' Perhaps as a result, a common re-
sponse has been to treat the encounter as an isolated and insignificant depar-
ture from the courts' otherwise broad-based commitment to adverse-party
proceedings."' Apart from the fact that such an approach is unsatisfying from
a doctrinal perspective, the rather lengthy catalog of ex parte matters in Part I
makes the argument from isolated aberration difficult to sustain. These matters
are neither isolated nor considered aberrations in the unbroken line of cases
upholding them. The denial practiced by scholars does little to explain the ex-
istence of non-contentious proceedings.
Another common response to encounters with non-contentious proceed-
ings has been to treat the specific practice as a vestige of an earlier day- a ves-
tige obviously inconsistent with the adverse-party rule but perhaps too well es-
tablished to overthrow. 7 One could argue, for instance, that the federal courts'
role in naturalization proceedings dates from early in the nation's history and
depends for its constitutionality on its pedigree rather than on its compliance
213. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 17, at 212-13 (characterizing mitigation as putting judges in the
position of issuing advisory opinions).
214. See, e.g., Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. REV. 1217, 1225
(2013) (listing matters that seem inconsistent with the adversary ideal but ultimately con-
cluding that the task of deciding if those matters can be squared with the adverse-party re-
quirement was "beyond the scope of the article").
215. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 18 (bankruptcy); Morley, supra note 18, at 668-69 (naturaliza-
tion).
z6. See, e.g., Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 587 n.157 (arguing that "the bankruptcy
scheme is a narrow exception to the adverseness requirement").
217. See, e.g., HART&WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 84-85.
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with the demands of Article 111 8 The instinct that underlies this strategy may
be sound: an early practice, consistently followed, can claim respect as liquidat-
ing or fixing the meaning of Article III. For example, the Court cited historical
pedigree in upholding qui tam relator actions, despite the fact that a relator
prosecuting the claim on the government's behalf was said to lack standing in
his own right.' 9
With respect to non-contentious proceedings, however, the practices
"grandfathered" occupy such a broad swath of judicial business that they raise
a fundamental question about the soundness of the adverse-party requirement.
If the Constitution really does embody such a requirement, then why were the
Framers and others in the early Republic apparently so untroubled by the
widespread exercise of jurisdiction in non-contentious matters in their federal
courts, and why did the First Congress assign, apparently without concern,
such matters to the courts' dockets? Also, how can grandfathering explain the
consistent appearance of non-contentious business on federal court dockets in
new manifestations today, such as the relatively recent creation of the FISA
court and the provision for trademark seizure proceedings? Resolving these
questions requires more than indulgence; it requires a coherent, possibly sepa-
rate, classification for non-contentious proceedings and perhaps a fundamental
rethinking of prevailing views of federal judicial power.
B. Tutun v. United States and the Possible Adversary Theory
Some scholars attempt to explain non-contentious proceedings by drawing
on what has come to be known as the "possible adversary" theory supposedly
outlined in Tutun v. United States.20 Under the possible adversary theory, the
prospect of eventual adverse-party litigation in the future can justify the exer-
cise of jurisdiction without an adverse party in the present."1 In Tutun, two cir-
218. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 458 n.3o9 (1996) (describing Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568
(1926), as a case in which Justice "Brandeis deferred to longstanding precedent that conflict-
ed with the modern idea that Article III courts can act only if presented with an adversarial
dispute").
219. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
220. 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
221. For example, Russell Wheeler has suggested that while naturalization proceedings were not
proper cases or controversies in the early Republic, the addition of the United States as a
possible "adverse party" in 19o6 (something that "did not exist in the earlier acts") gave
proceedings the adversarial quality necessary to bring them within the ambit of Article III.
Wheeler, supra note 17, at 134 & n.61. See also Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
236-37 (1912) (describing the Naturalization Act of 19o6 and explaining that no provision
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cuit courts certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether they could
exercise jurisdiction over appeals of district court denials of naturalization peti-
tions." 2 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, held that naturalization pro-
ceedings are proper exercises of the judicial power despite the lack of concrete
adverseness until (and unless) naturalization is denied and the question goes
up on appeal. In a stray statement from the decision, Justice Brandeis hypothe-
sized that one ground for upholding such proceedings was that the federal
government remained a potentially adverse party that might intervene to con-
test the petition if it so chose."
One finds the idea of a possible adversary expressed in a variety of contexts,
as scholars have deployed this theory to address a surprisingly wide range of
justiciability problems.' Some scholars have invoked the possible adversary
theory to explain the many uncontested matters that find their way onto the
dockets of the bankruptcy courts." Others have invoked it to explain the will-
ingness of federal courts to entertain ex parte warrant applications, arguing
that the warrant issues in the shadow of a criminal investigation that may lead
to criminal charges in which the target of the warrant can presumably test its
legality." 6 Running with this notion, some scholars have explored the rele-
vance of the possible adversary theory to ex parte FISA warrant practice. 
7
(FISA warrants rarely lead to criminal proceedings, however, making "razor
for government participation in the proceeding had been part of the law "as it formerly
stood").
222. 270 U.S. at 580.
223. Id. at 577.
224. For scholars who treat the possible adversary theory as central to Tutun, see David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1921-1930, 1986 DuKE L.J. 65, 122 (treating the possi-
ble adversary theory as central to Tutun and criticizing the conclusion that it was sufficient
for Article III purposes to show that the government "might" oppose the petition); and
Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 527, 542 (suggesting that Tutun upheld naturalization proceedings as cases or contro-
versies after finding that the government was available as a possible adverse party).
225. See Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and the "Related to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case Study
in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1, 39-4o n.145 (1987) (analogizing bank-
ruptcy to the possible adversary theory of Tutun). For a critique of Galligan's approach, see
Avery, supra note 18, at 417-18 n.137.
226. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 587 n.157.
227. For a standard dismissal of Article III concerns with the ex parte proceedings in FISA courts,
see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-Chief at the Lowest Ebb -A
Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L. REv. 941, 11o6 n.663 (20o8) (reasoning that the FISC "is
adjudicating a proceeding in which the target of the surveillance is the party adverse to the
government" and collecting authorities upholding the power of Article III FISA courts to
entertain ex parte applications for warrants to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance).
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thin" the fiction that their issuance may result in an adversary proceeding.) 8
Others suggest that Congress should address the absence of any possible ad-
versary by authorizing an after-the-fact suit for damages in which targets of
certain FISA warrants could contest their legality. 9 Indeed, a similar justifica-
tion for the exercise of jurisdiction could be offered in prize cases heard in ad-
miralty; the seized ship's owner, captain, or crew could potentially (and some-
times did) appear to contest condemnation of the prize.23 One might also use
the possible adversary theory to explain federal court jurisdiction over remis-
sion petitions, trademark seizure orders, and the issuance of administrative
subpoenas, among others.23'
The possible adversary theory has some appeal in that it offers a means of
reconciling the adverse-party requirement with the reality of non-contentious
practice, but it cannot bear the weight that scholars have placed upon it. To
begin with, whatever the theory's appeal in the isolated context of certain ex
parte proceedings, it is difficult to square with other elements of justiciability
doctrine. Under bedrock justiciability principles, only ripe disputes between
concretely interested parties can invoke the machinery of the federal judiciary.
Indeed, in one of the Court's more recent standing decisions, Clapper v. Amnes-
ty International USA, the Court reiterated that "threatened injury must be cer-
tainly impending to constitute injury in fact" and that "[a]llegations of possible
future injury" will not suffice.23 Ripeness decisions point in the same direc-
tion, rejecting the idea that the possibility of a future disagreement can provide
a sufficient basis for the invocation of the judicial power. 3 3 If these proclama-
228. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting
Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1165, 1224 n.187 (2013) (quoting Drones and
the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 31 (2013) (written statement of Robert
Chesney, Professor, Univ. of Tex. Law Sch.), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings
/printers/113th/u13-2.7 9 585.pdf [http://perma.cc/MYC3-FRNT]) (observing that the possi-
bility that a FISC warrant will ultimately be contested in an adversarial hearing is little more
than a "razor-thin legal fiction"). For background on FISA warrant applications, see Note,
supra note 3, at 2202-04.
229. Daskal, supra note 228, at 1224 n.187 (suggesting that "[t]o the extent that this fiction [the
possibility of future adversary proceedings] is deemed key, it could be dealt with by creating
an after-the-fact damages remedy and allowing litigants to contest the initial authorization
during that process").
23o. See supra Part I.B. 1.
231. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2, I.D.3.
232. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
233. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (requiring a suffi-
ciently immediate injury for there to be an actual controversy compelling immediate relief);
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tions hold, then hypothetical future adverseness cannot solve an actual justicia-
bility problem in a pending case any more than the prospect of hypothetical fu-
ture injury can confer standing and ripeness in a case where they are lacking. 4
This is particularly true where the possibility of future appearance by an ad-
verse party is, as in FISA proceedings, little more than speculative.23
Moreover, the prospect of a future adverse party does little to assuage the
concerns that underlie the adverse-party requirement. Hypothetical adverse-
ness does not improve the quality of the record presented to the court, and it
does not allow for a balanced presentation of factual or legal propositions; nor
does it prevent a court from deciding issues that could compromise the rights
of third parties or from interfering with the prerogatives of the political
branches of the government.23 6 And where an adverse party does not appear (a
frequent outcome, as we have seen),237 these problems will persist. It thus is
difficult to perceive how the hypothecation of a possible future adversary can
offer a plausible justification for non-contentious federal court proceedings.
Apart from questioning the coherence of the possible adversary theory, we
have serious doubts that Tutun actually endorsed such a theory. In hearing Tu-
tun, the Court resolved a division in the lower courts as to whether a district
court order adjudicating a petition of naturalization was subject to appellate re-
view.238 The relevant statute empowered the federal appellate courts to hear
F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, io6 Nw. U. L. REv. 55 (2012) (arguing that proba-
bilistic injuries should be regarded as satisfying the standing requirement).
234. An intriguing opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), rendered in connection with
the 1978 adoption of a FISA warrant process, points to the same conclusion. See Memoran-
dum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Hon. Edward
P. Boland, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Apr. 18, 1978), in
Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and
H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th
Cong. 26-31 (1978) (arguing that the prospect of adversity cannot supply the sort of live dis-
pute that justiciability doctrine requires). The OLC nonetheless concluded that FISA war-
rants were proper subjects for judicial cognizance by analogy to warrants issued in other set-
tings, arguing that the "adversity in fact" between the government and the surveillance
target sufficed to make the case justiciable. Id. at 28.
235. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
236. Cf. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 571-73 (describing the virtues of an adversary sys-
tem).
237. See, e.g., supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text (discussing the frequent non-appearance
of adverse parties in prize, salvage, and trademark seizure proceedings).
238. Tutun arose on appeal from a district court decision refusing to grant an application for nat-
uralized citizenship. The government took the position that naturalization proceedings were
not "cases" within the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction over "final decisions" in "all
cases" in the district court. See Brief of the United States at 9, Tutun v. United States, 270
U.S. 568 (1926) (No. 762); id. at 16-17 (acknowledging that naturalization proceedings were
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appeals from final decisions in "all cases." 9 Rather than limit its analysis to
the narrow question of the proper interpretation of that phrase, Justice Brande-
is's opinion tackled the more fundamental issue of Article III authority.240 In
doing so, Justice Brandeis adverted to the fact that the congressional practice of
assigning naturalization proceedings to the federal courts had begun in the
1790s and had never been questioned. 4 What's more, Justice Brandeis noted,
"[i]f the proceeding were not a case or controversy within the meaning of
Art[icle] III, § 2, this delegation of power upon the courts would have been in-
valid."42 The accompanying citation of authority suggests that Justice Brandeis
saw no problem with the practice in question under the finality requirement of
Hayburn's Case or under the non-advisory rule stated in The Correspondence of
the Justices243 and applied in Muskrat v. United States.'" Indeed, he recited two
possible obstacles to finality -the prospect of a second petition following the
denial of the first and the prospect of a suit by the government to cancel a cer-
"cases" within "the legitimate scope of the judicial power," but arguing that they were not
"cases" within the meaning of the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction). It was this con-
tention that Justice Brandeis rejected, see Tutun, 270 U.S. at 578-79, although he spent much
of his opinion discussing in more general terms the nature of Congress's power to assign
naturalization proceedings to the federal courts. See id. at 576-78. The government specifi-
cally distinguished between the inquisitorial mode of naturalization and the adversarial
mode of actions to cancel a naturalization certificate, arguing that only the latter were cases
within the appellate jurisdiction. As the government's brief explained, in many naturaliza-
tion proceedings, no appearance is entered to oppose the petition and the court must make
its own assessment of such factors as "demeanor, frankness, and intelligence." Brief of the
United States, supra, at 17. The government distinguished such non-contentious matters
from actions to cancel a certificate of naturalization, which it viewed as "cases" in every sense
of the word. In an unconscious echo of Justice Story's discussion of prize litigation, see infra
note 248, the government explained that hearings on "petitions for naturalization, on the
other hand, follow a procedure which is altogether different." Brief of the United States, su-
pra, at 25. In rejecting the government's view, in short, the Court squarely rejected the ar-
gument that cases required an adverse party.
239. Tutun, 270 U.S. at 579.
24o. Thus, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the statutory definition of a case for purposes of
appellate review might well be narrower than its meaning in other contexts. Id. at 579. But
reading the encompassing reference to "all cases" in context, Justice Brandeis found no in-
tention on Congress's part to limit appellate review of matters that were "cases" in the con-
stitutional sense at the district court level. See id.
241. Id. at 576.
242. Id.
243. Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 6
DHSC, supra note 56, at 755.
24. See Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), and Hay-
burn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
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tificate of citizenship -but concluded that an order granting or denying a peti-
tion for naturalization is "clearly a final decision.""
Next, Justice Brandeis considered arguments that the practice of naturaliza-
tion was essentially an administrative action and thus unfit for judicial cogni-
zance. In evaluating the nature of the proceeding, Justice Brandeis explained
that citizenship under the naturalization law was no mere privilege:
The applicant for citizenship, like other suitors who institute proceed-
ings in a court of justice to secure the determination of an asserted
right, must allege in his petition the fulfillment of all conditions upon
the existence of which the alleged right is made dependent; and he
must establish these allegations by competent evidence to the satisfac-
tion of the court. In passing upon the application the court exercises ju-
dicial judgment. It does not confer or withhold a favor.4
6
For Justice Brandeis, then, the key to the case-like quality of the proceeding lay
in the asserted claim of right and the exercise of judicial judgment in determin-
ing if the requisite showing had been made -a formulation that, we later will
see, has important implications for understanding other instances of non-
contentious practice. 47 Instead of discussing the need for adversary presenta-
245. See id. The Hart & Wechsler casebook acknowledges the threat to finality posed by proceed-
ings to re-open a naturalization order, but it distinguishes the kind of executive branch revi-
sion rejected in Hayburn's Case from motions to re-open that the parties address to the
courts themselves. See HART & WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 85-94. Read in this context,
Justice Brandeis's reference to Hayburn's Case likely means little more than that the early
Court called attention to constitutional finality problems when they appeared and had not
done so in connection with naturalization. Cf. Marcus & Teir, supra note 224, at 542 (reading
Justice Brandeis as invoking a case-or-controversy interpretation of Hayburn's Case). Schol-
ars have contrasted the early Court's negative reaction to pension claims with its apparent
indifference to naturalization proceedings. See, e.g., David Currie, The Constitution in the Su-
preme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 822-23 (1981) (arguing that, while the ab-
sence of a defendant may have been a factor in Hayburn's Case, the naturalization example,
as confirmed in Tutun, points in the opposite direction).
246. Tutun, 270 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted).
247. Although the federal government's administrative infrastructure was not as well-developed
as it is today, Congress still had administrative structures other than the courts available: it
could assign administration of naturalization petitions to the marshals (as it assigned re-
sponsibility for administering the census in the Census Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. iol) or to the
clerks of the district courts (as it did for registering copyrights in the Copyright Act of
1790). Its choice of personnel may have reflected its considered view of the nature of the
judgment required. In the Copyright Act, which was adopted by the same Congress that en-
acted the Naturalization Act of 1790, Congress directed parties seeking a copyright to lodge
copies of the work with the "clerk" of the district court (rather than with the judge of the
court or the court itself). See Copyright Act of 1790, § 3, 1 Stat. 125. The Act stated in per-
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tion of issues, Justice Brandeis emphasized the obligations of the court: to con-
duct open proceedings, to examine the petitioner and witnesses under oath,
and to enter a judgment. Plainly, then, he expected the court to perform the
searching inquiry that we associate with inquisitorial proceedings." 48
Justice Brandeis reasoned that Congress has broad discretion in structuring
the assertion of administrative claims against the United States. According to
the Justice, the United States may "create rights in individuals against itself
and provide only an administrative remedy." 49 Or it may provide a legal (that
is, judicial) remedy, but require that individuals first exhaust administrative
remedies. s° Or it may create both administrative and legal remedies and give
the individual a choice of which to pursue.2s' Or it may "provide only a reme-
dy" in federal court."' Justice Brandeis held that when Congress chooses the
last of these paths by creating a regular mode of procedure, and when the indi-
vidual invokes the established procedure in pursuit of a claim of right, "there
arises a case within the meaning of the Constitution."5 3 A petition for naturali-
zation, Justice Brandeis concluded, "is clearly a proceeding of that character."2 54
It seems odd that the animating feature of Justice Brandeis's opinion-that
when Congress so provides, ex parte administrative claims qualify as cases
within the meaning of Article III - has largely disappeared from view. That
disappearance is all the more startling when one considers that Justice Brandeis
was among the leading architects of the Court's justiciability doctrines and had
emptory terms that the "clerk of such court is hereby directed and required to record the
same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose." Id.
248. In this, Justice Brandeis also echoed Justice Story, but reached a different conclusion than
did the government. Justice Story understood that the procedures used in prize litigation
were "modelled upon the civil law" and could not be "more unlike than those in the Courts
of common law." See Arlyck, supra note 87, at 265 n.81 (quoting Justice Story's opinion in
The Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815)). Accordingly, Justice Story explained that it
was simply not necessary "that the adverse parties should be before the court" in a prize pro-
ceeding. Arlyck, supra note 87, at 265 (quoting Justice Story's notes on practice in prize cas-
es). Party adverseness was unnecessary because the court itself acted as the "general guardi-
an of all interests which are brought to its notice." Id. (quoting Justice Story's account of
prize procedure); see also id. at 265 n.81 (quoting Justice Story's opinion in The Adeline, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) at 284). One can scarcely find a clearer articulation of the inquisitorial role
of a federal court in hearing uncontested matters in the exercise of its non-contentious juris-
diction.
249. Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576.
250. Id. at 576-77.
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insisted in other contexts on the importance of adverse parties." s One might
suppose that Justice Brandeis's reputation as an adverse-party hawk would
lend greater authority to his acceptance in Tutun of ex parte proceedings. But
this has not been the case. Instead, scholars have tended to pigeonhole Tutun
as a decision that stands for a proposition less sweeping and potentially unset-
tling than the one Brandeis articulated. As we have noted, some point to the
fact that Justice Brandeis also invoked the lessons of history, adverting to the
longstanding practice of naturalizing citizens as one that had never been ques-
tioned. s6 And many, as we have seen, treat Tutun as a potential adversary case.
But that reading is not persuasive. Although the potential adversary lan-
guage had appeared earlier in Muskrat, Justice Brandeis did not suggest that
Muskrat controlled, and he did not suggest that his characterization of naturali-
zation proceedings as "cases" turned on the possibility that an opponent might
appear. Nor did he explain how much potential adverseness was enough or in-
dicate that the actual appearance of the United States was necessary to bring
the matter within the judicial power."s7 Justice Brandeis also did not contend
that the congressional creation of a potential role for the United States was es-
sential to make Tutun's claim a case; after all, the history of naturalization to
which Justice Brandeis referred did not feature an adversary, potential or oth-
erwise. To be sure, beginning in 19o6, applications for citizenship were to un-
ass. See Pushaw, supra note 218, at 458 & n.3o9.
256. For the view that Justice Brandeis was simply respecting history- even history at odds with
his vision-see id. at 458 n.3o9.
257. Justice Brandeis's discussion bearing on this point is as follows:
The petitioner's claim is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States. The claim is presented to the court in such a form that the judicial pow-
er is capable of acting upon it. The proceeding is instituted and is conducted
throughout according to the regular course of judicial procedure. The United
States is always a possible adverse party. By section ii of the Naturalization Act
the full rights of a litigant are expressly reserved to it. Its contentions are submit-
ted to the court for adjudication. Section 9 provides that every final hearing must
be held in open court; that upon such hearing the applicant and witnesses shall be
examined under oath before the court and in its presence; and that every final or-
der must be made under the hand of the court and shall be entered in full upon
the record. The judgment entered, like other judgments of a court of record, is ac-
cepted as complete evidence of its own validity unless set aside. It may not be col-
laterally attacked. If a certificate is procured when the prescribed qualifications
have no existence in fact, it may be canceled by suit. It is in this respect ... closely
analogous to a public grant of land, or of the exclusive right to make, use and
vend a new and useful invention.
Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577-78 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
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dergo relatively searching review.2s 8 In addition to the use of hearings at which
the court took testimony from the applicant and witnesses,5 9 the government
could contest naturalization, both before and after the issuance of the certifi-
cate.260 But before 19o6, the various congressional enactments defining the role
of courts in naturalization never provided for intervention by the United States
or any other party to contest the petitioner's application. 6 The most reasona-
ble conclusion, therefore, is the one recognized by Henry Monaghan: that the
reference to the government as a possible adverse party was not central to the
Court's holding that ex parte naturalization proceedings are cases within Arti-
cle 111.262
Even if one were to ascribe a possible adversary holding to Tutun, that con-
struct has done no work in subsequent cases. Although the Court has issued a
series of decisions upholding ex parte proceedings, it has never cited the "pos-
sible adverse party" theory of Tutun in doing so. Rather, the Court has empha-
sized that the proceeding under consideration calls for the exercise of judicial
judgment in resolving an issue of law or fact. That was the message in
Ullmann, upholding the judicial power to confirm the propriety of an uncon-
tested grant of immunity 63 It was also the message in Hohn, which treated ex
parte petitions for certificates of appealability as "judicial in nature, ''264 not-
withstanding the dissent's complaint that these proceedings lacked the quali-
ties of adverseness associated with cases., 6 ' Although the Court acknowledged
a8. See Naturalization Act of 19o6, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 11, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed by the Na-
tionality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, 54 Star. 1137).
259. On the inquisitorial nature of the judicial task in early naturalization proceedings, see In re
An Alien, 7 Hill 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (viewing the statute as requiring the court to satisfy
itself through some form of inquiry that the applicant for citizenship had made out an ap-
propriate case).
260. See Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577-78.
261. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
262. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1374 n.68 (referring to the possible adversary discussion as a
"makeweight"); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L.
REv. 6oi, 607 (1968) ("From the beginning, federal courts have performed many functions
in addition to deciding 'questions presented in an adversary context.' Federal courts often
decide questions of law and fact and discretion in absence of an adversary context, as they
do when they ... admit aliens to citizenship when no issue arises ... ").
263. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434 (1956) (noting that the district court was
acting within the judicial power in ensuring that the grand jury complied with statutory re-
quirements).
264. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 245 (1998).
265. Id. at 256-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that adversary disputes over COAs were commonplace, it did not invoke the
possibility of such a dispute as support for its holding.266
For all of these reasons, it does not make sense to try to explain away ex
parte proceedings through the possible adversary theory. Case law provides lit-
tle support for such a construct, and the use of hypothetical adversary parties
does not fit well with the Court's general approach to justiciability problems.
In any case, such an approach would invite line-drawing problems as the
courts considered how much potential adverseness was required in any particu-
lar case. FISA warrant proceedings, in particular, would seem vulnerable to a
rule that required more than the slightest possibility that future party oppo-
nents would emerge (or learn that they were the subject of a FISA warrant).
Better, we think, to address the problem forthrightly and to develop a coherent
framework for the presence of ex parte and other proceedings lacking an ad-
verse party. We offer such a framework below.
III. CONTENTIOUS AND NON-CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
Having described widespread ex parte practices in Part I, and having
shown in Part II that existing adverse-party scholarship does not adequately
explain their appearance on federal dockets, we offer a solution. We believe
that the explanation for non-contentious federal proceedings lies outside the
adversary model, in the many non-contentious forms of action that Britain, co-
lonial America, and the United States borrowed from the Roman and civil law.
Below, we demonstrate that the failure of the early federal courts to curb non-
contentious proceedings resulted not from oversight or inadvertence but from
an understanding shared by the Framers and the lawyers of the Founding gen-
eration that the "judicial power" conferred by Article III consists of two distinct
dimensions: contentious jurisdiction and non-contentious jurisdiction. Moreo-
ver, although non-contentious jurisdiction is not generally a part of the vo-
cabulary of a modern American judiciary less well-acquainted with the civil
law, we show that this form of jurisdiction can explain the willingness of feder-
al courts to uphold, in appropriate situations, the exercise of judicial power
over ex parte proceedings in the face of challenges based on modern justiciabil-
ity doctrines.
Such a dual-power solution has the virtue of preserving much of the
Court's adverse-party learning for application to contentious disputes over
matters of federal law, state law, and federal constitutional law in particular. At
the same time, the construct of non-contentious jurisdiction can help rational-
ize, clarify, and evaluate the manner in which federal courts manage the admin-
266. Id. at 243 (majority opinion).
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istration of claims and other ex parte matters. In this Part, we describe the his-
torical background of non-contentious jurisdiction, from its origins in Roman
law, to its reception in Europe, to its manifestations in legal proceedings and
materials at the time of the Framing. Our findings lead us to reevaluate the ad-
verse-party requirement and to offer a novel account of the case-controversy
distinction employed by Article III.
A. The Historical Pedigree of Non-Contentious Jurisdiction
1. Roman Law
Although it did not leave much of an impression on the common law of
England, non-contentious jurisdiction has a rich grounding in history. Its ori-
gins lie in the law of ancient Rome, which appears to have divided judicial ac-
tions into two forms: iurisdictio contentiosa and iurisdictio voluntaria, or
contentious and "voluntary" jurisdiction.267 Contentious jurisdiction was
"[j]urisdiction in cases involving a legal controversy between the parties to [a]
trial" designed to resolve a conflict of legal or personal interests .,68 Voluntary
jurisdiction, by contrast, was "the intervention of a magistrate in matters in
which there [was] no quarrel between the parties and the fictitious trial
serve[d] only as a way of performing certain legal acts or transactions.2 69
267. On the origins of non-contentious jurisdiction in Roman law, see Walter Neitzel, Non-
Contentious Jurisdiction in Germany, 21 HARv. L. REV. 476, 480-81 (19o8) (linking the Ger-
man practice of non-contentious jurisdiction to precursors in Roman law relating to matters
of adoption, guardianship, and registration of land titles); and Elisabetta Silvestri, Non-
Contentious Jurisdiction in Italy 1 & n.i (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211579 [http://
perma.cc/sVUM-8V8X] (collecting authority for the "well established" proposition "that
Roman law made a distinction between contentious jurisdiction and iurisdictio voluntaria").
Surviving discussions of voluntary jurisdiction in Roman law are sparse and somewhat ru-
dimentary. See MAX KASER, DAs RoMIscHEs ZIVILPROZESSRECHT [RoMAN CIVIL LITIGATION]
29,134 & n.25 (1966). For our purposes, however, whether what emerged as voluntary juris-
diction in European civil law courts during the modern era accurately reflected the Roman
understanding is less important than that voluntary jurisdiction was a well-known feature of
court systems and legal literature at the time of the Framing. See infra Part III.A.2.
268. Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, in 43 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. PHIL.
SOC'Y 333, 524 (1953); see also ANTONIO FERNANDEZ DE BUJAN, JURISDICCION VOLUNTARIA EN
DERECHO ROMANO [VOLUNTARY JURISDICTION IN ROMAN LAw] 20-23 (1986) (describing
the distinction between contentious and voluntary jurisdiction).
269. Berger, supra note 268, at 524. The "voluntary" nature of this form of jurisdiction thus lay
not in any choice on the part of the magistrate on whether to exercise his jurisdiction, but
rather in the voluntary appearance of the party who was submitting his petition for resolu-
tion or ratification. See FERNANDEZ DE BUJAN, supra note 268, at 23.
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Voluntary proceedings included in iure cessio (the conveyance of property in
the form of a feigned case, which resulted in a consent judgment sanctioning
the conveyance), emancipatio (the emancipation of minors), adoptio (adoption),
and manumissio (the manumission of slaves), as well as the "cooperation of of-
ficials in guardianship matters and legal acts for the validity of which a permis-
sion of the competent authority is required."27 The court's function in such
matters was limited to sanctioning, ratifying, legitimizing, or collaborating in
the creation of a legal act or relationship that was accepted by the parties in ad-
vance and that did not prejudice the rights of third parties not before the court.
As such, whenever it appeared that an agreement or alignment of the parties'
interests was not present or had disappeared, the proceedings would alter and
become contentious in character."
As this brief summary reveals, matters within iurisdictio voluntaria arose not
from a concrete dispute of law or fact among the parties, but from the desire of
those parties to secure a conclusive legal recognition of their status or to obtain
formal approval of "certain legal acts or transactions."' Indeed, many of the
invocations of voluntary jurisdiction described above were similar to petitions
for naturalization in federal courts in that the law provided a procedure by
which parties could alter their legal status through ex parte applications for ju-
dicial action.273 For example, emancipatio, or "[t]he voluntary release of a son or
daughter from paternal power by the father," could, under the law of Justinian,
be "performed by a simple declaration before a competent official." 74
27o. Berger, supra note 268, at 524.
271. See FERNANDEZ DE BUJAN, supra note 268, at 23.
272. Berger, supra note 268, at 524.
273. One comparative scholar expressly drew this connection between non-contentious jurisdic-
tion and naturalization proceedings. See MAURO CAPPETI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 121 (1967) (observing that "the judicial intervention" in non-
contentious matters "borders on[] administration rather than adjudication" and comment-
ing that, in Italy, "citizenship is conferred upon aliens by administrative act," whereas in
America it is conferred "by the courts").
274. Berger, supra note 268, at 451. Emancipatio was a derivative form of mancipatio, which in the
ancient Roman law was "the only method by which important kinds of property could be
legally transferred from seller to buyer." WILLUM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN
LAw AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW 313 (1938); see also Berger, supra note 268, at 573
(describing emancipatio as a form of mancipatio). Mancipatio was a ceremony held before
witnesses, involving a declaration of title by the purchaser not contradicted by the seller. Id.
at 573; see also BURDICK, supra, at 330-31 (describing mancipatio as a "formal legal procedure"
for the transfer of ownership, marriage by purchase, adoption, emancipation, and testa-
ments).
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Other invocations of non-contentious jurisdiction took the form of feigned
controversies. Notably, in jure cessio ("a surrender in court") would secure a
change in property ownership as follows:
[In jure cessio] was a collusive or fictitious suit whereby the person to
whom the property right was to be conveyed claimed in open court to
be the owner. Thereupon, the magistrate asked the other party, the pre-
sent owner, whether he also claimed it. Upon the denial or silence of
such other party, the magistrate gave judgment (addicit) in favor of the
claimant.2 75
Parties relied upon proceedings in jure cessio "for a number of legal transac-
tions," such as the transfer of property, the formalization of adoption and
emancipation, and "the creation of servitudes. ,,27
6
According to Fernandez de Bujan, voluntary jurisdiction in Roman law oc-
cupied an "autonomous" zone on the border between the judicial and adminis-
trative powers and, as a result, has posed challenges for historians attempting
to classify or describe its precise nature.2' Nevertheless, and despite the fact
that it is in some respects difficult to square with our own conceptions of judi-
cial activity, voluntary jurisdiction did comport with the Roman conception of
jurisdiction as the execution of "a public function upon private juridical inter-
ests and relationships. " 7S The judge or magistrate was not a "mere automa-
275. BURDICK, supra note 274, at 331.
276. Id. Any description of procedures in "Roman law" is incurably inexact, given that Roman
law evolved over the course of several centuries to the extent that its early forms might have
been unrecognizable even to later Roman citizens. Injure cessio, for instance, was superseded
by mancipatio, which itself eventually fell into obsolescence. See id. at 331-32 ("Even in the
time of Gaius, mancipatio, he says, was generally employed instead of in jure cessio, because
it was less difficult to transfer property in the presence of one's friends than to go into court
before the praetor."). On the evolution of non-contentious jurisdiction in Rome, see Neitzel,
supra note 267, at 480, which contrasts "old" Roman law's refusal to recognize a role for the
state in guardianships with the law of the Empire, which assigned the appointment of
guardians to judicial officials.
277. FERNANDEZ DE BUjAN, supra note 268, at 16; see also id. at 23-27 (describing various views of
the propriety of classifying voluntary jurisdiction as truly jurisdictional or judicial in na-
ture).
278. Id. at 16 (authors' translation). As Fernandez de Bujan explains in more detail:
A mi juicio, y a pesar de las opiniones contrarias a la utilizaci6n del adjetivo volun-
taria, cabria argumentar a favor de la misma que, desde el punto de vista formal,
en estos supuestos los interesados o solicitantes -ya que no cabria hablar en sen-
tido estricto de partes - de la actuaci6n magistratural se presentan voluntariamen-
te al magistrado sin ser citados, no para que 6ste ampare o declare el ejercicio de
un derecho o Ia satisfacci6n de un interns de una de las partes en discordia, sino
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ton," but instead tested the factual basis for the petition, required testimony on
the record before granting judicial sanction to the petition, and exercised "con-
trol over the legality of the acts of the appearing party or parties."279
2. The European Reception of Non-Contentious Jurisdiction
Non-contentious jurisdiction further developed as Roman law was received
into the civil law of continental Europe and Scotland.s ° Thomas Wood's influ-
ential eighteenth-century treatise A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law, for
example, divides "causes" into "Jurisdictio Contentiosa, or Judicial, which is ex-
ercised upon Persons whether they consent to it or not," and "Voluntaria,
which may be used at all times without any manner of contradiction; as Eman-
cipation, Adoption, Manumission; and in several other legal Acts granted by
the Judge upon request, and by consent of all Parties. " ' Voluntary jurisdiction
also appeared in Scotland, and the distinction between contentious and non-
contentious jurisdiction was described in the late eighteenth century by Sir
John Erskine, author of a treatise that was well-known in Britain and in Ameri-
ca. 22 Drafters of the German civil code in the sixteenth century similarly incor-
para que colabore en el nacimiento de una relaci6n juridica consensuada por los
requirentes o comparecientes.
Id. at 27 ("In my view, although there are opinions against the use of the word 'voluntary' as
an adjective [qualifying jurisdiction], there is room to argue in favor of such a use: that,
from a formal point of view, in these cases the interested parties or petitioners -because we
cannot speak of parties in a strict sense - seeking judicial intervention come before the mag-
istrate voluntarily (without being compelled by process), not for the magistrate to protect
the exercise of a right or to determine a disputed interest, but for the magistrate to collabo-
rate in the birth of a legal relationship agreed upon by the applicants or appearing parties."
(authors' translation)). For the Romans, jurisdiction (iurisdictio, or "the power to speak the
law") denoted both the power invested in the magistrate and the fulfillment of the duties for
which the power was bestowed. Id. at 39.
279. Id. at 23-24 (authors' translation).
28o. On reception, see Franz Wieacker, The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and
Western Legal Thought, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 258-61 (1981).
a81. THOMAS WOOD, A NEw INSTITUTE OF THE IMPERIAL OR CIVIL LAW 293 (4th ed., J. and J.
Knapton et al. 1730) (emphases in original).
282. 1 ERSKINE, supra note 30, at 27-28; see also id. at 71-72 (discussing the ministerial powers of
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porated elements of non-contentious jurisdiction 8 although German law did
not perfectly map onto ancient forms. 8a
Non-contentious jurisdiction remains a feature of many continental judicial
systems today. In France, the civil code defines voluntary jurisdiction, or ju-
ridiction gracieuse, to encompass both ex parte proceedings and feigned contro-
versies. French law empowers the proper court to assert non-contentious juris-
diction "over all claims not involving an adversary and not contestable by a
third party; and ... over all claims in which the parties, not being in disagree-
ment, are required by their status or the nature of the affair, to obtain a court
decision." 8 ' Other countries have taken a less formal approach. Italian courts
exercise the functional equivalent of non-contentious jurisdiction (giurisdizione
volontaria) in the absence of any formal codification in the rule books . 6
Non-contentious procedures vary somewhat from nation to nation. In Ita-
ly, non-contentious matters have been handled by a judge "in chambers," ra-
ther than during the formal sitting of the court."a In Germany, by contrast,
much non-contentious jurisdiction has been assigned to the local or district
courts. 8 Non-contentious proceedings have a judicial quality; one treatise on
German law explained that although a certain exercise of jurisdiction was non-
contentious, it was "in no way 'non-judicial."'2 '' But the character of the pro-
ceeding reflects its non-contentious roots. Non-contentious jurisdiction re-
quires the judge to play an active role in developing the factual record; the
court cannot rely on an adverse party to help frame the issues. One German
scholar characterized the judge in non-contentious matters as enjoying "a great
283. See Neitzel, supra note 267, at 48o-81. Neitzel suggests that a non-contentious role for the
judiciary in the appointment of guardians first became a feature of German law in the six-
teenth century. See id.
284. See id. (contrasting, for example, the Roman law treatment of property "as a mere res" with
the German notion of property as a communal matter, and describing the greater formalities
that were employed to secure a transfer of property in German law).
285. CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 273, at 122 n.52. Notably, France distinguishes betweenju-
ridiction gracieuse and juridiction contentieuse. Id.
286. See id. at 120 (noting the inclusion of non-contentious jurisdiction in the German code and
that the Italian code "makes no mention of it except in connection with the recognition of
foreign judgments," although the concept is widely used); Silvestri, supra note 267, at 2 (ob-
serving that the Italian Code of Civil Procedure "makes no specific reference to non-
contentious jurisdiction," but noting that the Code "provides for a variety of special pro-
ceedings that are conventionally ascribed to non-contentious jurisdiction").
287. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 273, at 121-22; Silvestri, supra note 267, at 3.
288. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CrviL JUSTICE 442-43 (2004) (describing
the use of local courts); Neitzel, supra note 267, at 482-83 (describing reliance on the district
courts).
289. MURRAY& STURNER, supra note 288, at 444.
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deal of freedom" to "take any evidence." 0 An Italian scholar echoed that con-
clusion: non-contentious proceedings "are marked by the extensive inquisitori-
al powers bestowed upon the judge in charge of the case."291 These powers en-
sure that the judge has "ample discretion as regards the evidence-taking phase
of the procedure."9 2
A broad range of matters has been assigned to non-contentious jurisdiction
in Europe. Many countries, for example, provide for judicial oversight of pro-
bate matters in an effort to ensure proper resolution of potentially fraught is-
sues of inheritance and succession. 9 3 (As we will see, common-form probate
proceedings in Anglo-American law derive from this form of non-contentious
jurisdiction in European civil law countries. 94) In addition, European civil-law
countries often rely on non-contentious jurisdiction to oversee the appoint-
ment and supervision of guardians,"5 and the formal registry of interests in re-
al property.9 6 Finally, European countries have provided for the formal regis-
tration of contracts of suretyship and the acknowledgement of debts through
non-contentious proceedings 97 and have assigned certain matters of insolven-
cy and bankruptcy to such a mode.29
8
ago. Neitzel, supra note 267, at 483-84.
291. Silvestri, supra note 267, at 4.
292. Id. at 5.
293. See KARL GAREIS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAw: SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF THE LAw
AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL STUDY 261 (Albert Kocourek trans., 1911) (describing the role of
non-contentious jurisdiction in matters of German inheritance and succession); MURRAY &
STORNER, supra note 288, at 442-43 (same, in matters of German inheritance); Silvestri, su-
pra note 267, at 2 (same, in Italian law).
z94. See infra Part III.A.3.
295. See GAREIS, supra note 293, at 261 (noting that the appointment of guardians falls under
non-contentious jurisdiction in German law); MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 288, at 442-
43 (same); Silvestri, supra note 267, at 2 (noting that Italian law provides for non-
contentious proceedings for the appointment of guardians).
296. See GARIEis, supra note 293, at 262 (including registry officers who take action to effect the
transfer of land under non-contentious jurisdiction in German law); MURRAY & STORNER,
supra note 288, at 442 (same, for registration of real estate interests).
297. See Neitzel, supra note 267, at 494.
298. In nineteenth-century German procedure, non-contentious forms were used in insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings. GAREIs, supra note 293, at 263 (describing property concerns in
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings as belonging to the "sphere of non-contentious ju-
risdiction"); cf. Silvestri, supra note 267, at 7-8 (noting that the Italian legislature has some-
times assigned matters, such as bankruptcy and the management of companies, to courts for
processing in chambers under the forms of non-contentious jurisdiction, but questioning
the wisdom of such assignments).
14o8
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Although defining the construct of non-contentious jurisdiction in its mod-
ern guise presents conceptual challenges,29 9 scholars agree that courts exercis-
ing non-contentious jurisdiction perform somewhat the same role as adminis-
trative officers or agencies. Thus, one scholar contrasted contentious matters
with non-contentious matters, which he characterized as "prudential admin-
istration of justice, for the security of private legal interests.""°' Another scholar
defined non-contentious jurisdiction as "a form of judicial intervention that
borders on the field of tasks falling, as a rule, within the realm of executive
power, that is, tasks that could (at least in principle) be performed by adminis-
trative bodies as well."0 1 Mauro Cappelletti and his co-authors report that the
traditional definition is that voluntary jurisdiction involves the "public admin-
istration of private law by judicial organs. "3 2 Often, non-contentious proceed-
ings seek a form of official recognition viewed as "necessary to create individual
rights,"0 3 comparable in some respects to petitions for the recognition of pa-
tents, copyrights, and titles to public land.
The frequently ex parte character of non-contentious proceedings has led to
predictable concern with the protection of the rights of third parties. European
countries have dealt with third-party rights in a variety of ways. Most com-
monly, as in Italy, the courts simply deny preclusive effect to the decrees of tri-
bunals exercising non-contentious jurisdiction, thereby limiting their poten-
tially prejudicial effect.30 4 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has
found that individuals have a due process right to be informed about and to
participate in any non-contentious proceedings that might affect their interests.
The German Federal Constitutional Court also has held that parties to a non-
contentious proceeding may seek the recusal of an interested or biased judge.0 '
299. See, e.g., CAPPELLETI ET AL., supra note 273, at 120 ("It is not easy to define 'voluntary juris-
diction.'"); MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 288, at 443 (describing the boundary between
contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction as "not always very clear").
300. GAREIs, supra note 293, at 261 (footnote omitted).
3o. Silvestri, supra note 267, at 2.
302. CAPPELLETrI ET AL., supra note 273, at 121 (quoting PiERO CALAMANDREI, ISTITUZIONI DI
DIRiTro PRocassuAE CwivLE § 23 (2d ed. 1943)). Cappelletti and his co-authors also note
that many scholars do not accept this definition. Id.
303. Neitzel, supra note 267, at 477; see also CAPPELLETrI ET AL., supra note 273, at 121 (describing
the unifying element in the voluntary jurisdiction cases as the presence of a "private law ac-
tivity" that "cannot be undertaken without an order, authorization, or some other kind of
judicial intervention").
304. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 273, at 122 (confirming that decrees in non-contentious
proceedings have no res judicata effect); Silvestri, supra note 267, at 5 (same).
3o5. Mauro Capelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation, 25 STAN. L. REV.
651, 686 n.198 (1973).
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3. Non-Contentious Jurisdiction in England and America
The situation in England and America was more complicated, if only be-
cause of the somewhat rockier reception the civil law encountered in those
countries. The common-law courts of England resisted, and largely prevented,
Roman and civil law from usurping the central place of the common law as the
foundation of the English legal system, °6 and the common law (eventually at
least) was adopted as the primary source of law in much of the United
States.3 °7 Nevertheless, many English and American courts adopted civil-law
practices, and many exercised non-contentious jurisdiction.3os
Many of these non-contentious practices took place in courts bearing the
stamp of continental and civil influence -such as courts of equity and the eccle-
siastical and admiralty courts - but the practices actually predated the Norman
Conquest and grew organically out of the common business of local courts well
before the time of Blackstone.3 9 For example, the courts of Anglo-Saxon Eng-
306. On the reception of Roman law in England, see BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN
ENGLAND 1603-1641: A POITICAL STUDY (1973). On the efforts of common-law courts to re-
sist and circumscribe the jurisdiction of rival courts, see 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTO-
RY OF ENGLISH LAW 423-30 (photo. reprint 1966) (3 d ed. 1945).
307. See, e.g., Pfander & Birk, supra note 14, at 1628, 1646 (discussing adoption of common law in
America and citing sources).
308. Although the reception of Roman law was nowhere near as complete in England as it was in
Scotland or on the continent, Roman and civil law nevertheless bore decided influences on
the practices of non-common law courts in England and were regular features of the law of
nations, conflicts of laws, and mercantile law. For an overview of civil-law practice in Eng-
land, see LEVACK, supra note 306. On the influence of Roman law in England, see Thomas
Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Mer-
chant, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERCAN LEGAL HISTORY 208, 212-14 (1907) (explain-
ing that the judges of the common-law courts did not recognize civil law as authoritative,
but that the admiralty, equity, and ecclesiastical courts "were largely influenced by the Civil
Law, if their procedure was not entirely derived from it"). On the differences between civil
and common law as practiced in English courts, see Charles Donahue, Jr., lus Commune,
Canon Law, and Common Law in England, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1745 (1992); Peter G. Stein, Ro-
man Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1591 (1992).
309. The witengamote, or "public moots," of Anglo-Saxon England regularly exercised a voluntary
jurisdiction in ceremonial acts that was influenced to varying degrees by custom and the
proliferation of"Roman ideas and forms." Paul Vinogradoff, Transfer of Land in Old English
Law, 20 HARv. L. REV. 532, 532, 546 (1907). England's Statutes of Merchants of 1283 and 1285
called for merchants and their debtors to register their contracts in a non-contentious pro-
ceeding before the Mayor's Court. The Statute gave these registered obligations the status of
a matter of record and would trigger in cases of default the speedy seizure of debtor's goods
or the imprisonment of the debtor. See Statute of Merchants, 11 Edward I (1283); Statute of
Merchants, 13 Edward I (1285), both cited in i Statute of the Realm 53, 98 (1235-1377),
http://aalt.law.uh.edu/AALTi/H6/CP4ono677/aCP 4 ono677fronts/IMGo 5 55 .htm [http://
perma.cc/DQ4E-4NKQJ.
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land and the county courts of medieval England conducted the voluntary trans-
fer of land and the sanctioning of documents through judicial process.31° By
witnessing these and other formal acts, such as marriages, the courts provided
legal recognition and public legitimacy. 1 Later, British ecclesiastical courts
consciously exercised non-contentious jurisdiction in a wide variety of proceed-
ings, including the probate of wills and the issuance of marriage licenses," 2
and, as we already have noted, one of the chief functions of admiralty courts
was the condemnation of prizes in what frequently were ex parte proceedings.
Similarly, according to William Burdick, the non-contentious Roman proce-
dure injure cessio was "undoubtedly the inspiration of the collusive or fictitious
suits in early English law known as fine and common recovery," a cognizable
action in English common-law courts.33
The Court of Chancery also possessed a non-contentious jurisdiction,
which it exercised in such matters as the appointment of guardians for infants,
and, as noted previously, in the creation of equitable receiverships.1 4 Much as
31o. See Lolabel House, The County Court in the Thirteenth Century, 49 AM. L. REGISTER 284, 284
(19o) (explaining that the work of county courts in the thirteenth century "was mainly in
civil cases and in voluntary jurisdiction, such as witnessing transfers of land and sanctioning
documents" (citing 1 WILLIAMv STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: IN ITS
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 425-26 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 5th ed. 1891)). Transfer of land
under old English law also was accomplished through judicial process, and the manorial
courts of England later used voluntary jurisdiction to effect various transactions related to
real property through the practices of surrender and admittance. See Vinogradoff, supra note
309, at 533-36.
311. Vinogradoff, supra note 309, at 543-47.
312. See Lewis M. Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REV. 503, 505-11 (1945); see
also Herbert Wood, The Destruction of the Public Records: The Loss to Irish History, 43 STuD.:
IRISH Q. REv. 363, 374 (1922) (noting that the voluntary jurisdiction of Irish ecclesiastical
courts extended to granting probates of wills and administrations, issuing marriage licenses,
setting "institutions and collations to livings," conserving churches and churchyards, and
the "granting of faculties for building and altering glebe houses and churches, of licences for
curates, schoolmasters &c."); id. at 375 (discussing the administrative and regulatory func-
tions of ecclesiastical courts). Until most of their powers were abolished or transferred to the
Court of Probate and the Divorce Court in the mid-nineteenth century, the ecclesiastical
courts in England "exercised a very extended jurisdiction, comprising not only what we
should ordinarily call ecclesiastical causes, but matrimonial suits and divorces a mensa et tho-
ro, all testamentary causes and suits, suits for church rates, and suits for defamation." The
English Law Courts VI: The Ecclesiastical Courts, 8 GREEN BAG 330, 330 (1896). For a descrip-
tion of the types of cases commonly heard by ecclesiastical courts during the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, see David Millon, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Medieval England, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REv. 621.
313. BURDICK, supra note 274, at 332.
314. See STORY, supra note io8, § 1338, at 927. Justice Story explained that the "Court of Chan-
cery will appoint a suitable guardian to an infant, where there is none other, or none who
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an application for a receivership assumed the form of an often-fictional dis-
pute,31s courts of equity predicated the appointment of a guardian for a minor
upon a fictional suit over property held in the district.1 6 Justice Joseph Story
reported on this development with some puzzlement, wondering why the fic-
tion of a dispute was necessary to trigger a court's equitable powers of ap-
pointment."7 It should come as no surprise, then, that many of these same
non-contentious proceedings made their way to the American colonies and
were employed in the equity, admiralty, and probate courts of the early United
States.
Indeed, although many of their judges had little or no legal training or edu-
cation,' local colonial courts often exercised jurisdiction over both contentious
and non-contentious matters, and some even performed purely executive or
legislative functions, such as maintaining county buildings, conducting in-
quests, raising taxes, and planning highways. 1 9 Many colonial courts were as-
will, or can act, at least, where the infant has property ... Guardians appointed by the court
are treated as officers of the court, and are held responsible accordingly to it." Id.
315. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
316. STORY, supra note 1o8, § 1351 n.4.
317. Justice Story described the fictional dispute as follows: "It often occurs, that a bill is filed for
the sole purpose of making an infant a ward of chancery; but in such a case the bill always
states, however untruly, that the infant has property within the jurisdiction, and the bill is
brought against the person in whose supposed custody or power the property is." Id. Story
continued: "Why such a mere fiction should be resorted to, has never, as it seems to me,
been satisfactorily explained; and why the Lord chancellor, exercising the prerogative of the
crown as parens patriae, might not, in his discretion, appoint a guardian to an infant, having
no other guardian, without any bill being filed, seems difficult to understand upon princi-
ple." Id. 5 1351 n.4. Notably, the chancellor's power to appoint conservators of the estates of
"idiots and lunatics" derived from the Crown's prerogative and authorized appointment
without any need to invoke a fictional dispute. See A. HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 11-15 (Exeter, N.H., G. Lamson 1822) (describing the Crown's pre-
rogative power to act as "trustee of the persons and fortunes of ideots [sic] and lunatics" but
distinguishing the Crown's power over infants as "by no means similar").
318. See, e.g., Erwin C. Surrency, The Evolution of an Urban Judicial System: The Philadelphia Sto-
ry, 1683 to 1968, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 109 (1974) (noting that "[t]he judges of the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court prior to the Revolution were not required to be 'learned in
the law,'" and that until 1786, "the great majority of the judges of [the Court of Common
Pleas in Philadelphia County] were laymen").
319. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 14 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that colonial courts
"performed innumerable executive, administrative, and even legislative tasks" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Warren M. Billings, Pleading, Procedure, and Practice: The Meaning
of Due Process of Law in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 47 J. S. HIST. 569, 578 (1981) (observing
that in colonial Virginia, " [s] ome counties simply did without coroners, and . . . the justices
themselves convened and conducted the inquest"); Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a
County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
282, 282 (1976) (describing colonial county courts as having in effect a "general obligation to
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signed quintessentially non-contentious tasks, such as recording land transfers
and other instruments, conducting examinations for the admission of attorneys
to the bar, and evaluating petitions for liquor licenses." Colonies and territo-
ries established orphans' courts for the protection of the estates and welfare of
orphans and invested courts with probate powers to administer estates."' Still
others were granted wide-ranging and non-specialized jurisdiction over com-
mon law as well as probate, admiralty, and equity cases, thereby assuming the
role played by both the Court of Chancery and the ecclesiastical courts in Eng-
land.32
Nevertheless, we do not make specific claims about the process by which
the tradition of non-contentious jurisdiction made its way to the new world. In
some respects, governmental systems lacking a sophisticated administrative
apparatus, such as Anglo-Saxon England and the early colonial American set-
tlements, would understandably use courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-
contentious business regardless of whether that business was seen as grounded
in the Roman tradition of voluntary jurisdiction.3"3 The sixteenth-century de-
velopment of the administration of prize cases, for example, seems to have
grown organically out of the need of the state to provide conclusive legal title to
the captures taken by privateers acting under the state's authority rather than
out of regular disputes over such matters or as a direct outgrowth of Roman
law.3 4
act as regulatory agencies"). Despite their ability to exercise such powers, the county ses-
sions courts of colonial Massachusetts were subject to the traditional limitation on courts:
that they could only act "insofar as public business was brought before [them]." See id. at
284. For a description of the administrative powers exercised by the early Virginia colonial
county courts, see George B. Curtis, The Colonial County Court, Social Forum and Legislative
Precedent: Accomack County, Virginia, 1633-1639, 85 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 274 (1977).
320. See Curtis, supra note 319, at 275, 282 (registration of certificates of sale, payment or
acknowledgement of debt, wagers, and indenture agreements); Alan F. Day, Lawyers in Co-
lonial Maryland, 166o-1715, 17 A M. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 146-47 (1973) (bar admissions); Hat-
tog, supra note 319, at 288-91 (liquor licenses); George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of the Re-
cording System in Massachusetts, 21 B.U. L. REV. 281 (1941) (land transfers); John T. Hassan,
Land Transfer Reform, 4 HARV. L. REv. 271, 272 (189o-91) (same).
321. See Surrency, supra note 318, at 97, 119.
322. See, e.g., Billings, supra note 319, at 572 (describing colonial Virginia's "simplified system of
inferior and appellate courts that combined the jurisdictions of such English courts as the
leet, quarter sessions, the assizes, king's bench, common pleas, chancery, and the admiralty,
as well as that of the church courts"); Spencer R. Liverant & Walter H. Hitchler, A History of
Equity in Pennsylvania, 37 DICK. L. REV. 156, 165-67 (1932-33) (describing the equitable pow-
ers conferred on the general common-law courts of Pennsylvania).
323. See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text. We thank John Langbein for this insight.
324. See R.G. Marsden, Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England, 26 ENG. HIST. REV. 34
(1911).
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We believe that by incorporating non-contentious jurisdiction, Article III
simply responds to the actual needs of the federal system to administer its law.
For example, the decision of Congress to bring the judicial power to bear on
naturalization petitions by assigning them to "courts of record" made function-
al sense. Open proceedings would ensure a searching judicial inquiry into the
status of the applicant and could help to prevent the naturalization of those
with suspiciously limited ties to the community.32 Such an assignment could
also ensure the creation of a permanent and conclusive record of the alien's
admission to citizenship. A permanent record was of central importance in a
world in which only citizens enjoyed the right to own land.326 In addition, the
conclusive quality of judgments "of record" protected citizenship decisions
from attack in subsequent disputes over title to property. 7
This practical response to perceived needs provides the best account of how
these non-contentious proceedings arrived on federal dockets and how they fit
with the practice of federal courts today. Nonetheless, we do see an obvious
link between European developments and the non-contentious practices cata-
logued in Part I of this Article. The Framers and others of the Founding gener-
ation were well versed in Roman political history,"' and many were close stu-
325. Early legislation frequently relied on the people as a check on official action. The first census
law directed the marshal of the district court to conduct an enumeration and to place the re-
sults before the grand jury for an assessment of the quality of the returns. See Act of 1790,
ch. 2, 1 Stat. loi. On the nature of the inquiry required in naturalization proceedings, see In
re an Alien, 7 Hill 137 (N.Y. 1845) (viewing the statute as requiring the court to satisfy itself
through some form of inquiry that the applicant for citizenship had made out an appropri-
ate case).
326. On the connection between naturalized citizenship and the ownership of land (a right de-
nied to aliens at common law), see Pfander & Wardon, supra note 47, at 366-68.
327. In a variety of early Republic disputes over property ownership, the official record was in-
troduced to resolve questions about an alien's admission to citizenship. See, e.g., Spratt v.
Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393 (1830) (quoting the naturalization record of James Spratt); Stark
v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 420 (1813) (quoting the naturalization record of
John Philip Stark). Thus, in Spratt, a dispute over the inheritance of land, the Supreme
Court expressed great reluctance to look behind the record:
It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry; and, like every other
judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity.... It might be productive
of great mischief, if, after the acquisition of property on the faith of his certificate,
an individual might be exposed to the disabilities of an alien, on account of an er-
ror in the court, not apparent on the record of his admission.
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 408. See also Stark, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 420 (viewing the judgment of natu-
ralization by the court of record as conclusive); Campbell v. Gordon, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 176
(18io) (same); McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N.Y. 263 (1851) (same).
328. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 17-
26 (2008); FORREST MCDONALD, NovUs ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 67-69 (1985).
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dents of Roman and civil law 329 and of the practices of the English admiralty,
equity, and ecclesiastical courts . 3  Civil law was in fact central to the education
of the more sophisticated American lawyers, including such luminaries as Chief
Justice John Marshall, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams.33 In 1786, James
Madison examined the practices of the Dutch admiralty courts as part of his
pre-constitutional study of confederacies,332 and Alexander Hamilton and
James Wilson, among others, were well familiar with principles of admiralty
jurisdiction and practice. 333 The courts of the colonies and the early Republic
often, implicitly or explicitly, looked to the courts of England in developing
329. The deep familiarity of many Americans in the Founding generation with Roman and civil
law has been canvassed exhaustively elsewhere. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 14, at 1629-
31, for a summary. For more in-depth discussions, see PAUL M. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (Da Capo Press 1970) (1939); M.H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CWIL
LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN-JuRISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (1997); and Thomas H. Lee, The Civil Law Tradition in American Constitutional
Jurisprudence, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/lee.faculry.workshop
.spring2o13.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6EQ-HEDN] (manuscript in progress). A surprising
amount of documentation of the legal texts studied by colonial and early American lawyers
has been collected. It provides a wealth of insight into the extensive and diverse internation-
alist character of legal education during that period. See, e.g., WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON,
CENSUS OF LAW BOOKS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1978); THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: A REPERTORY OF HIs IDEAS ON GOVERNMENT (Gilbert Chinard ed., 1926);
GEORGE C. GROCE, JR., WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON: A MAKER OF THE CONSTITUTION 27
(1937); HAMLIN, supra; FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 52-53 (1979); CHARLES
WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 157-87 (1911); Daniel R. Coquillette, Justinian in
Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758-1775, in 62 PUBL'NS OF THE
COLONIAL SOC'Y OF MASS., LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 1630-18oo, at 359 (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter Coquillette, Justinian]; Daniel R. Coquillette, The
Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.'s Law Commonplace (1763), 39 ARIz. ST. L.J. 317,
326 (2007); Charles R. McKirdy, The Lauyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Cen-
tury Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 130-31 (1976); James Wilson, Commonplace Book
(unpublished James Wilson Papers) (located at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania) (on
file with authors). One also can glean the importance of civil law sources to American legal
practice by viewing Alexander Hamilton's application of such sources in his law practice. See
4 THE LAw PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 627-35
(Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds., 198o).
330. For a time, the civil law possessed a surprising amount of traction in the United States, par-
ticularly in those quarters that disdained the English legal tradition and hoped for the emer-
gence of a distinctively American jurisprudence based on internationalist sources. For an
overview, see Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA.
L. REv. 403 (1966).
331. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 14, at 1629-31. One of the questions asked of John Adams
when he sought admission to the bar, for instance, was what he had "lately read" in Latin.
Coquillette,Justinian, supra note 329, at 363.
332. See Casto, supra note 69, at 139 n.114.
333. See id. at 130-39.
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processes and procedures, including the procedures employed in local courts,
courts of equity, and probate and prize proceedings. Application of the civil law
in appropriate cases was assumed at the Constitutional Convention,334 and the
Process Act of 1789 prescribed that the forms and modes of proceedings of civil
law would govern in cases of admiralty and equity jurisdiction. 35 Later, as
Thomas Lee has noted, Edmund Randolph reported to Congress that "a feder-
al judge in the early Republic had to be not only 'a master of the common law
in all its divisions' but also a 'civilian.'", 6 The judicial power with which feder-
al courts were invested surely encompassed both the common-law and civil-
law traditions.
Regardless of whether the Framers specifically contemplated a link between
the judicial power they conferred on federal courts and the voluntary jurisdic-
tion of Roman and civil law, we have little doubt that non-contentious jurisdic-
tion was a regular feature of the judicial proceedings in equity, admiralty, and
probate with which the Framers were familiar from everyday experience. In
this cosmopolitan legal world, the decision of Congress to assign non-adverse
proceedings to federal courts does not present much of a mystery. Indeed, the
uncontroversial decision to include equity and admiralty "cases" in the federal
constitutional catalog provides solid evidence that non-contentious jurisdiction
was considered an acceptable dimension of the business of Article III courts.
B. The Adverse-Party Requirement Reconsidered
What, then, of the adverse-party requirement? After all, if the judicial pow-
er conferred by Article III includes a role for non-contentious jurisdiction (as
history and practice tend to suggest), then the adverse-party requirement must
be modified- or at least be rendered more malleable - to account for the exer-
cise of that power. But if an inflexible adverse-party requirement is part of the
irreducible core of Article III or of the Court's justiciability doctrines, then one
might argue that non-contentious jurisdiction simply cannot be considered
part of the judicial power, and that the many departures from adverse-party
proceedings in the federal reports are (at least from an originalist perspective)
fundamentally impermissible. Below, we explain that the supposed roots of an
334. See 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 431 (1911)
("Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant by the words 'In all the cases before
mentioned it (jurisdiction) shall be appellate with such exceptions &c,' whether it extended
to matters of fact as well as law - and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law. Mr. Wil-
son. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil law.
The jurisdiction of the federal Court of Appeals had he said been so construed.").
335. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93.
336. Lee, supra note 329, at 7.
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inflexible adverse-party requirement stand on textually and historically infirm
ground. Although adverseness has work to do in defining and circumscribing
the judicial power in contentious proceedings, the imposition of an inflexible,
across-the-board requirement does not fit with the text of Article III or the
practice of federal courts in administering federal law. Indeed, we think non-
contentious jurisdiction may help to explain some other enduring mysteries of
federal jurisdiction, including why the Framers chose to use two terms, "cases"
and "controversies," to describe the work of the federal judiciary.
1. Cases, Controversies, and the Judicial Power
The well-known words of Article III extend the "judicial power" to "Cases"
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to
"Controversies" between certain configurations of parties.337 Although the
terms are not actually linked in the text, since the twentieth century the Su-
preme Court has frequently conjoined them in its discussions of justiciability,
referring to a "case-or-controversy" requirement in a manner suggesting that
the two terms are wholly synonymous."' The case-or-controversy requirement
has been invoked repeatedly by courts and scholars seeking a textual founda-
tion for the adverse-party requirement, as Justice Scalia did in Windsor and
Hohn.339 The most careful and comprehensive attempt to ground the adverse-
party requirement in the text, structure, and history of Article III -that of Re-
dish and Kastanek in their investigation of settlement class actions - places par-
ticular emphasis on the term "controversy," arguing that the adverseness in-
337. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The intended meaning of the terms "case" and "controversy" is a
richly canvassed topic. For various accounts, see Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 227 (199o); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv.
777, 8oo-12 (2004); William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 263 (199o); Pushaw, supra note ii; Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REy. 1289, 1313-34
(2005).
338. See Pushaw, supra note ii, at 451-53.
339. See supra notes 8-13, 146-148 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 241-42
(1998) (listing adverseness as one of the "requisite qualities of a 'case' as the term is used in
... Article III of the Constitution"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) ("In part [the
terms 'case' and 'controversy'] limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process."); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Pas-
sive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961) (arguing that, because the judicial power "may be
exercised only in a case," courts "may not decide non-cases, which are not adversary situa-
tions and in which nothing of immediate consequence to the parties turns on the results").
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herent in that term should be imputed to the definition of "case" as well.4 ° On
this view, both terms imply the existence of opposing parties with adverse in-
terests presenting their dispute for adjudication in a standard legal action.
From the perspective of modern lawyers steeped in the assumptions of the
American adversary system and long accustomed to the Supreme Court's con-
flation of "case" with "controversy," the conclusion that a justiciable case re-
quires the participation of an adverse party makes a fair amount of sense. In-
deed, Redish and Kastanek have argued that the Court's conjunction of the
terms casts a "heavy burden" on those who propose to read the term "cases" as
broader in scope than the term "controversies.""' But the modern view must
confront burdens of its own. To begin with, judicial opinions conflating cases
with controversies are of relatively recent vintage,"2 and it is by no means clear
that such a reading was shared by the Framers or by the early Supreme
Court. 3 In fact, important early definitions of the term "cases" within the
meaning of Article III provided by Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Jo-
seph Story do not refer to adverseness and do not assume the appearance of
more than one party to the proceeding. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story
were both familiar with the range of ex parte matters that had been assigned to
the federal courts. Both Justices, moreover, upheld the exercise of judicial pow-
er in such matters? 44
340. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 564-65.
341. Id. at 566.
342. See text accompanying infra note 349.
343. Given that the early Supreme Court reporter provided the label "case" to the decidedly non-
adverse Haybur's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), such an assumption seems somewhat
tenuous.
344. Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected the argument that ex parte judicial proceedings to natu-
ralize were merely ministerial and did not enjoy the conclusive quality of matters of record.
See Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 402 (1830) (argument of counsel) (contending that
naturalization proceedings were not judicial but merely "ministerial," and that there were no
parties to the proceeding but that instead "[a]ll is ex parte"). Justice Story was equally con-
vinced that ex parte petitions for the remission or mitigation of tax forfeitures were proper
subjects of judicial cognizance. The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (Story, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Mass. 1815) ("In the performance of this duty, the judge exercises judicial functions,
and is bound by the same rules of evidence, as in other cases."). In an important encounter
with the forfeiture statute, the Supreme Court apparently reached the same conclusion. It
ruled that the Treasury Secretary could remit both portions of the forfeited sum, including
that owed to the government and that owed to the custom-house officers who brought the
forfeiture proceeding. See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (tO Wheat.) 246, 295-96 (1825).
Daniel Webster appeared for the customs officials and argued that the Secretary lacked
power to remit after the condemnation had taken effect and had invested the officers with a
property right. Webster expressly invoked the separation of powers, reasoning as follows:
"All judicial power, under the constitution, is vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferi-
or tribunals as Congress shall establish. How, then, can any portion of that power be vested
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Against this background, it is striking that Chief Justice Marshall and Jus-
tice Story couched their canonical definitions of the term "case" in terms broad
enough to encompass ex parte matters. Listen first to the familiar words of
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States:
This clause [extending jurisdiction to federal question "cases"] enables
the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question
respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is ca-
pable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the
subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares,
that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the consti-
tution, laws, and treaties of the United States.4
5
Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution adopts the same formulation:
"A case, then, in the sense of this clause of the constitution, arises when some
subject touching the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is sub-
mitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by
law.,,346
The Marshall-Story account provides a straightforward basis for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over both contentious and non-contentious cases. Consider
the typical contentious federal question claim, one in which a party demands a
remedy from an opposing party for the claimed violation of a legal right. 47
Such a claim for redress of violations would clearly qualify as an assertion of
one's rights within the Marshall-Story paradigm."' Yet the Marshall-Story
definitions would also encompass non-contentious federal question claims.
in the treasury department, or in any other executive department?" Id. at 277. The Court did
not address the argument directly, but its decision to uphold the forfeiture suggests that it
did not harbor constitutional misgivings with the procedure.
345. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824); see also Weston v.
City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464 (1829) (explaining that the term "suit"
encompasses "any proceeding in a court of justice, by which an individual pursues that rem-
edy ...which the law affords him"); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6. Wheat.) 264, 408
(1821) (defining the term "suits" to include "all cases were [sic] the party suing claims to ob-
tain something to which he has a right").
346. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES S 1646, at
424 (photo. reprint 2005) (2d ed. 1851).
347. We have framed this definition of contentious jurisdiction to track that put forward by
Pushaw. See Pushaw, supra note 11, at 472.
348. We thus view the Marshall-Story definition as broad enough to encompass the "cases" for
redress identified in early dictionaries but not as limited to them. See Redish & Kastanek,
supra note 16, at 565 n.71 (reporting early legal dictionary definitions for the word "case").
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The definitions require only the assertion of claims by a single "party" and say
nothing about the joinder of an opposing party. In addition, the formulations
require only the assertion of one's "rights," and thus encompass claims in the
nature of ex parte applications for pension benefits, naturalized citizenship, and
other legal entitlements, such as warrants, conferred by law. As both Chief Jus-
tice Marshall and Justice Story would have understood, one can certainly assert
claims of right on an ex parte basis without seeking redress from an opposing
party.
34 9
The formulations provided by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story to
some extent tracked civil-law definitions of the "causes" cognizable before a ju-
dicial tribunal. The term "case" in Article III bears an obvious linguistic simi-
larity to the Latin term causa, or cause, and both terms cover much the same
ground. Indeed, the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines "causa" to mean "judicial
proceedings," or a "legal case."3 ' The definition of "cause" in an eighteenth-
century English treatise anticipates Justices Marshall and Story:
A Cause (called in the Latine Causa) is defined (by Logicians) That, by
whose Vertue or Efficacy, any thing is made to have a Being or Exist-
ence [i.e., causation] ... The word Cause is Metaphorically used here
[i.e., in a legal treatise], for the word Action: which (amongst those
many Significations the Glossaries seem to put upon it) we shall only
define to be the right of prosecuting or pursuing (in a Court of Judica-
ture) whatsoever any one supposes, is properly his Due, &c.3"'
349. See Arlyck, supra note 87, at 265 (quoting Justice Story's view that it was "not necessary that
the adverse parties should be before the court," because the court itself acted as the "general
guardian of all interests which are brought to its notice"); see also id. at 265 n.81 (quoting
Justice Story's opinion in The Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (181S), which described
prize proceedings as "modelled upon the civil law" and indicated that prize proceedings
could not be "more unlike than those in the Courts of common law").
350. See Causa, i OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2012) ("Judicial proceedings, a legal case,
trial."). As Pushaw reports, moreover, the term "cause of action" was often shortened to
simply a "cause" or an "action." Pushaw, supra note ii, at 473 n.134; Cf. JOHN CowELL, ALAw
DICTIONARY: OR, THE INTERPRETER OF WORDS AND TERMS, USED EITHER IN THE COMMON
OR STATUTE LAwS OF THAT PART OF GREAT BRITAIN, CALL'D ENGLAND (London, D. Browne
et al. 17o8) (equating "case" and "cause" in defining the term "extra-judicial").
351. H.C. [HENRY CONSETT], THE PRACTICE OF THE SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS: To
WHICH IS ADDED, A BRIEF DISCOURSE OF THE STRUCTURE AND MANNER OF FORMING THE LI-
BEL OR DECLARATION 15 (London, W. Battersby, 2d ed. 1700). Noah Webster's 1828 Ameri-
can Dictionary of the English Language contains a similar definition of "cause":
A suit or action in court; any legal process which a parry institutes to obtain his
demand, or by which he seeks his right or his supposed right. This is a legal,
scriptural and popular use of the word, coinciding nearly with case from cado, and
action from ago, to urge or drive.
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Like the Marshall-Story formulation, this definition of "cause" encompasses ex
parte proceedings in which an individual "pursu[es]" in a court of judicature
that which he supposes to be "properly his Due" and does not require the join-
der of an adverse party.
Indeed, if one canvasses antebellum judicial decisions, one sees nothing like
the modern use of the conjoined terms "cases or controversies" to suggest ad-
verse-party restrictions on the work federal courts can perform. Our research
suggests that the conjunction of terms did not appear until an 1887 circuit court
opinion of Justice Stephen Field that refused to enforce a subpoena at the be-
hest of the federal Pacific Railway Commission.32 Justice Field's account of the
term "cases" follows:
The judicial article of the [C] onstitution mentions cases and controver-
sies. The term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so
in that it is less comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of
a civil nature. By cases and controversies are intended the claims of liti-
gants brought before the courts for determination by such regular pro-
ceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or en-
forcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of
wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States takes such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The term implies the
existence ofpresent or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted




Note the move here. Justice Field first suggests the broad similarity of the
terms "cases" and "controversies." Then, after restating and expanding the
Marshall-Story definition, Justice Field makes the then-novel claim that the
term "case" implies the features of a controversy; namely, the existence of pre-
sent or possible adverse parties with competing contentions. In short, Justice
Field used the idea of a controversy to transform the non-contentious Mar-
shall-Story definition of a "case" into one that requires the existence of an ad-
verse-party dispute. He perceived no such dispute in the matter before him; a
federal commission was conducting an investigation for regulatory purposes




Cause, 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE cclxi-cclxii
(1828). The dictionary defined "case" as "[a] cause or suit in court" and stated that "case is
nearly synonymous with cause, whose primary sense is nearly the same." Case, id. at ccliv.
352. In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 258 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
353. Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
354. Id. at 259.
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Justice Field may have recognized that he was breaking new ground and
consequently may have labored to explain how other non-contentious applica-
tions differed from the administrative subpoenas under consideration. 35 ' Nev-
ertheless, and perhaps because his efforts at distinguishing other non-
contentious proceedings did not prove persuasive, his opposition to a federal
judicial role in administrative subpoena enforcement did not take hold. The
Court later ruled that applications for such subpoenas were proper subjects of
judicial cognizance,'3 6 and the federal courts today oversee the enforcement of
administrative subpoenas without raising Article III doubts.
3 57
Yet Justice Field's reformulation of the Marshall-Story definition of a
"case," from one that contemplates ex parte applications to one that requires
adverse parties, has had great influence. Justice Field himself imported Pacific
Railway's case-controversy conjunction into Supreme Court jurisprudence in
Smith v. Adams in 1889: "By those terms [cases and controversies] are intended
the claims or contentions of litigants brought before the courts for adjudication
by regular proceedings established for the protection or enforcement of rights,
or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs." 3s8 Later, in Muskrat, the
Court recited the "present or possible adverse parties" idea from Pacific Railway
in the course of rejecting what it perceived as an improper attempt to secure an
advisory opinion.319 And by the middle of the twentieth century, the conflation
of cases with controversies was complete.
36
355. Justice Field distinguished the subpoena enforcement surrounding grand jury proceedings
from the administrative subpoenas at issue on the ground that grand juries were required by
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 257 n.2. He distinguished letters rogatory on the ground that, in
those cases, a controversy was pending on the docket of a foreign tribunal. Id. at 256-57. Fi-
nally, he distinguished petitions for habeas corpus relief, treating them as an exception to
the Article III adverse-party requirement. Id. at 255 & n.i. The tone and focus of the opinion
as a whole suggest that Justice Field's approach may have been driven by an antipathy to the
regulatory power of the commission and a desire to protect federal dockets from administra-
tive-agency support functions. In a wide-ranging discussion of the nature of judicial power,
Justice Field sought to show that the federal courts could not perform administrative work
and in particular lacked power to issue and enforce investigative subpoenas at the behest of
the newly created federal railway commission. See id. at 249-59. Justice Field also argued
that the proposed investigation threatened the railroad's privacy. See id. at 253-54.
356. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 476 (1894).
357. See supra Part I.D.3.
358. 130 U.S. 167, 173 (1889). The conjunction gained wider currency thereafter, appearing in
Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. 179, 185 (1896), and La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 423, 456 (1899), before taking hold completely in twentieth-century
doctrine.
359. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
36o. See Pushaw, supra note ii, at 451.
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Perhaps needless to say, we think the Marshall-Story formulation better
and more faithfully captures the idea of a "case" as used in Article III, and we
propose that scholars and jurists disavow the Justice Field gloss. In any event,
it now seems clear that the case-controversy conjunction arrived on the scene
after nearly a century of ex parte practice and provides scant support for the
view that an adverse-party requirement applies across the board to all matters
brought before Article III courts.
Stepping back from this genealogy, we observe that, from a textual per-
spective, the conjunction of cases and controversies runs afoul of the common-
place presumption that legal drafters use different terms to convey different
meanings. 6 ' That presumption bears particular force here, given that in Article
III, the terms "cases" and "controversies" are repeatedly deployed in two differ-
ent ways. The term "cases" is generally used where a grant of jurisdiction de-
pends on the subject matter of the action, whereas the term "controversies" is
used exclusively where the grant of jurisdiction depends on the identity of the
parties opposing one another.362 Indeed, some scholars (including one of us)
have treated the terms as potentially conveying different meanings, arguing
that "cases" may be the broader of the two and may include both civil and
criminal matters, while the narrower "controversies" may include only disputes
of a civil character.' Pushaw, by contrast, has questioned this civil-criminal
distinction and argued that the terms may actually describe two different func-
tions of the federal judiciary. 6' For Pushaw, cases that implicate federal law
invite the federal courts to play an expositional role, and controversies simply
call upon the federal courts to provide an unbiased forum for the adjudication
361. See, e.g., J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 255-56 (Chicago,
Callaghan & Co., 1891).
362. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or
more states;- between a State and Citizens of another State;- between Citizens of different
States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.").
363. Fletcher, supra note 337, at 266-67; James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original
Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 6o4-12 (1994). This argument echoes
Justice Field's speculation in Pacific Railway. See In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) ("The term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so
in that it is less comprehensive tha[n] the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature.").
364. Pushaw, supra note 11, at 460-65.
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of disputes. 6s While many scholars now agree that controversies differ from
cases, no consensus has yet emerged to explain what the difference is.
Our construct of non-contentious jurisdiction helps to explain the conspic-
uous difference in usage between the terms "case" and "controversy" in a man-
ner that accounts for the presence of ex parte proceedings on federal dockets.
On our view, and in keeping with the Marshall-Story definition of a "case,"
federal courts have the power to exercise non-contentious jurisdiction in feder-
al question proceedings that have been assigned to them by Congress. We
think "cases" include both criminal and civil matters and at the same time con-
template a special function for federal courts. As this Article has noted, non-
contentious matters crop up on both the civil and criminal side of the federal
docket. Just as federal bankruptcy proceedings require federal judicial admin-
istration of the bankruptcy estate, so too do federal criminal matters frequently
lead to the issuance of ex parte search or arrest warrants and the entry of con-
victions on the basis of non-adverse guilty pleas. 3 66 The term "case," particular-
ly as defined by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story, extends broadly
enough to encompass all such proceedings. Article III "controversies," by con-
trast, require a dispute between designated opponents and exclude original pe-
titions for the performance of the administrative functions associated with
non-contentious jurisdiction2
67
365. Pushaw later described his thesis as follows: "In federal question, admiralty, and foreign
officer 'Cases,' the judiciary's main role would be to 'expound' (i.e., interpret and apply)
laws having national and international significance. By contrast, in 'Controversies,' federal
judges would serve chiefly as neutral umpires in resolving bilateral disputes involving the
designated parties." Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power over Federal Court Jurisdiction:
A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 847, 851. For
criticisms of Pushaw's law-declaration thesis, see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Con-
gress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REv. 75, 149 n.278, which argues
that the law-declaration model of the judicial role did not appear in federal jurisprudence
until the twentieth century; and John Harrison, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 229-30 (1997), which
criticizes Pushaw's account as lacking direct evidence and failing to fit with available evi-
dence about foreign officer jurisdiction.
366. We describe guilty pleas as "non-adverse" in the sense that both sides agree as to liability
and the sentence to be imposed. For a suggestion that non-contentious jurisdiction includes
causes both criminal and civil, see Layton B. Register, Spanish Courts, 27 YALE L.J. 769, 772
(1918), which states:
The civil affairs of the courts of first instance are either contentious or non-
contentious. The non-contentious jurisdiction consists of uncontested or ex parte
acts, and includes categories both civil and criminal. The contentious jurisdiction
comprises contested causes and includes all civil and commercial actions which
... can not be brought before the municipal courts.
367. For our suggested distinction between original and ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction,
see infra Part IV.A.i.
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We thus take Pushaw's suggested distinction in a new direction, s68 empha-
sizing less the special law-exposition role of the federal courts and more their
power to exercise their judicial functions despite the lack of a controversy when
Congress has called for the exercise of federal judicial power. A "case," on this
view, might arise under federal law or touch matters of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, without invariably entailing the joinder of adverse parties. Federal
courts might plausibly be given - and, as we have seen, often have been given -
the authority to exercise judicial judgment in the administration of federal law
"cases" on an ex parte or non-contentious basis. That was certainly the view of
the Court in Tutun, which concluded that naturalization petitions give rise to
"cases" within the meaning of Article 111,369 and it is a view that permits theory
for the first time to cohere with text and practice.
2. Hayburn's Case and the Lessons of History
How, then, to account for Hayburn's Case?3"' Congress did, after all, assign
the circuit courts responsibility for processing the pension claims of disabled
veterans on an ex parte basis, and three circuit courts did, indeed, refuse to en-
tertain the claims in question37' (although the judges of some of the courts
agreed to hear the claims, extrajudicially, as "commissioners""3 '). While the
368. Pushaw did not tackle the problem of ex parte proceedings. He did not include ex parte mat-
ters in his discussion of "cases" that lack attendant disputes. See Pushaw, supra note 11, at
480-82 (arguing that English courts expounded the law in such undisputed matters as advi-
sory opinions, prerogative writs, and relator and informer actions). Nor did he suggest that
his account of the meaning of cases would solve the puzzle of ex parte proceedings. Cf. id. at
526-30 (arguing that his case-exposition theory should apply to issues of mootness, ripe-
ness, and standing).
369. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
370. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
371. See supra Part I.A.2. A consideration of Hayburn's Case can be aided by distinguishing be-
tween ex parte proceedings and extrajudicial activities or duties. The former involve proceed-
ings before a court by a single party or by parties without adverse interests seeking an order
of the court or some other judicial action. By contrast, extrajudicial activities are functions
performed by a judge outside the course of regular court or judicial proceedings, whether by
virtue of the judge's office or by special appointment. Some notable examples of extrajudi-
cial activities include the Chief Justice's service on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian
Institution, Justice Robert H. Jackson's role as prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, and
Chief Justice Earl Warren's appointment to head the commission that investigated President
Kennedy's assassination. See Pfander, supra note 6o, at 6. As will be seen infra Part IV, some
of the objections taken by the Justices to the use of courts to administer Congress's pension
scheme included work, such as examining injuries, that was viewed as not properly judicial
in character.
372. Pfander, supra note 60, at 35.
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Court did not decide the question itself, the circuit courts wrote letters to Pres-
ident George Washington, explaining their refusal to do the business. Set forth
in footnotes to the Court's inconclusive proceedings, the letters point to two
flaws in the pension scheme. The first was a lack of judicial finality: the circuit
court decisions were subject to revision by an executive branch official (the Sec-
retary of War) and then by Congress.3 7' The second was a concern with the ju-
dicial nature or the "judicial manner" of the proceeding. 374 Although the finali-
ty concern seems straightforward, the letters do not say precisely what they
mean by the second critique.
Lacking a clear explanation, some scholars have speculated that these
doubts as to the judicial nature of the proceeding were meant to express con-
cern with the ex parte nature of the claims. The first edition of Hart and
Wechsler's federal courts casebook put the issue, characteristically, in the form
of a question: "Was the lack of provision for any party defendant one of the
reasons why the judges thought that the statute did not call for the exercise of
'judicial power'?"37 The current edition, also characteristically, puts the matter
more forthrightly. After posing the hypothetical possibility of a statute assign-
ing the determination of federal Social Security disability claims to the federal
courts on an ex parte basis, the current edition suggests such a statute would
fail: "Hayburn's Case, however, seems to reject rather decisively Congress's ef-
fort to enlist federal courts to act as administrative agencies by applying law to
fact outside the context of a concrete dispute between adverse parties. '',, 6 The
373. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 41o n. On the centrality of the concern with judicial finality, see 8 DHSC,
supra note 56, at 547-49 (quoting notes from Justice James Iredell that highlighted his con-
cern with that feature of the statute); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 70 (1926) (quoting a newspaper account of the Pennsylvania cir-
cuit decision and emphasizing revision by the Secretary of War); id. at 71 (quoting a letter
from Judge Richard Peters, a district judge on the Pennsylvania circuit, that cited the pen-
sion law as one that was rendered improper by the "danger of [e]xecutive control over the
judgments of Courts").
374. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 41o n.
375. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 99 (ist ed. 1953) [hereinafter HART &WECHSLER 1st].
376. HART & WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 84. This possibility is not entirely hypothetical.
Some federal courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over original administrative peti-
tions, citing Hayburn's Case as governing precedent. See, e.g., In re Beck, 526 F. Supp. 2d
1291, 1300-01 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that a statutorily prescribed ex parte license applica-
tion from a salvage vessel operator did not present a case or controversy under Article III be-
cause of a lack of an adverseness and citing Hayburn's Case as support).
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view that Hayburn's Case forecloses ex parte administration of claims has be-
come quite widespread." 7
Widespread-but, we think, anachronistic. Perhaps the strongest evidence
against an adverse-party reading of Hayburn's Case lies in the federal courts'
contemporary and subsequent acceptance of ex parte duties of various sorts.
Indeed, in Hayburn's Case itself, the Supreme Court did not insist on the ap-
pearance of adverse parties. Randolph proceeded by "motion" on behalf of his
client, William Hayburn, and that appears to have been thought sufficient to
authorize an initial evaluation of the merits.37 No one demanded service on, or
the appearance of, the respondent circuit court.17 9 In the wake of Hayburn's
Case, moreover, Congress reassigned pension duties to the district judges on an
ex parte basis.38° More significantly, as we showed earlier, Congress repeatedly
377. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 129, at 594, 595 & n.io8, 599; Wheeler, supra note 17, at 135-36; cf.
Marcus & Teir, supra note 224, at 528 n.ll (listing cases citing to Hayburn's Case as precedent
for the case-or-controversy requirement).
378. To be sure, the Court divided 3-3 and thus refused to permit the Attorney General to appear
to seek an order compelling the enforcement of pension rights by virtue of his office alone.
But that decision simply obliged Randolph to proceed on behalf of Hayburn as his client.
Randolph's motion sought a writ of mandamus directed to the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Pennsylvania, the court to which Hayburn had applied for a pension. See 6
DHSC, supra note 56, at 70 n.i.
379. Standard practice in seeking mandamus required service of the petition on the party against
whom mandamus was being sought. See THOMAs TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS, As IT OBTAINS BOTH IN ENGLAND, AND IN IRELAND
297-98 (London, William Benning & Co., 1848) (observing that the court has the power to
issue mandamus in the first instance, thereby compelling the respondent to comply with the
order on pain of contempt before being given an option to appear and respond to the mo-
tion); id. at 300-01 (describing the rules that govern service of the rule to show cause on the
respondent, thus making clear that notice of the proceeding comes after the petitioner has
made a proper showing in support of the rule and the court has agreed to issue the rule and
demand a response). None of the documents we have encountered refers to service of Ran-
dolph's motion on the circuit court or to the appearance of any other formal defendant. Yet,
curiously, the first edition of Hart & Wechsler asserts that, with the appearance of Hayburn
as a party, "there were two perfectly good adverse parties in the Supreme Court." HART &
WECHSLER 1st, supra note 375, at 99. Perhaps the authors of Hart & Wechsler (and the par-
ticipants) viewed service as unnecessary given the presence of two Pennsylvania circuit
judges (Wilson and Blair) on the Supreme Court bench. In any case, the Court's willingness
to proceed without a formal respondent appears to have been a commonplace feature of
their supervision of their judicial inferiors. In other early cases, the Court entertained ex
parte motions for supervisory writs and did not demand prior notice to, or joinder of, de-
fendants. See supra text accompanying notes 131-136 (describing the petition for a writ of
mandamus in United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795)).
380. The curative 1793 legislation made a number of changes. In particular, it avoided the finality
problem by instructing the district judge to collect evidence under oath and send the evi-
dence along to the Secretary of War and ultimately to Congress, which reserved to itself the
power to make any "proper" order. See An Act To Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions,
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assigned administrative matters to the federal courts. 81 Such matters surely
would have implicated the rule against the judicial acceptance of administrative
assignments, had such a rule emerged from Hayburn's Case. That was what
Justice Brandeis apparently meant by referring to the case in the course of up-
holding ex parte naturalization proceedings in Tutun.3s2
In addition, we have reviewed the contemporaneous commentary and do
not believe that the circuit judges' refusal to act was based upon the ex parte
character of the proceedings. s Apart from the concern with finality, which
was prominently featured in every account of the case, one finds a smattering
of additional concerns, unrelated to the lack of adverseness, that may explain
why some of the judges considered Congress's scheme to require the perfor-
mance of non-judicial duties. In proceedings before the House of Representa-
tives in April 1792, held shortly after the Pennsylvania circuit refused to act, the
reporter described the problems as follows:
[I]t appeared that the Court thought the examination of Invalids a very
extraordinary duty to be imposed on the Judges: and looked on the law
... as an unconstitutional one, inasmuch as it directs the Secretary of
War to state the mistakes of the Judges to Congress for their revision
.... Another objection, on the part of the Judges, was, that whereas
there are laws now in force, prescribing a day, beyond which the court
shall not sit, this new law declares that the court shall not sit five days
for the purpose of hearing claims, whether they be offered or not; and
ch. 17, § 2, 1 Stat. 324, 325 (1793) (calling on the Secretary of War to make a report based on
the evidence submitted as would enable Congress to "take such order thereon, as [it] may
judge proper"); Pfander, supra note 60, at 37-38 (recounting the terms of curative legislation
in which Congress directed the district courts either to collect evidence on pension claims in
the first instance or to assign the task to duly appointed commissioners). In addition, the
task of inspecting wounds and disabilities was transferred from federal judges to physicians,
who were expected to offer their opinion as to the extent of the claimant's disability. See Act
of March 23, 1792 § 2, 1 Stat. 243.
381. See supra Part I (collecting early Republic examples of naturalization proceedings, remission
petitions, and warrant applications).
38a. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926).
383. We have relied primarily on the original documents collected by the editors of the Docu-
mentary History series and on the reports of contemporaneous newspaper accounts in War-
ren's history. See 6 DHSC, supra note S6, at 33-72, 285-95, 370-86 (collecting documents re-
lating to Hayburn's Case, Ex parte Chandler (unreported), and United States v. Todd
(unreported), in Wilfred J. Ritz, United States v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794), 15 WASH. & LEE L.
Rev. 220, 227-31 (1958) ); I WARREN, supra note 373, at 69-82.
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leaves nothing to the discretion and integrity of the Judges, to sit as
long as they have public business to do.""
On this account (which precedes the court's letter to President Washington),
the Pennsylvania circuit viewed the absence of finality as the master objection
and identified two other criticisms that we might today characterize as matters
of judicial dignity. First, the statute called upon the court to conduct a physical
examination of the wounds of the invalids, a duty the judges apparently re-
garded as distasteful.' 8s Second, the statute required that the circuit courts
"remain at [their] places" for "five days, at the least, from the time of opening
the sessions thereof" to allow disabled veterans to file their claims., 86 In the
early days, many circuit courts would sit for a day or two at most and then ad-
journ. 87 Viewing the duty to sit as inconsistent with the "discretion and digni-
ty" of their judicial office, the Pennsylvania circuit judges may have had this af-
front to their discretion in mind in criticizing the law as imposing duties not of
a "judicial" character. 88
Apart from the report in the House proceedings, the editors of the Docu-
mentary History of the Supreme Court have published a previously overlooked set
of notes, authored by Justice James Iredell during the August 1792 argument in
384. 6 DHSC, supra note 56, at 48 (emphasis added). The term "not," italicized here, was appar-
ently included by mistake. Id. at 49 n.6.
385. See Act of March 23, 1792 § 2 (directing that the circuit courts "shall forthwith proceed to
examine into the nature of the wound" and make a finding as to the degree of disability).
386. Id. § 3.
387. See Pfander, supra note 60, at 36-37 & n.189.
388. For the suggestion that the judges were unhappy with the workload associated with pension
duty, see id. at 48-50. One participant in the House investigation of the Pennsylvania circuit,
William Vans Murray, thought it rather "singular" that the judges would exercise the right
to declare a statute unconstitutional when doing so permitted them to "avoid" "merely a
personal duty." Letter from William Vans Murray to John Gwinn (Apr. 15, 1792), in 6
DHSC, supra note 56, at 5o. For the identification of Murray as a member of the committee,
see 6 DHSC, supra note 56, at 49 n.7. The need for a physical examination may help to ex-
plain the logic of Congress's decision to assign the task of initial assessment to the federal
circuit courts. See Mark Tushnet, Dual Office Holding and the Constitution: A View from Hay-
burn's Case, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789,
at 196, 199 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (noting the geographic logic that underlay Congress's
decision to assign fact-finding to the circuit courts in the first instance rather than to the
War Department). Unlike district courts, which typically sat in maritime commercial cen-
ters, the circuit courts convened at various cities in the several states and were more accessi-
ble to disabled veterans.
1429
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Hayburn's Case. 8 , In describing "objections" to the pension statute, Justice
Iredell's notes read as follows:
Objections.
1.Not of a Judicial nature.
2.Not to be exercised in a Judicial manner.
As to the first, it must be found in the Constitution
all Laws under the United States &c.
Contracts equally valid &c.
Pensioners. all public Services
Congress have done nothing more than to direct [the pensioners'] titles
to be re-examined
In effect a Suitor.
Petitions of Right & Monstrans de droit Destitute of forms of Writ
Suit a Demand of any thing.
A more dignified mode of becoming a Defendant
2. Not to be executed in a Judicial way.
Examples.
To inspect wounds in the case of Mayhems.
Substance only to be regarded where a Sovereignty permits itself to be
sued.
Forms may be disregarded where Parties agree.390
389. See 8 DHSC, supra note S6, at 547-550 & n.1 (2007) (reproducing notes from Justice Iredell
that were omitted from the treatment of Hayburn's Case in Volume 6 of the Documentary
Histoy). Although Justice Iredell often took copious notes, see S DHSC, supra note 56, at
164-93, 214-17 (collecting the Justice's extensive notes on his views about the susceptibility
of states to suit and his account of the argument in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793)), we do not know how well he captured the discussion or whether his notes reflect
the views of the Justices or the arguments of counsel.
390. 8 DHSC, supra note 56, at 548-49. It appears that the two prior "objections" were those of
the other Justices that he did not necessarily share. Notably, the language of those two ob-
jections in Justice Iredell's notes closely tracked the language of the Pennsylvania circuit
court's objections. The conversation appeared to range widely and included a discussion of
the possibility that the Supreme Court might correct the pension errors of the Secretary of
War through the use of mandamus. Id. (expressing doubts that the secretary's duty was
clear enough to warrant mandamus, but noting that the oath to support the Constitution
might trigger mandamus in any case involving conduct in violation of constitutional duty).
In a later case, the Court rejected the use of mandamus to add individuals to the pension list,
opining somewhat cryptically that "Mandamus cannot issue to the secretary of War for
(such] purposes." Exparte Chandler (unreported), in 6 DHSC, supra note S6, at 294-95 (re-
producing Chandler's application for mandamus to compel his addition to the pension list
and the minutes of the Court's rejection of the motion).
1430
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Even as it poses obvious interpretive challenges, this evocative fragment
may provide a window into the nature of the Justices' concerns. The second
"objection" tends to confirm that one or more Justices continued to view the
obligation to examine the wounds of the petitioners as casting doubt on the
"judicial manner" of the proceeding. Justice Iredell's notes suggest that some-
one attempted to respond by invoking the "example" of "mayhems." At com-
mon law, as various digests and abridgments of the day confirm, a judge called
upon to hear a case of "mayhem" was obliged to inspect the plaintiffs wounds
in the course of adjudicating the claim.39" ' The mayhem example seems intend-
ed to answer any doubts (apparently unrelated to any concern with a need for
adverse parties) that had arisen as to the "judicial" quality of the examination
obligation.
392
Justice Iredell's account of the first objection addresses a different issue.
One could argue that the arguments in Justice Iredell's notes denote a lingering
concern with the formal joinder of the United States as a defendant and there-
fore provide some support for an interpretation of the circuit court letters as
reflecting a concern with proper parties. But a variety of considerations point
away from adopting this adverse-party gloss on Hayburn's Case. First, none of
the Justices suggested, either in the letters or in comments collected in Justice
Iredell's notes, that the federal courts lacked power over the proceedings in the
absence of adverse parties. The concern instead appeared to focus on sovereign
dignity and formal consent to suit.393 Second, of the broad mix of considera-
391. See 2 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw lo (London, A. Strahan 1768) (re-
porting that the Justices "cannot increase the Damages without their View" in a case of
mayhem); 1 ISAAC ESPINASSE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ACTIONS AT Nisi PRIUS 399-400
(Philadelphia, J. Crukshank & W. Young 1791) (reporting that in cases of wounding or
mayhem, the court "may upon view encrease the damages," and noting cases in which such
an increase was allowed "on a view of the party, and examination of the surgeon"); 2
CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 532-33 (Lawbook Exchange
2009) (1742) (reporting on prayer by defendant for "examin[ation] by Justices" in case of
mayhem and reporting that a judgment of mayhem adjudged upon "by Inspection of the
Court" was peremptory); WOOD, supra note 30, at 546 (reporting that in cases of battery and
mayhem, "[t]he Court may Encrease the Damages upon View of the Record and the Per-
son").
392. Potentially confirming this interpretation, when Congress adopted a new pension law in
1793, it called for physicians to conduct the examinations and to provide their opinions to
the judge as to the extent of any disability. An Act To Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pen-
sions, ch. 17, S 2, 1 Stat. 324, 325 (1793).
393. Issues of sovereign dignity may have been much on the mind of the Attorney General, the
Justices, and Justice Iredell in particular. Justice Iredell joined in dismissing the precursor to
Chisholm while serving as a Circuit Justice in 1791. The case reappeared on the Supreme
Court's original docket in February 1792. Arguments in Chisholm at the Supreme Court were
held one year later in February 1793. Edmund Randolph appeared as counsel of record for
Chisholm. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419 (identifying Randolph as counsel for plain-
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tions in play, only the concern with finality was consistently articulated and
broadly shared.394 Third, the Justices' views were apparently evolving; while
the five-day provision informed the circuit court's initial response in April, it
did not appear in Justice Iredell's notes of the argument in August.3 95 Fourth, it
may be difficult ultimately to separate the concern with the manner of suing
the United States from the problem of finality. Congress's desire to retain con-
trol over the purse strings certainly informed its approach to pension claims
and later led it to assign money claims to legislative courts that were not con-
strained by Article III's judicial finality requirement. 96
The lesson of Hayburn's Case is not that the federal courts lack power to
hear ex parte proceedings, but that they can act only where their decision will
have a binding, legally determinative effect. The prospect of executive revision
would have denied that effect to the courts' pension decisions. And the lack of
finality explains subsequent cases in which the Court has invoked Hayburn's
Case to support the proposition that the work of commissioners lies beyond the
judicial power conferred in Article III. In such well-known cases as Ferreira and
Gordon,397 the Court refused to accept an appellate role in reviewing the prelim-
inary work of non-Article III tribunals. In each case, Congress had failed to as-
cribe finality to the adjuncts' work, bringing the cases squarely within the final-
ity principle of Hayburn's Case. Rather than a precedent that rejects judicial
administration, in short, Hayburn's Case should be read as a precedent that in-
sists on judicial finality.
tiff); 5 DHSC, supra note 56, at 129-32. Justice Iredell's notes of the proceedings in Hay-
burn's Case were taken in August 1792. See 8 DHSC, supra note 56, at 547-49.
394. Justice Iredell later explained that the "Objection" that "weighed most with him" was the
proviso subjecting the courts' determination to executive and legislative revision. 8 DHSC,
supra note 56, at 549.
395. Randolph strongly urged the legality of the pension scheme, and his views, as well as those
of the other Justices, may have changed some minds. On Randolph's attitude, see Letter
from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, in 6 DHSC, supra note S6, at 45, which de-
scribes a brief conversation with Justice Wilson; and Letter from Edmund Randolph to
James Madison, id. at 67-68, which recounts Randolph's attempt to persuade the Court in
the pension case and offering a somewhat critical view of Chief Justice Jay's command of the
law.
396. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 643-47, 651-53 (1985) (de-
scribing the Hayburn's Case finality rule as making Congress reluctant to authorize the fed-
eral courts to hear claims against the United States and discussing the compromise that led
in 1855 to the creation of a non-final Article I tribunal, known as the Court of Claims, that
acted in an advisory capacity and was subject to congressional oversight).
397. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1864); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 51-52 (1851).
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3. Feigned Cases and Adverse Parties
In attempting to justify the adverse-party requirement, scholars also some-
times point to the hostility that courts now direct towards feigned or collusive
cases, which were a commonplace of early federal practice but now are soundly
repudiated. 398 Feigned cases, which have a long pedigree in English and Ameri-
can judicial proceedings, are cases constructed by the parties upon a contrived
or assumed set of facts in order to obtain a judicial decree or decision on a point
of law.399 Importantly, however, the decisions that restrict the use of collusive
cases do not actually question the power of the federal courts to hear non-
contentious proceedings in general, but only collusive proceedings that assume
the form of contentious ones. Consider Lord v. Veazie,400 the decision that Jus-
tice Scalia (in Windsor) and many scholars have identified as an important early
articulation of the adverse-party requirement.40 ' There, Chief Justice Taney
minced no words in decrying the parties' invocation of judicial power in collu-
sive proceedings:
It is the office of courts of justice to decide the rights of persons and of
property, when the persons interested cannot adjust them by agreement
between themselves, - and to do this upon the full hearing of both par-
ties. And any attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the opin-
ion of the court upon a question of law which a party desires to know
for his own interest or his own purposes, when there is no real and sub-
stantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties to the
suit, is an abuse which courts of justice have always reprehended, and
treated as a punishable contempt of court.
4 °2
In accordance with these views, the Court dismissed an appeal after it became
clear that the parties were not true adversaries but had conspired in presenting
a feigned case that was meant to secure an advantageous statement of the law
for use against an unrepresented third party.
40 3
Given the potential for abuse of the rights of third parties, one can readily
understand why the Court attempted to limit the use of feigned proceedings.
398. See Morley, supra note 18, at 661; Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 567-70.
399. See Lindsay G. Robertson, "A Mere Feigned Case": Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy
and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 249, 259-60.
400.49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
4o. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2703 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Lord, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 255-56).
402. Lord, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 255.
403. See id.
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Yet historians agree that feigned proceedings were a fairly commonplace tool of
adjudication in the early Republic.4°4 Previous work identifies property dis-
putes and tax cases as primary exemplars of feigned cases. For example, in
Hylton v. United States, the officials of the Treasury Department structured a
feigned dispute to obtain a test of the federal carriage tax.4"' Similarly, in Pen-
nington v. Coxe, the parties set up a wager agreement that would satisfy the
amount-in-controversy threshold needed to procure review in the Supreme
Court.4°6 Other well-known examples of cases alleged to be feigned include
Fletcher v. Peck,40 7 M'Culloch v. Maryland,4°s and Cohens v. Virginia,4" 9 where
fictitious factual circumstances were pleaded in order to secure a test of the
constitutionality of state laws .
410
One can best grasp the early appeal of feigned proceedings when one un-
derstands their similarity to a modern declaratory judgment action. Most
feigned proceedings enabled parties to secure a definitive judicial clarification
of law or fact as the basis for ordering their affairs. In Hylton, the parties genu-
inely disputed the constitutionality of the carriage tax; ownership of i50 car-
riages was feigned only to ensure access to the Court's docket. Similarly, in
Pennington, the feigned wager between the parties was designed to secure ac-
404. See Bloch, supra note 129, at 612 (treating collusive suits as a commonplace feature of the
early Republic).
405. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). For an account, see Robert P. Frankel, Jr., Before Marbury:
Hylton v. United States and the Origins ofjudicial Review, 28 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 1 (2003).
406. See Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804); see also Charlotte Crane, Pennington v.
Coxe: A Glimpse at the Federal Government at the End of the Federalist Era, 23 VA. TAX REV. 417
(2003) (explaining the wager contrivance in Pennington).
407. 1o U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (181o).
408. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
409. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821).
41o. See 1 WARREN, supra note 373, at 146-47, 392-95 & n.1 (describing both Hylton and Fletcher as
feigned cases); Robertson, supra note 399, at 256-65; see also Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Ef-
ficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 1O65, 1073, 1092-93 (2000) (suggesting that Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823), was a feigned case); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland,
and the Southern States' Rights Tradition, 33 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 875, 912-13 (2000) (discuss-
ing charges that Cohens was a feigned case); Pfander & Hunt, supra note 57, at 1884-87,
1894-1903 (describing the feigned case of Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (18o6),
in which such prominent early American statesmen as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and Chief Justice John Marshall all played central roles in procuring a feigned judicial test of
the legality of the capture of a vessel by officers of the United States during the quasi-war
with France); Harold J. Plous & Gordon E. Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland: Right Principle,
Wrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REv. 710, 725 (1957) (noting accusation that McCulloch was a feigned
case).
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cess to a federal trial docket for a resolution of a genuine dispute.41' Taking ac-
count of these developments, the Court explained in Lord that amicable actions
are "approved and encouraged, because they facilitate greatly the administra-
tion of justice." '412
Yet the very idea of an agreed-upon dispute posed a threat to the interests
of courts and third parties. Just as courts today issue declaratory judgments on-
ly in cases of "actual controversy,"43 so too courts in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries worried that litigants would present amicable cases to obtain a
legal pronouncement for reasons other than to resolve a genuine disagreement
about the law.414 Hence the idea, also expressed in Lord, that "there must be an
actual controversy, and adverse interests."415 The Court attempted to ensure
compliance with this adverse-party limit by threatening lawyers who brought
improper feigned cases with contempt sanctions. 4' 6
Lord thus introduces the idea that parties may contrive amicable proceed-
ings to obtain a declaration of their respective rights only in cases of genuine
uncertainty as to the law applicable to their own circumstances. When the par-
ties lack adverse interests, feigned litigation often aims to secure a precedent
rather than to resolve a dispute. Feigned cases to procure advantageous prece-
dents became particularly troublesome during the Gilded Age, as railroads and
other regulated entities hit upon ingenious strategies to structure private litiga-
tion that would necessitate the adjudication of constitutional issues.417 In one
411. Robertson, supra note 399, at 262-63 (discussing Hylton and Pennington).
412. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850).
413. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
414. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 399, at 259-63; cf. Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791,
83 YALE L.J. 999, 1009-10 (1974) (describing growing antipathy towards the trying of
feigned issues in England).
415. Lord, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 255.
416. Id. Contempt was commonly used by the superior courts in England to punish lawyers for
bringing improper feigned proceedings. See Bethany R. Berger, "Power over This Unfortunate
Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MAuy L. REV. 1957,
2000-01 (2004) (citing Hoskins v. Berkeley, loo Eng. Rep. lo86, 1o86 (K.B. 1791)).
417. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (refusing to entertain a collusive challenge to
the constitutionality of federal law); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S.
339, 345 (1892) (observing that action brought by passenger to challenge constitutionality of
rates charged by railroad was a collusive suit designed to secure an appeal from the legisla-
ture to the courts). See generally William C. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Pro-
cedure, 26 REv. LITIG. 641 (2007) (tracing the impact of Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis on
the Court's development of prudential doctrines of avoidance). On the importance of the
facts, see Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002 & n.2 (1924)
(explaining that the "stuff of these contests" over constitutional rights "are facts, and judg-
ments upon facts").
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such case, a railroad contrived to have a passenger bring suit for damages after
seeking and being denied the opportunity to purchase a ticket at a new regulat-
ed rate. 4' s In other cases, friendly shareholders would initiate a derivative suit
to block the corporation from purchasing bonds issued by a federal agency,419
and friendly trustees would request instructions as to the legality of a course of
action in the face of feigned constitutional uncertainty."
The Court's willingness to entertain more or less friendly constitutional
challenges to government regulation came under fire from Progressives and
New Dealers. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice Brandeis spoke
for four members of the Court in arguing against the friendly shareholder's de-
rivative suit as a tool of constitutional adjudication."' Concurring in the major-
ity's decision to uphold the Authority's role in the market for electricity, Justice
Brandeis argued that the Court should not have reached the merits.' The first
precept on Justice Brandeis's well-known list of justiciability limits focused on
the need for adverse parties:
418. See Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 143 U.S. at 345 (indicating hostility to "friendly" consti-
tutional challenges to legislative enactments absent an "honest and actual antagonistic" rela-
tionship between the parties). After the parties agreed to the factual record, the railroad
sought an instruction that the new law, restricting passenger ticket prices, violated its con-
stitutional rights as a taking of property. When the state court refused the instruction, the
railroad appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan. Wellman v. Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co.,
47 N.W. 489, 489-9o (Mich. 189o). The Attorney General of Michigan appeared for the
first time in the proceeding to defend the state law and characterized the proceeding as a
feigned case. See id. The Supreme Court agreed and expressed concern lest the parties con-
struct an artificial factual record on which the constitutional evaluation was to be made. See
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 143 U.S. at 345.
419. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 18o, 199-202 (1921) (upholding juris-
diction over suit to block the company from investing in a federal bond issue on the ground
that Congress lacked power under the Constitution to clothe a federal instrumentality with
such authority). On the use of derivative suits by an out-of-state shareholder to procure ac-
cess to federal court on the basis of diversity, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz,
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 261, 265-71 (1981) (discussing Dodge v. Woolsey, S9 U.S. (18 How.) 331
(1855)).
42o. See Comment, The Case-Concept and Some Recent Indirect Procedures for Attacking the Constitu-
tionality of Federal Regulatory Statutes, 45 YALE. L.J. 649 (1936) (describing the use of stock-
holder's suits and cases framed in reorganization proceedings as weapons in the battle be-
tween American business and the New Deal); cf In re Cent. W. Pub. Serv. Co., 13 F. Supp.
239 (D. Del. 1935) (refusing to adjudicate constitutionality of federal law in an ex parte peti-
tion for instructions).
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The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individu-
als. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'4 3
Justice Brandeis knew from his own experience as an advocate that the rec-
ord was crucial to the defense of the constitutionality of government regula-
tion .' He presumably also knew that parties to a friendly dispute over the
constitutionality of regulation could not be relied upon to develop a record that
would ensure a searching evaluation of the law's justification and its impact on
regulated entities.
Apart from helping to ensure that the Court could effectively perform its
role in constitutional adjudication, Justice Brandeis's emphasis on the need for
adverse parties was echoed by Congress's actions to secure a place for the gov-
ernment in the litigation of constitutional claims. In legislation enacted in 1937,
one year after Ashwander, Congress called upon the district courts to notify the
Attorney General of the United States of constitutional issues that arise in pri-
vate litigation.4"5 In addition, the legislation conferred a right of intervention
on the federal government, enabling it to defend the constitutionality of federal
statutes.4 6 Now codified in Title 28, the federal intervention right has been
buttressed by rules of procedure that oblige the parties in private litigation to
423. Id. at 346 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry., 143 U.S. at 345).
424. Justice Brandeis was the author, with his sister-in-law Josephine Goldmark, of the brief for
the prevailing party in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (19o8), which relied upon an exten-
sively developed factual record detailing the effects of long working hours on women's
health. In the brief, Justice Brandeis and Goldmark argued successfully in favor of uphold-
ing a state restriction on working hours for women. For an account of the use of the so-
called "Brandeis brief" to defend social legislation, see OWEN M. Fiss, 8 HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-
191o, at 175-76 (1993); and NANCY WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 28-33 (1996).
425. See Act of Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-352, § 1, 50 Stat. 751, 751 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2403). For background on the adoption of the statute, see Raoul Berger, Intervention by Pub-
lic Agencies in Private Litigation in the Federal Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65 (1940). The intervention
provision originally appeared as part of President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, but it was
eventually enacted as part of a less ambitious and controversial set of provisions. See Note,
Federal Intervention in Private Actions Involving the Public Interest, 65 HARV. L. REV. 319, 322 &
nn.15-16 (1951).
426. See Note, supra note 425, at 321-22.
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perform the notification function.4  Notably, upon intervention the govern-
ment was to have the right to present "evidence" and was to enjoy "all the
rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party ... to the extent nec-
essary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of
constitutionality.4 8 Congress, then, sought to buttress the factual and argu-
mentative record on which findings as to constitutionality were to be based. 4"9
Congress displayed much the same concern with institutionalizing adverse-
party procedures in adopting the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.430 The act
authorizes "courts of the United States" to declare "the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration." 43' But the act care-
fully limits the issuance of such declaratory judgments to cases "of actual con-
troversy."432 By authorizing declaratory judgments, the legislation significantly
undercut the need for any further reliance on feigned or collusive suits to ob-
tain the same sort of relief (thereby further pushing those proceedings to the
margins of federal practice). By including a statutory requirement of an "actual
controversy," moreover, the Declaratory Judgment Act addressed concerns that
the granting of declaratory judgments would be akin to the impermissible issu-
ance of advisory opinions.433 Finally, the requirement of adverse parties helped
to protect the interests of third parties from proceedings that might affect their
rights.
427. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1 (obliging a party to serve the Attorney General with notice of any pa-
per filed in federal court that calls into question the constitutionality of a federal statute).
Advisory committee notes explain that the notice obligation imposed by rule on the parties
.supplements the court's duty to certify a constitutional challenge." FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1 cmt.
(2006).
428. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2012).
429. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (treating the adverse-party requirement
as essential to the integrity of the judicial process and indispensable to the adjudication of
constitutional questions by the Supreme Court).
430. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-343, 48 Stat. 955.
431. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). For background on the Declaratory Judgment Act, see HART &
WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 56-57.
432. 28 U.S.C. 5 2201(a).
433. Compare Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) (questioning the power of
federal courts to entertain declaratory judgment actions in light of the case-and-controversy
requirement), with Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (upholding
the Declaratory Judgment Act after limiting its application to "definite and concrete" dis-
putes that touch "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests"). The decision
in Haworth upholding the Declaratory Judgment Act casts serious doubt on earlier cases that
questioned the legitimacy of declaratory-style adjudication. Cf Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911) (refusing, despite express congressional authority, to address the
constitutionality of a statute that reallocated land rights conferred in earlier law).
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The "cryptic" decision in Muskrat anticipated these statutory developments
to some extent.434 The case arose after Congress enlarged the number of tribal
members who were to participate in a land allotment, thereby reducing the
stake of the original members of the group.43 When litigation was later filed
seeking to enjoin the Interior Department from enforcing the later legislation,
Congress authorized certain tribal members to challenge their reduced allot-
ment by suing the United States in the court of claims."36 When that suit was
dismissed, the tribal members sought review under a provision of the law au-
thorizing direct appeal to the Supreme Court.437 The Court held that the matter
lay beyond the power of the Article III judiciary.138 In the Court's view, Con-
gress was simply seeking an advisory opinion as to the constitutionality of the
subsequent legislation, whereas the resolution of constitutional questions was
limited to disputes between adverse parties.4 9 Notably, the Court agreed one
year later to address the issue in the more familiar context of adversary litiga-
tion between tribal members and the Interior Department."
Time has not been kind to Muskrat. Judge Fletcher argued that Muskrat has
been superseded by the recognized power of federal courts to issue declaratory
judgments and by subsequent cases that exercise that power in more adven-
turesome contexts.44' The Hart and Wechsler casebook reaches much the same
conclusion, treating the case as "puzzling" and "cryptic" and suggesting that it
would lack contemporary relevance if it did nothing more than cast doubt on
434. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361.
435. Id. at 348-49.
436. Id. at 349-50.
437. Id. at 350.
438. Id. at 363. That the case lay beyond the power of Article III courts would not necessarily de-
feat the jurisdiction of the court of claims, a legislative court. But the Court viewed the case
as one entirely unsuited for resolution by the court of claims because it did not seek an
award of damages for a taking of property or any other form of relief cognizable in the court
of claims. Rather, the Court simply sought a decision as to constitutionality, as a prelude to
further review in the Supreme Court under a statute that conferred appellate review as of
right. See id. at 350 (conferring a "right of appeal" on either party to obtain final decision in
the Supreme Court). Because the Court viewed the preliminary action in the court of claims
as inseparable from Congress's desire to procure a determination by the Court, it chose to
invalidate the statute in its entirety and directed the court of claims (which had reached the
merits) to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 363.
439. See id. at 361 ("That judicial power, as we have seen, is the right to determine actual contro-
versies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.").
440. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 282 n.284 (1988) (citing
Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912)).
441. Id. at 281-82.
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the validity of declaratory judgments.442 One might argue that the decision an-
ticipates Justice Brandeis's effort to ensure (through the rejection of collusive
claims) a proper record for constitutional adjudication. 443 But it does not cast
doubt on the power of federal courts to entertain non-contentious proceedings
assigned to them by Congress. Indeed, Justice Brandeis cited Muskrat in Tutun
for the proposition that the presence of a case or controversy was vital for ju-
risdiction, without suggesting that its insistence on adverse parties posed any
threat to the power of the federal courts to hear naturalization petitions.4 "
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF NON-CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
A. The Theory Sketched
1. Original and Ancillary Non-Contentious jurisdiction
Having demonstrated the constitutional basis for the non-contentious ju-
risdiction of federal courts, we now face the task of delineating the forms of
that jurisdiction and the principles governing it. First, we must distinguish be-
tween "original" and "ancillary" non-contentious jurisdiction. In our view, the
non-contentious matters we have described in this Article can be separated into
actions that are originally non-contentious and non-contentious features of ac-
tions that are ancillary to an actual or potential dispute. A federal statute con-
ferring original non-contentious jurisdiction must provide for the assertion of a
442. See HART &WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 97-98,140.
443. The Court relied on the fact that the United States, though nominally a defendant, did not
have any interest in the resolution of the claims:
The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional validity of this
class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property
right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against
the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judg-
ment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question.
Such judgment will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to
the court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. In a legal sense
the judgment could not be executed, and amounts in fact to no more than an ex-
pression of opinion upon the validity of the acts in question.
Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361-62.
444. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926). Justice Brandeis may have borrowed
the possible adverse party formulation from Muskrat, which had approvingly quoted Justice
Field's use of the construct in defining "cases." See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting In re
Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 258 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)). For an argument that Justice Field
improperly added the potential adverse-party element to the Marshall-Story definition of a
case, see supra notes 354-362 and accompanying text.
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claim of right. Typically, the party will claim an entitlement to a benefit created
by federal law, such as the right to naturalized citizenship or to seek a mitiga-
tion of penalties or the waiver of fees. In other contexts, the party seeks legal
validation of an act or status, such as in the application for a warrant or the
condemnation of property. In still other contexts, the party claims a right to the
invocation of administrative or judicial machinery for the disposition of an es-
tate, as in bankruptcy proceedings or the appointment of an equity receiver.
Apart from assigning federal courts "original" jurisdiction over non-
contentious matters, we believe that Congress may also confer power on the
federal courts to entertain "ancillary" non-contentious proceedings. Many of
the examples of non-contentious jurisdiction that we cataloged in Part I arise in
connection with a dispute between actual or potential adversaries. Consent de-
crees settle disputes between contending parties, just as guilty pleas resolve
criminal charges, and default judgments are entered in connection with litiga-
tion to secure an unmet demand upon a party who has failed to answer the
court's summons. In all these instances, the power of federal courts grows out
of their duty, in any case properly before them, to provide parties with the re-
lief to which applicable law entitles them.445 Like consent decrees, which are
ancillary to the resolution of pending disputes (as Redish and Kastanek have
recognized), much of the non-contentious work of the federal courts takes
place in the shadow of potential or actual contention. Both original and ancil-
lary non-contentious jurisdiction have a place in our conception of federal judi-
cial power.
2. The Elements of Non-Contentious Jurisdiction
Drawing on the Marshall-Story formulation of a case, as well as on the fea-
tures of non-contentious jurisdiction handed down from the Romans, we think
that Congress has power to assign federal courts responsibility for the adjudi-
cation or administration of certain claims brought without the presence of an
adverse party. Recall what Chief Justice Marshall said in defining power over
federal question "cases" (but not "controversies") in especially broad terms:
[The federal question grant] enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That pow-
44s. Some matters that are entertained under a court's original non-contentious jurisdiction
share some of these features. For instance, equity receiverships provide relief to creditors
whose legitimate claims cannot be satisfied, and bankruptcy proceedings involve potentially
conflicting claims of creditors to an estate insufficient to satisfy them all.
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er is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a par-
ty who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.
46
Here, Chief Justice Marshall emphasizes three elements: the party must assert
a claim of right, the claim must implicate federal law, and the claim must pro-
ceed in the "form prescribed by law."" 7
Although Chief Justice Marshall did not say so expressly, the second ele-
ment of his definition -the requirement that cases must implicate the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States -imposes an important limit on
the scope of original non-contentious jurisdiction. While the federal courts
may hear non-contentious "cases" that seek to vindicate a claim of federal right,
the original non-contentious power does not extend to "controversies" defined
by the alignment of the parties. Controversies really do require opposing par-
ties, as Justice Scalia and Pushaw and Redish have observed. The paradigmatic
example of such a controversy, a diversity dispute between citizens of different
states, helped to define the early contentious work of the federal courts. Apart
from the linguistic fact that a controversy connotes a dispute between parties,
the federal courts have little business exercising original non-contentious juris-
diction over matters of non-federal law. State legislatures would not ordinarily
welcome federal judicial administration of state law, for example, and lack the
power to assign such matters to the federal courts even if they did welcome
their assistance. The familiar "probate exception" to Article III might best be
understood as an outgrowth of the principle that federal judicial power over
controversies requires a dispute between adversaries and does not extend to
original non-contentious applications for rights created by state law." 8
But the inability of the federal courts to exercise "original" non-contentious
jurisdiction over matters of state law does not preclude those courts' exercise of
"ancillary" non-contentious jurisdiction in controversies otherwise properly be-
fore them. As long as a dispute within the contentious jurisdiction of the feder-
al courts implicates the judicial power of the United States, the court may grant
the full range of approved remedies. This means that a federal court may un-
dertake the inquisitorial duties associated with entry of consent decrees and de-
446. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824).
447. Id. Chief Justice Marshall's definitions of a "suit" in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 454 (1829) ("any proceeding in a court of justice, in which an individual
pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the law affords him"), and in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 408 (1821) ("all cases were the party suing claims to obtain
something to which he has a right"), echo these elements.
448. See Pfander & Downey, supra note 86 (evaluating claims that the probate exception stems
from Article III's omission of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, from Article III's law and equity lim-
its, and from general principles of federalism, and concluding that it stems from the limits
on the power to administer the law in controversies governed by state law).
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fault judgments in any matter properly before the court, even in diverse-party
controversies that do not seek to vindicate any federal right. In this sense, at
least, our construct of ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction applies to some
matters that others might characterize as involving potential adversaries.
The final element of Chief Justice Marshall's definition requires the party
seeking to invoke the non-contentious jurisdiction of the federal courts to fol-
low the form "prescribed by law." This element of the definition properly cap-
tures the primacy of Congress in defining the scope of non-contentious juris-
diction. Congress can, as Justice Brandeis observed, assign administrative
matters to federal agencies or to federal courts or create a system of shared re-
sponsibility among them."' 9 While the federal courts presume that Congress
intends to preserve contentious judicial review of final agency action,4 ° no
similar presumption should operate in favor of judicial resolution of non-
contentious proceedings in the first instance. Federal courts, on this view,
should accept congressional assignments of non-contentious work but should
not seek out such assignments through the "alchemy" of statutory interpreta-
tion. 41' Nor should they develop a counterpart to their disputed (and to some
extent disavowed) power to recognize the existence of implied rights of action
to enforce federal statutes that contain no explicit right of action.4 2 We see no
basis for the creation of an implied non-contentious right of action that would
enable private parties to choose a federal judicial proceeding instead of one in
the proper agency (nor do we think it likely that federal judges would clamor to
create such a doctrine).
At the same time, the common-law tradition, as confirmed by federal prac-
tice, can provide a form "prescribed by law" within which a party or parties
may pursue uncontested proceedings. Default judgments, both in law and eq-
uity, have deep roots in the legal tradition. From the power to issue default
judgments, courts derive the power to register settlement agreements and enter
guilty pleas. In all of these instances, the federal courts proceed in ancillary
449. See Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576-77.
450. See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988).
451. "Alchemy" was the label that Justice Frankfurter attached to what he viewed as a particularly
aggressive form of statutory interpretation in support of the power of federal courts to en-
tertain suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements. See Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 462 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that Justice
Douglas's majority opinion had attempted to accomplish more than could fairly be achieved
through the "alchemy" of statutory interpretation); cf. James E. Pfander, Judicial Purpose and
the Scholarly Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. z43 (1991) (arguing that Jus-
tice Frankfurter's claim was based on a selective and ultimately unpersuasive evaluation of
the statute's text and legislative history).
452. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164-65 (2008).
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non-contentious jurisdiction and do so without any specific grant of authority
from Congress. Yet congressional approval of these practices can be easily in-
ferred from the available legal materials. In the case of default judgments, au-
thorized by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Enabling
Act confers rulemaking authority on the Supreme Court, culminating in the
promulgation of rules that take effect unless Congress disapproves of them.4"3
Judicial activity in uncontested bankruptcy proceedings, the entry of plea
agreements, and the registration of settlements enjoy a similar foundation in
positive law.
454
3. Other Requirements for the Exercise of Non-Contentious jurisdiction
Apart from the elements embedded in the Marshall-Story formulation of a
"case," several other requirements deserve a place in the definition of the scope
of federal non-contentious jurisdiction.4"5 First, the federal courts can exercise
non-contentious jurisdiction only where their decisions will enjoy the finality
demanded by Article III. The finality requirement emerges from Hayburn's
Case, in which various justices and district judges adverted to the prospect of
executive revision in refusing to accept the judicial role thrust upon them by
Congress. 4s6 The Court has consistently reaffirmed the finality rule in various
settings, 4 7 particularly in the context of ex parte proceedings. For example, fi-
453. See 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (2012).
454. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (bankruptcy); FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) (settlements); FED. R. ClIM.
P. 11 (pleas).
455. Of the elements of non-contentious jurisdiction sketched in this section, we regard both the
finality requirement and the requirement that the jurisdiction call for the exercise of judicial,
rather than ministerial, judgment as rooted in Article III's provision for federal courts to ex-
ercise only the "judicial power" of the United States. Finality has been a hallmark of the ex-
ercise of federal judicial power since 1792. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
Similarly, the Court has long recognized that the assignment of non-judicial duties to feder-
al judges may pose a threat to branch independence. Thus, the Court has insisted that feder-
al judges called upon to play legislative and administrative roles in certain matters must re-
main- free to refuse the assignment and must honor the primacy of their judicial
assignments. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Mandatory assignment of
ministerial work to federal courts would violate this separation-of-powers precept. We view
the third element, the court's duty to conduct an inquisitorial investigation into the facts
underlying any application for the exercise of non-contentious power, as implicit in statutes
conferring such power on the court. But we recognize that it may be easier to enforce such
an obligation through the creation of a judicial culture sympathetic to inquisitorial duties
than through appellate review.
456. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
457. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (invalidating congressional leg-
islation because it violated the finality rule).
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nality concerns informed the Court's approach to naturalization proceedings in
Spratt v. Spratt.458 Speaking through the Chief Justice, the Court emphasized
that a decision granting a petition for citizenship was subject to review but was
to be regarded as a binding judgment unless it was overturned through proper
proceedings. 4 9 Justice Brandeis made much the same argument in Tutun, em-
phasizing that a judgment conferring citizenship was conclusive, although sub-
ject to proper forms of judicial revision.460 Under the common-law system,
writs of scire facias and coram nobis were available to reopen proceedings and
challenge matters of record. (Those writs no longer control in federal courts,
having been superseded by the all-purpose Rule 6o motion.)461 As long as the
courts themselves preside over the revision of their own decrees, no problem of
executive revision would appear to arise, even where the government itself is
the party seeking to reopen the judgment.4
62
Although finality is justly regarded as essential to the exercise of judicial
power, finality in the context of non-contentious jurisdiction does not require
final judicial resolution of an entire dispute. That is the function of contentious
jurisdiction. Instead, finality simply requires the conclusive determination of
the issue that has been assigned to the federal courts for decision (subject, per-
haps, to appeal to a higher Article III court). On this view, federal courts can
determine a single issue in the context of a proceeding that will ultimately be
resolved by a different institution. Consider the initial fact-finding preceding
the resolution of a petition for remission of penalties; Justice Story explained
that it was upon the district court's "statement of the facts, and this only, that
the secretary is authorized to proceed."46' Consider as well the enforcement of
discovery requests, whether in support of a foreign proceeding (through letters
rogatory) or in support of administrative investigations (through administra-
tive subpoenas). In such matters, the federal court conclusively resolves the
right to discovery, but the court does so in support of another judicial or ad-
ministrative institution's proceeding. 46 4
458. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393 (1830).
459. Id. at 407.
460. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926).
461. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (providing procedures for obtaining relief from a judgment); see also
FED. R. Crv. P. 6o(e) (abolishing coram nobis); FED. R. Civ. P. 8o(b) (abolishing scire faci-
as).
462. See HART &WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 85-94.
463. The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1815); see also supra
Part I.A.3 (discussing remission proceedings).
464. See supra Part I.F.6.
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Second, non-contentious jurisdiction obligates the federal trial court to
conduct its own investigation of the facts and law that govern the propriety of
the proposed judgment. We saw in the example of prize cases, for instance, the
robust role assumed by the admiralty court in determining the basis for con-
demnation.46, An explanation for this role may lie in the concern that courts
might have felt for the accuracy or completeness of cases presented to them on
an ex parte basis; as was seen in Roman law and in proceedings under the Nat-
uralization Act of 1790, in cases of non-contentious jurisdiction, the court bears
responsibility to test fully the legality of the claim.
The inquisitorial duty that we propose can be illustrated in today's terms
by the rules governing the entry of default judgments, which require the dis-
trict court to determine if the well-pleaded facts in the complaint support the
entry of judgment and to fix the amount of damages based on the court's own
investigation.466 A similar inquisitorial duty attaches to the judicial role in
overseeing class action settlements, bankruptcy orders of various kinds, guilty
pleas, and consent decrees. 467 The FISA court has taken important steps to im-
prove the quality of its ex parte decisions, hiring a group of legal advisors to
conduct thorough initial investigations of important petitions and inviting the
Department of Justice to highlight and thoroughly brief any suggested changes
in the law.468
Inquisitorial proceedings also cast special duties of candor on the advocates
who appear before the federal courts. The Court's dismay in Lord v. Veazie re-
flected its dissatisfaction with the parties' failure to disclose that the proceeding
lacked true adversaries; the threat of contempt was meant to ensure that law-
yers attended to their duty of candor to the court in the future. 46 9 Rule 3.3 of
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct similarly
recognizes a duty of candor in ex parte proceedings: "In an ex parte proceed-
ing, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer
that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the
465. See supra Part I.B.i.
466. See supra Part I.F.1.
467. See supra Part I.C (discussing bankruptcy proceedings); Part I.F.3-5 (discussing consent de-
crees, guilty pleas, and class action settlements).
468. Although it exceeds the scope of our project, we hope future scholarship on the nature of
non-contentious jurisdiction will build upon the findings of this Article by considering the
varied ways in which courts discharge their inquisitorial duties and exploring the kinds of
best practices that might improve the quality of judicial investigations in the matters that
require them.
469. See 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 254-55 (185o).
124:1346 201 5
ARTICLE III, ADVERSE PARTIES, AND NON-CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
facts are adverse." 47' This duty of candor has been thought to apply with spe-
cial force to proceedings before the FISA court, where the absence of an adver-
sary and the secret nature of the proceedings impose a particularly demanding
duty on the government attorneys who appear before that court.47
Third, the federal courts may accept non-contentious assignments only
where the task at hand involves the exercise of judicial, rather than ministerial,
judgment. Here again is Chief Justice Marshall's description of the judicial role
in naturalization: "[The courts] are to receive testimony, to compare it with the
law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as
the judgment of the court.
472
Chief Justice Marshall's description anticipates later comments from Justic-
es Story and Brandeis. In discussing petitions for remissions of forfeitures, Jus-
tice Story worked hard to defend the judicial quality of the proceeding: in tak-
ing evidence and making factual findings, "the judge exercises judicial
functions, and is bound by the same rules of evidence, as in other cases." 473 Jus-
tice Brandeis's comment in Tutun was similar: the applicant seeking naturali-
zation "must allege in his petition the fulfillment of all conditions upon the ex-
istence of which the alleged right is made dependent; and he must establish
these allegations by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the court. In
passing upon the application the court exercises judicial judgment."474 In all of
these instances, the Court confirmed the judicial quality of the judgment being
exercised and the point that this quality is crucial to the propriety of the exer-
cise of non-contentious jurisdiction.47
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the judicial quality of the work in these
cases suggests that while some administrative assignments are proper grist for
470. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (d) (2013). As the comment to Model Rule 3.3 ex-
plains, "Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the
matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is ex-
pected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as
an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by op-
posing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantial-
ly just result." Id. at cmt. [14].
471. See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things 7 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 209,
252-53 (2014).
472. Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 4o8 (1830).
473. The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
474. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926) (citation omitted).
475. See also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1998) (holding that because of its pro-
cedural resemblance to other matters in the court of appeals, "an application for a certificate
of appealability constitutes a case under" 28 U.S.C. § 1254, which permits the Supreme
Court to review "[c]ases in the courts of appeals .... [b]y writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. §
1254 (2012)).
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the mill of the Article III judiciary, others might be considered ministerial in
character and therefore appropriate only for assignment to another department
or officer. The idea of ministerial action played an important and somewhat
unsettled role in the early Republic. Ministerial action was subject to judicial
control through writs of mandamus, while the exercise of judicial discretion by
a lower court was not typically subject to mandamus control. 476 Similarly, of-
ficers acting in a discretionary capacity typically enjoyed immunity from suit
for actions taken within the scope of their jurisdiction, while officers acting in a
ministerial capacity were subject to suit when they failed to perform duties re-
quired by law.4' Marshals, though assigned to serve process and execute the
judgments of federal courts, were officers of the executive branch and thus
were subject to suit for the unlawful performance of their duties. 478 Judicial
clerks were also considered ministerial officers in the sense that individuals
who claimed a legal entitlement to action by the clerk (for example, copying a
court record or entering a judgment) could apply to the court to compel per-
formance of the duty.479
The judicial/ministerial distinction has provided grounds for the Court to
reject administrative assignments that were improperly ministerial or that
simply required the rote performance of a duty and did not call for the exercise
of judicial judgment.4o One can get a sense of the intuition underlying this
admittedly blurry line by considering the initial judicial reaction to the pension
law: the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania reportedly refused the
assignment in part because the statute compelled the court to sit for five days
to receive pension applications and thus abrogated the court's discretion to
close the court session when the work was complete. Such obligatory work was
apparently viewed as not of a "judicial" nature.8' The nation's first copyright
law furnishes an additional example. An author seeking a copyright on a "map,
476. See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right To Petition: Toward A First Amend-
ment Right To Pursue judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 899, 917 &
n.63 (1997); see also United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 53 (1795) (refusing to is-
sue a writ of mandamus to control discretionary judicial decision not to issue a warrant).
477. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
478. On the marshal's status as an officer of the executive branch, see James E. Pfander, The Chief
Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers, and the "Court of Law" Requirement, 107 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1125, 1153 (2013) (describing statutory provision vesting appointment of marshals by
the President).
479. See Jeter v. State, 117 So. 460 (Ala. 1928) (mandamus to compel court clerk to perform min-
isterial duty); State ex rel. Boller v. Peffley, 67 N.E.2d 87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (same); Eng-
lish v. Treaccar, 153 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (same).
48o. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-78 (1988); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40 (1851).
481. See supra notes 386-388 and accompanying text.
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chart, book, or books" was obliged to lodge a copy with the Secretary of State
and to "deposit" a printed copy of the title of the work with the federal district
court of the district in which the author resided.4 2 In specifying the duty to
record, no judicial judgment was contemplated. Instead of assigning the duty
to the court itself, Congress provided that "the clerk of such court is hereby di-
rected and required to record the same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him
for that purpose." Congress apparently held the view that work of a clearly
ministerial character was properly assigned to the clerk, leaving the court to en-
force the duty (if necessary) through a proper judicial proceeding.
48
3
The judicial/ministerial distinction provides a straightforward answer to
the question of how the federal courts in the early Republic came to view
themselves as empowered to hear ex parte matters in certain cases but not in
others. While the pension applications at issue in Hayburn's Case lacked the fi-
nality necessary to make them proper objects of the judicial power, the same
criticism cannot be made of the naturalization process. Federal courts passing
on naturalization applications were making conclusive determinations of al-
iens' entitlement to citizenship. They were also, as Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Brandeis later observed, exercising judicial judgment in determining
whether the petition met the statute's parameters and was adequately support-
ed by the factual record.4' 4 The apparent tension between pension claims and
naturalization petitions disappears on our account; both were forms of non-
contentious jurisdiction, but the pension claims lacked the finality necessary to
bring them within the judicial power.
Although the judicial/ministerial distinction provides the federal courts
with authority to reject proceedings that do not call for the exercise of judicial
judgment, the practice of the federal courts has been to defer to Congress and
accept ex parte assignments in doubtful cases. 48' This practice of deference pos-
es a potential threat to the federal courts, since Congress has control over the
assignment of a truly staggering array of federal administrative chores. The
threat may appear more pointed given the implicit obligation of the federal
courts in such cases to conduct their own investigation of the facts on which
482. Copyright Act of179o, ch. 15, 553-4, 1 Stat. 124, 125.
483. Thus, the statute specifically provided that the clerk would give a copy of the copyright rec-
ord to the author upon request. Id. § 3.
484. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926) (Brandeis, J.); Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 393, 408 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.).
485. For example, although District Judge Thomas Bee privately complained in 18oo of the min-
isterial or administrative nature of the court's role in assessing petitions for remission or
mitigation of forfeitures, see Pfander, supra note 6o, at 26, courts nevertheless accepted the
task and treated it as judicial in character. See, e.g., The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (Sto-
ry, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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their determination will be made. 486 While we recognize that a threat does ex-
ist, we remain fairly sanguine. Congress for the most part values the dispute-
resolution and law-elaboration roles of the federal judiciary and generally
works to support those roles.48 7 Moreover, Congress can be expected to moni-
tor the cost effectiveness of its administrative systems. It seems unlikely that a
Congress already concerned with the cost of, say, administering Social Security
benefit claims would turn that task over to the federal courts. However effi-
ciently the courts might process the claims, the cost per claim would predicta-
bly far exceed that of the current administrative arrangement. Except when
Congress decides that proper administration requires the high-powered (and
high-priced) judgment of the federal judiciary, as in the case of the FISA
courts, we can expect Congress to continue to rely on agencies instead.
Fourth and finally, as was the case under Roman law, non-contentious ju-
risdiction should end where the proposed judicial order or judgment threatens
to encroach on the rights of third parties not before the court. This principle is
central to the notion of non-contentious jurisdiction and, under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applies to all proceedings in federal
court.4 88 To the extent that a single party seeks to register or claim an individu-
al federal right or benefit, third-party rights are unlikely to be implicated in
most circumstances. More for one individual, such as a naturalized citizenship
or pension benefit, does not necessarily mean less for someone else (except for
the taxpayer, of course, who lacks standing to mount a federal court challenge
to congressional decisions to distribute such largesse)., 8' But in other circum-
stances, where the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction does pose a poten-
tial threat to the rights of third parties (such as in the case of settlement class
actions, the issuance of FISA warrants, and some bankruptcy proceedings),
federal courts must be especially vigilant to ward off the entry of judgments
that burden those who have not been brought before the court.49 ° Potential
486. See supra note 468.
487. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
929 (2013).
488. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("It is a principle of
general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process.").
489. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
490. On the whole, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause may provide a more effective in-
strument for moderating non-contentious forms than a strict adherence to an adverse-party
rule that would foreclose the exercise of all judicial power over such matters. Non-
contentious practice frequently occurs in connection with the assertion of what was once
called in rem jurisdiction over such estates as those in probate, prize, and bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court has long since ruled that the due process rights to notice and an opportunity
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problems with third-party rights may not deprive the court of power to hear a
case on the non-contentious side of its docket, but they certainly require a more
searching investigation and may require those seeking to invoke the court's ju-
risdiction to offer separate justification.
B. The Theory's Implications for the Article III Injury-in-Fact Requirement and
Separation of Powers
The recognition of non-contentious jurisdiction places some pressure on
the rules that govern standing under Article III. As the Court frequently has re-
iterated, a plaintiff may invoke the judicial power of the judicial branch only
when she has suffered an "injury in fact," only when the injury is "traceable to"
the defendant's violation of a legally protected interest, and only when the re-
lief sought from the court will "redress" that injury.491 This focus on the re-
dress of injuries reflects judicial suspicion of attempts on the part of Congress
to confer standing to enforce general compliance with the law through citizen-
suit provisions. The Court rejected one such attempt in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, turning back a claim that sought to vindicate the public's interest in
government compliance with environmental consultation requirements,' and
it has taken a hard look at other congressional grants of standing.493 In the con-
text of qui tam litigation, where an individual pursues fraud claims against
government contractors on behalf of the federal government, the Court refused
to regard the bounty payable to a successful claimant as creating a sufficient in-
terest to warrant standing.494 Instead, in order to accommodate the historical
pedigree of qui tam actions without casting standing doctrine into doubt, the
to be heard apply with equal force to in rem proceedings as to in personam proceedings,
thereby limiting the potential threat to third-party rights. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring "notice reasonably calculated ... to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections").
491. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 18o-81 (2000).
492. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
493. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496-97 (2009) (rejecting an environ-
mental group's standing to enforce a procedural right in the absence of a concrete injury);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (recognizing state's standing to challenge EPA's
refusal to regulate greenhouse gases); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (upholding a citi-
zen's right to challenge an agency's determination that the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee was not subject to registration as a "political committee" within the meaning of
federal law).
494. Vt. Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
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Court treated the right to pursue a qui tam action as one that the United States
(which possesses the real injury-in-fact) assigns to another party.495
Whatever sense the Court's three-pronged inquiry makes when one party
seeks redress from an opponent following an invasion of his rights, it simply
does not fit with the realities of non-contentious jurisdiction as practiced by
federal courts. In deploying non-contentious jurisdiction, Congress can create
individual rights and enable individuals to bring an ex parte action in federal
court to secure formal recognition of the right in question. Such individuals
have not suffered an "injury-in-fact"; rather, they seek to establish a legal in-
terest through the assertion of their claim. Such an ex parte proceeding bears
more than a passing resemblance to a claim for a bounty, in that the petitioner
seeks recognition of a right as a "byproduct" of the litigation process. 496 In Tu-
tun, for instance, the petitioner sought relief from the district court's denial of
his application for naturalized citizenship.4 97 Clearly, the petitioner could make
out a conventional claim of Article III standing at the appellate level: reversal of
the district court decision would redress the injury caused by the denial and
provide the relief sought. But the initial petition sought a benefit -a certificate
of citizenship -rather than redress for some injury-in-fact. Non-citizens suffer
no Article III "injury" from the creation of a system of naturalization; in seek-
ing naturalized citizenship, they pursue a change in status that will arise as the
byproduct of the proceeding. Nonetheless, by treating the original petition as a
case within Article III, Justice Brandeis pointedly rejected the government's ar-
gument that jurisdiction did not exist because the petitioner sought a mere
"privilege."4 98
As with the adverse-party requirement, one might be tempted to resolve
the tension between non-contentious jurisdiction and the injury-in-fact re-
quirement by adapting the Court's rejection of "byproducts" to the lessons of
495. Id.
496. In Vernont Agency, the Court concluded that the congressional provision of a bounty to a qui
tam relator was insufficient to confer Article III standing:
The interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the viola-
tion of a legally protected right. A qui tam relator has suffered no such invasion -
indeed, the "right" he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the
litigation is completed and the relator prevails. This is not to suggest that Con-
gress cannot define new legal rights, which in turn will confer standing to vindi-
cate an injury caused to the claimant. As we have held in another context, howev-
er, an interest that is merely a "byproduct" of the suit itself cannot give rise to a
cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.
Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted).
497. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568,574 (1926).
498. Id. at 578.
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history. After all, the Court has sometimes adjusted its standing doctrine to
take account of historical practice. 499 As we have also seen, however, non-
contentious proceedings are not a one-off aberration, but a well-established
category of federal court jurisdiction. A cleaner solution therefore lies in our
suggested bifurcation of the judicial power. By dividing judicial power into
contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction, the Court can retain much of the
doctrinal framework that now governs the handling of adversary disputes,
which to a large extent tracks the plaintiffs entitlement to a remedy of damages
or injunctive relief. At the same time, the Court can develop a new body of
rules to govern the practice of non-contentious jurisdiction, in which the plain-
tiff's requested relief dictates a different formulation of the standing require-
ment. 0 ° We propose the following reformulation of the standing test in mat-
ters of non-contentious jurisdiction: the Court need not insist on an "injury-in-
fact," but should require, in the words of ChiefJustice Marshall, a party who "asserts
his rights in the form prescribed by law."'
Adopting this reformulation of the current standing test in matters of non-
contentious jurisdiction will not frustrate the important role the standing doc-
trine plays in maintaining the separation of powers between the judiciary and
the political branches. Many argue that the separation-of-powers principle
mandates the injury-in-fact rule, which prevents courts from asserting su-
premacy over Congress or the executive. 0 2 Although the Court's standing deci-
499. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008) (describing the weight
of historical practice as "well nigh conclusive" (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 777)).
500. Perhaps needless to say, the three-pronged "injury-in-fact" test for standing is not itself pre-
sent in the text of Article III. Nor was this test articulated during the early Republic as a nec-
essary antecedent for the exercise of judicial power as traditionally understood. But Cf
Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 489-92 (2004) (hypothesizing that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (1803), set forth a precursor of standing doc-
trine in determining whether Marbury had a right to challenge the executive branch's failure
to deliver his commission appointing him a justice of the peace).
5o. Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).
502. To some extent, this argument tends to beg the question. If one begins with an assumption
of a purely adversarial system, it would seem to follow that federal courts sit to resolve dis-
putes and lack power to engage in the inquisitorial work entailed in some administrative
matters. But if one recognizes that the federal courts have been assigned and have exercised
a broad range of non-contentious jurisdiction throughout history, then the line separating
judicial work from administrative work might seem much less distinct. Just as the Europe-
ans have difficulty drawing an ideal distinction between contentious and non-contentious
jurisdiction, see supra Part III.A.2, so too might one recognize that, say, the administrative
work of naturalization can be given to either courts (as it was in 1790) or agencies (as it is
today). The blurry quality of the line underscores the wisdom of Justice Brandeis's recogni-
tion that Congress has a good deal of discretion in deciding how to structure administrative
claims. See Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576-77.
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sions often invoke the separation of powers and the need to avoid judicial ag-
grandizement at the expense of the political branches, one has difficulty identi-
fying judicial hubris in the acceptance of ex parte assignments from Congress.
Most of the time, the ex parte matters that the federal courts have heard over
the years have tended to present fact-bound issues with little broader signifi-
cance than their contribution to the administration of a statutory scheme, and
it would be unusual for such matters to embroil the courts in attempts to su-
pervise the decisions of the political branches."' 3
Moreover, when a non-contentious proceeding requires explication of fed-
eral law or judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative or executive ac-
tion, standing should still play a role. As was seen in Ex parte Fitzbonne, °4 such
occasions do arise, but the mere invocation of non-contentious jurisdiction
should not permit a party to evade Article III's justiciability requirements.
Standing doctrine prevents parties from seeking determination of a question of
law when they lack a concrete, individual interest in the determination of that
question and when that determination will not yield anything of consequence
other than the court's pronouncement itself. Although the traditional formula-
tion of standing requirements for parties in contentious proceedings is not
readily translatable to parties in non-contentious proceedings, the core of
standing doctrine can be reformulated to perform largely the same function in
non-contentious actions. The standing test we propose above would require
that, before addressing a question of law, a court should satisfy itself that the
parties before it have asserted an actual, concrete right and that their entitle-
ment to that right necessarily turns on resolution of the question of law.
In addition, to prevent a lack of adverseness from undermining the integri-
ty of a court's resolution of legal issues, it might be prudent to accord legal
pronouncements in non-contentious cases less precedential weight in future
cases. Such treatment would have the further benefits of preventing non-
contentious proceedings from yielding precedents binding on adverse third
parties (the lesson of feigned cases) and of discouraging invocations of non-
contentious jurisdiction for purely ideological ends (the lesson of the Progres-
sive era's attack on friendly constitutional litigation). 5 '
503. Arguably, the acceptance of such assignments honors the separation of powers by acknowl-
edging the power of Congress to decide how to structure the assertion of non-contentious
claims. So long as the work genuinely calls for the exercise of judicial judgment in the appli-
cation of law to fact, and the other elements of judicial power are respected, federal judicial
acceptance of non-contentious work should not pose a structural problem.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
505. Decisions by the federal district courts- the locus of much non-contentious jurisdiction-
lack precedential effect. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011)
("[F] ederal district judges, sitting as sole adjudicators, lack authority to render precedential
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Our emphasis on the need for prudence in the management of non-adverse
proceedings provides a natural foundation for Justice Kennedy's conclusion in
Windsor that the adverse-party requirement is not constitutional in dimen-
sion. s° 6 Although our adversarial system has come to emphasize the need for
fully adverse presentations as a prelude to constitutional adjudication, Article
III does not limit the judicial power to cases in which adverse parties contest
the matter at hand. Nevertheless, the Court's teachings about the need for con-
crete adverseness in contentious cases counsel prudence before proceeding to
decision in a case such as Windsor.
s0 7
C. The Theory Applied: Judicial and Administrative Work
Traditional assumptions about the adversary nature of the federal court
system have led to frequent confusion in attempts to properly classify the ex
parte work of courts and judges, and such encounters still engender confusion
today. We argue in this section that the theory presented in this Article offers a
more persuasive account of the practice of federal jurisdiction than the adverse-
party theory. In addition, we show that the theory of non-contentious jurisdic-
tion helps to solve a surprising number of difficulties that have arisen in the ju-
dicial management of administrative chores.
1. The Distinction Between Courts and Judges
The construct of non-contentious jurisdiction may help to clarify the line
between the work assigned to Article III courts and the work assigned to the
judges who staff those courts. Since the Founding, the nation's jurists and law-
yers have debated both the nature of the "judicial Power" that Article III con-
fers on federal courts and the scope of Congress's power to assign additional
chores to federal judges. Consider an early episode associated with the pension
claims of disabled veterans. Congress first assigned claim-assessment duties to
decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court.") When a disappointed
party seeks review of the denial of a claim, the resulting appellate court decision may have
precedential effect if the panel designates it as precedential. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b).
5o6. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685-88 (2013).
507. Cf Henry P. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 665, 707-08 (2012) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court still disclaims any freestand-
ing authority to pronounce on issues of constitutional law .... A live controversy of some
kind must still exist.").
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the circuit courts, as courts.s' Later, after the circuits refused those assign-
ments, Congress conferred an initial fact-finding function on the "judges" of
the district courts or on commissioners appointed by those judges." 9 One
might raise various questions about that solution. First, one might question
Congress's power to assign non-judicial work to the Article III judiciary. Se-
cond, one might doubt Congress's power to assign federal judges work outside
of their normal judicial responsibilities. To the extent one regards the fact-
finding office as an inferior office of the United States, Article II of the Consti-
tution casts doubt on congressional appointment.
One might be tempted to treat all assignments to the "courts" as grants of
judicial power and all assignments to "judges" as presumptively operating to
assign ministerial work of a non-judicial character. But that simple distinction
does not appear to explain either the history or the modern treatment of such
assignments. For example, when Congress conferred power on the federal
courts to hear ex parte warrant applications in connection with Alexander
Hamilton's tax on distilling, the grant of power was assigned to "any judge of
any court of the United States, or either of them."" '° This economical grant of
authority extends warrant-review powers to the courts themselves as well as to
the judges who staff those courts. The logic underlying such a dual grant lies in
the way that Congress had restricted the terms or meeting times of the courts it
had created. If an inspector or collector needed a warrant, and the court was
not in session, the statute would have clearly authorized the judge to act in a
judicial capacity. Similarly, when Congress conferred habeas power on the fed-
eral courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was careful to invest both the courts
themselves (in the first clause of section 14) and the judges of those courts (in
the second clause) with the power to review the legality of detention."1'
The construct of non-contentious jurisdiction helps to explain why this du-
alism did not trouble the lawyers and jurists of the early Republic and should
not cause distress today. Whether brought before a court or a judge, applica-
508. An Act To Provide for the Settlement of the Claims of Widows and Orphans Barred by the
Limitations Heretofore Established, and To Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, ch. 11,
5 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (1792).
509. An Act To Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions, ch. 17, § 2, 1 Stat. 324, 325 (1793).
51o. An Act Repealing, After the Last Day of June Next, the Duties Heretofore Laid upon Dis-
tilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and Laying Others in Their Stead; and also upon Spir-
its Distilled Within the United States, and for Appropriating the Same, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat.
199, 199 (1791).
511. For an account, see Pfander, supra note 57 (arguing that the grant of power both to courts
and judges was meant to ensure access to the "great writ" when federal courts with limited
terms were not in session).
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tions for warrants and writs of habeas corpus call upon courts to exercise judi-
cial judgment and therefore present cases within the meaning of Article III.
Such an understanding of assignments of judicial work to Article III judges
remains relevant today. Consider the Court's comparatively recent decision in
Hohn,S12 which began with an ex parte petition to a circuit judge for a COA in a
habeas post-conviction proceeding. Justice Scalia argued vigorously that such a
proceeding could not be regarded as a case or controversy within the judicial
power of the federal courts.513 But the Court disagreed, concluding that the ap-
plication for a COA was a "case" in the circuit court for purposes of the exercise
of the Court's certiorari authority. 14 We think the Court correctly recognized
that Congress has the power to confer non-contentious jurisdiction either on
Article III courts or on the judges of those courts, depending on its view of the
nature of the proceeding, without placing the matter at hand outside Article III
or the statutory provisions for appellate review that would otherwise apply.
2. The Probate Exception
The inability of the federal courts to exercise original non-contentious ju-
risdiction over "controversies" may help to clarify that most arcane of federal
jurisdiction doctrines, the probate exception S15 While many theories have been
proposed to account for the exception, ,6 and while the Supreme Court has
sought to whittle the exception down to size,5 17 one can best explain the cases
as reflecting the belief that the federal courts should not exercise non-
contentious jurisdiction over matters grounded in state law. Probate proceed-
ings can be non-contentious in character. They often begin with an uncontest-
ed "common form" application for the probate, or proof, of a will.S,8 If the
court agrees that the will qualifies under applicable law for admission to pro-
bate, the court will appoint an administrator to oversee the collection and dis-
512. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
513. Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
514. Id. at 253 (majority opinion).
515. See Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7 th Cir. 1982) ("The probate exception is one of the
most mysterious and esoteric branches of the law of federal jurisdiction.").
516. See, e.g., Pfander & Downey, supra note 86, at 1541-6o (discussing prior theories claiming
that the probate exception stems from Article III's omission of ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
from Article III's law and equity limits, or from general principles of federalism).
517. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 306-07 (2006) (treating the probate exception as an
outgrowth of the limited scope of the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction); see also
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (limiting the reach of the probate exception by
reference to the proper subjects of a suit at equity).
518. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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tribution of the estate's assets. s 9 Although disputes may crop up in the course
of administration and may present a controversy between diverse citizens with-
in the scope of federal jurisdiction, the initial proceeding is not a "controversy."
On this reading, then, the initial petition does not satisfy the controversy re-
quirement of Article III and does not come within the jurisdiction conferred on
federal courts over state-law controversies between diverse parties.
The Supreme Court offered precisely this account of the probate exception
in an overlooked nineteenth-century decision:
There are, it is true, in several decisions of this court, expressions of
opinion that the Federal courts have no probate jurisdiction, referring
particularly to the establishment of wills; and such is undoubtedly the
case under the existing legislation of Congress. The reason lies in the
nature of the proceeding to probate a will as one in rem, which does not
necessarily involve any controversy between parties: indeed, in the ma-
jority of instances, no such controversy exists.... [B]ut whenever a
controversy in a suit between such parties arises respecting the validity
or construction of a will, or the enforcement of a decree admitting it to
probate, there is no more reason why the Federal courts should not take
jurisdiction of the case than there is that they should not take jurisdic-
tion of any other controversy between the parties.520
These passages (interestingly, written by the same Justice Field who appears to
have begun the conjunction of cases and controversies) convey two important
ideas: that the power of the federal courts extends to any controversy or dis-
pute between diverse parties, even where it happens to involve the validity of a
will, and that the proceedings at the core of the probate exception were those of
a non-adversarial character.521' The distinction thus presented tracks entirely
with the limits of federal non-contentious jurisdiction put forth in this Article.
S19. See supra note 83.
S20. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1875).
521. Consider as well this comment from Ellis v. Davis:
Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included in nor ex-
cepted out of the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United States. So far
as it is ex parte and merely administrative, it is not conferred and cannot be exer-
cised by them at all until, in a case at law or in equity, its exercise becomes neces-
sary to settle a controversy of which a court of the United States may take cogni-
zance by reason of the citizenship of the parties.
109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883).
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3. The Extradition Puzzle
The construct of non-contentious jurisdiction also helps to resolve doubts
that have long dogged the process of international extradition. In the typical
case, a foreign government applies to the United States for the extradition of an
individual, and the Department of Justice initiates the proceeding by filing an
extradition complaint before a judge or magistrate."s Following the issuance of
a warrant for apprehension, the judge or magistrate holds a hearing to deter-
mine the legality of the extradition request. 2 If the judge or magistrate agrees
that the case for extradition has been made (after considering the treaty and as-
sessing the case for probable cause), the magistrate certifies the propriety of de-
tention to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination as to
whether extradition should be ordered.5 4 The target of extradition may seek
limited review by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the system does not
provide for direct appellate review of initial extradition decisions, 2 ' and a va-
riety of questions have arisen as to the nature of the habeas tribunal's power56
From a practical perspective, moreover, reliance on habeas review can result in
a series of duplicative proceedings.27
For reasons rooted in history, federal courts have often characterized the in-
itial consideration of the complaint for extradition as a proceeding outside of
Article 111.528 This characterization apparently dates from the case In re Metz-
ger.s29 In Metzger, the government opposed the attempt of a detained individual
to seek review, via habeas corpus, of a district judge's decision to issue a certifi-
522. For an overview of extradition processes, see Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3 d 470, 472-74 (7 th
Cir. 2000). See generally John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation,
43 VA. J. INT'L L. 93 (2002) (outlining the history of extradition in the United States).
523. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2012).
524. Id. §§ 3184, 3186.
525. See Lindstrom, 203 F.3d at 473.
526. See Parry, supra note 522, at 153-69.
527. See, e.g., DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 870 (7 th Cir. 1999) (decrying delay and multi-
plicity of proceedings in an extradition matter pending in the federal system for seven
years).
528. One scholar suggests with some force that the modern view of extradition as taking place
outside of Article III traces to Judge Henry Friendly's synthesis of extradition law. See Parry,
supra note 522, at 16o-64 (discussing Judge Friendly's decision in Matter of Mackin, 668
F.2d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1981), interpreting In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (S How.) 176 (1847), and
In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852), as placing extradition outside of Article III and
prohibiting any appellate review of extradition certificates); see also United States v.
Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting the government's application for de-
claratory judgment review of the denial of an extradition certificate).
529. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 176.
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cate of extradition."' 0 Because the judge was said to be acting as a magistrate,
and doing so outside of any established "tribunal," the government claimed
that the Court lacked supervisory power by way of habeas. 3' The Court agreed
that it lacked habeas jurisdiction because the case was decided by the district
judge "at chambers" rather than in "court" in the exercise of a "special authori-
ty." 32 Having characterized the district judge's action as non-judicial, or execu-
tive in character, the Court applied the rule of Marbury: the proposed issuance
of a supervisory writ to the district judge was said to represent an exercise of
the Court's original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction, and to lie beyond the
Court's power. 33 Since Metzger, many have regarded the district judge's role in
extradition proceedings as outside the traditional judicial power.534
Scholars have identified two reasons why the Metzger Court regarded the
district judge's extradition decision as outside of Article III."' The first reason
is based on a characterization of the executive's inherent authority over extradi-
tion. A variant of this argument was made in 1799 by then-Representative John
Marshall in the well-known case of accused British mutineer Jonathan Rob-
bins. Marshall argued on the floor of the House that the issue of extradition
"was a case for Executive and not Judicial decision.",, 6 Acknowledging that the
federal courts might test detention through habeas corpus, Marshall nonethe-
less suggested that President Adams had properly made the final determination
about extradition.
5 3 7
The second reason is statutory. The treaty under which the Metzger Court
acted (and which the Court considered self-executing) provided for "judges
and other magistrates" to certify evidentiary sufficiency "to the proper Execu-
53o. See id. at 183.
531. Id. at 186.
532. Id. at 191.
533. Id. at 191-92.
534. Parry, supra note 522, at 129.
535. See, e.g., Allison Marston, Innocents Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Interna-
tional Extradition Statute, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 343, 356-60 (1997) (discussing the proper char-
acterization of the judicial role in extradition); Parry, supra note 522, at 125-34 (discussing
the nature of the judicial role in extradition); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Consti-
tution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1198, 12o8-1o (1991) (discussing the ministerial character ofjudicial practice under the
1848 extradition statute).
536. 1o ANNALS OF CONG. 605 (18oo). Robbins, also known as Thomas Nash, was accused by the
British of committing murder during a mutiny aboard a British ship. Some who felt that the
Adams administration improperly capitulated to British demands decried his extradition
and execution. For an account, see Parry, supra note 522, at lo8-14.
537. See Parry, supra note 522, at 112-13.
146o
124:1346 201 5
ARTICLE III, ADVERSE PARTIES, AND NON-CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION
tive authority.""38 This treaty apparently gave the executive discretion over the
final extradition decision.3 9 By incorporating the judicial determination into a
process in which the executive was to make the final decision, the treaty may
appear to have enlisted the judiciary into an essentially administrative or execu-
tive task. Hayburn's Case, Ferreira, and Gordon all viewed the absence of judicial
finality as rendering the judicial role merely executive or ministerial.' 4
Yet modern decisions correctly recognize that extradition presents no fi-
nality problem. Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing in DeSilva v. DiLeonardi,"4
recognized that the Secretary of State does not have power to revise the judicial
certificate but only to refrain from extraditing in cases in which the judge has
found just cause. As Judge Easterbrook explained, the judicial decision finally
determines the government's right to extradite, and the Secretary simply de-
cides whether to carry out the extradition (as she almost invariably does). 2
But the Secretary cannot extradite without a judicial certificate and cannot
overturn a judicial decision rejecting extradition on probable cause, treaty, or
other grounds.-43 Judge Easterbrook drew the logical conclusion: the govern-
ment's application for an extradition certificate gives rise to a "case" within the
meaning of Article III to which the judicial power extends. ?4 He noted in a lat-
er decision involving the same parties that such applications could be assigned
to the district courts as courts, and they could be subject to appellate review in
the Article III hierarchy. 4 s
538. Id. at 115 & n.115 (quoting Webster-Ashburton Treaty, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 9, 1842, art. lo, 8
Stat. 572, 576, T.S. No. 119); see Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 188 (treating the extradition
procedure set forth in the treaty as "the supreme law of the land").
539. See Parry, supra note 522, at 116. The extradition statute, An Act for Giving Effect to Certain
Treaty Stipulations Between This and Foreign Governments, for the Apprehension and De-
livering Up of Certain Offenders, 9 Stat. 302 (1848), allows commissioners (now magistrate
judges) to hear extradition proceedings, though "district judges often preside over these cas-
es." Parry, supra note 522, at 134 n.219.
54o. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702, 704 (1864); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 51-52 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 41o n. (1792).
541. 125 F.3 d 111o (7 th Cir. 1997).
54a. See id. at 1113.
543. See id. (characterizing an extradition certificate as one that "authorizes, but does not com-
pel," the executive to carry out an extradition and concluding that federal courts have the
constitutional authority to certify for extradition).
544. See id.
S54. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 1999) (excoriating the multiple levels of
review occasioned by the current structure of extradition litigation and calling upon Con-
gress to replace this structure with the usual practice of an initial district court decision fol-
lowed by appellate review).
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That conclusion fits well with our view that non-contentious jurisdiction
enables the district courts to conduct an administrative evaluation of an appli-
cation for certification without exceeding the bounds of Article III. While ex-
tradition proceedings get underway with an ex parte submission, the evalua-
tion of an application for a warrant or certificate of extradition surely qualifies
as an exercise of judicial judgment and often includes adverse parties. District
courts or magistrates evaluate the factual basis for the claim that the underlying
criminal charge enjoys the support of probable cause, and they consider legal
challenges to the extradition treaty or process. Recall that the Court in 1795
characterized Judge Laurance's analysis of the warrant application in the case of
Captain Barr6 as having occurred in the judge's "judicial capacity."4 6 On this
basis, the Court concluded that the matter was not subject to review on man-
damus. The Lawrence decision thus represents an early rejection of the admin-
istrative or ministerial conception of extradition work. Building on Lawrence,
DeSilva, and Tutun, one might construct a plausible argument for the exercise
of appellate review of extradition decisions under the current jurisdictional
statutes. As we have seen, section 1291's provision for appellate review of final
district court "decisions" encompasses all "cases" in the district courts; 47 on
the logic of Tutun, appellate review would follow as a matter of course (thereby
lessening the need for a second round of habeas review).
4. FISA Courts
Since the adoption of FISA in 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court has reviewed government applications for the approval of certain sur-
veillance practices on an ex parte basis." 8 As with other warrant applications, 49
546. See supra text accompanying note 135. As noted supra note 131, the judge's name is styled
Lawrence in the opinion, but is typically spelled Laurance.
547. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. S68 (1926).
54s. The statutory scheme for the approval of FISA warrants was amended in 2008 and now al-
lows the government to "seek the FISC's authorization of certain foreign intelligence sur-
veillance targeting the communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad." Clapper v.
Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013). See generally Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (setting forth the statutory scheme); Note, Stand-
ing-Challenges to Government Surveillance -Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 127
HARV. L. REv. 298 (2013) (discussing Clapper). Current law requires the government to ob-
tain FISC approval of proposed foreign surveillance, including approval of the government's
certification "(1) that procedures are 'reasonably designed' to limit targeting to individuals
outside the United States; (2) that procedures will minimize acquisition, retention, and dis-
semination of nonpublic information about non-consenting U.S. persons; (3) that 'guide-
lines have been adopted to ensure compliance with targeting limits and the Fourth Amend-
ment'; and (4) that all these procedures comport with the Fourth Amendment." See Note,
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the government submits the request to the court without notice to the target of
the proposed surveillance.55 0 But unlike the targets of other warrant proceed-
ings, most FISA targets will never learn that the surveillance has been carried
out and will never have occasion to challenge the warrant in the course of crim-
inal proceedings. Unlike other warrant proceedings, moreover, the proceedings
do not take place in the local federal courthouse; rather, they require the FISA
judges to travel to a secret courthouse."5 ' If the FISC denies the government's
application, FISA provides for oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review. 12 The government does not invariably release either the
decisions of the trial court or the opinions of the court of review, although a
few decisions have come to light as a result of the leaks by Edward Snowden."s3
Critics have argued that the FISC's ex parte process presents both constitu-
tional and practical problems and have put forward a variety of suggested
cures."s 4 For example, Orin Kerr has argued that Congress should establish a
special advocate within an existing security-cleared government department to
offer adversary presentations during FISC proceedings.5 5 Steve Vladeck has
supra, at 299. Typical requests may seek orders approving of electronic surveillance, physical
searches, use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, or access to certain business rec-
ords. See ANDREW NOLAN, RICHARD M. THOMPSON II & VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 7-5700, INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEIL-
LANCE ACT'S COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2013).
s4g. See generally supra note 51o and accompanying text (describing warrant practice under the
nation's first excise tax on distilled spirits).
s5o. The 1978 statute provides for a subsequent challenge by an aggrieved person against whom
FISA evidence is or is about to be used in a courtroom proceeding; the target may move to
suppress on the ground that (I) the evidence was unlawfully obtained or (2) the electronic
surveillance was not conducted according to the court order's conditions. See 5o U.S.C. S
1806(e) (2012).
551. See Note, supra note 3, at 2206.
SS2. On the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, see 5o U.S.C. §
1803(b) (2012). The review court's first decision, In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3 d 717 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2002) attracted much attention. See Note, supra note 3, at 2202.
553. See Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, loo VA. L. REV. 1513,
1513 (2014).
554. On the practical side, some critics worry that the courts rubber-stamp the government's
surveillance policy and fail to provide a meaningful check. For example, the Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center observes that the FISC has turned down only twelve of some
35,000 FISA applications. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (2014), http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats
.html [http://perma.cc/QWJ7-CWND].
555. See Orin Kerr, A Proposal To Reform FISA Court Decisionmaking, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 8, 2013, 1:12 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2o13/o7/o8/a-proposal-to-reform-fisa
-court-decisionmaking [http://perma.cc/JHX9-PSMK] (arguing that the Oversight Section
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urged instead that "private security-cleared lawyers, not government employ-
ees... serve as adversaries in secret litigation commenced by the govern-
ment.",, 6 Such proposals have gained traction in Congress; newly introduced
bills would attempt to ensure adversarial presentations by requiring the ap-
pointment of public interest advocates in certain situations. ss7 One commenta-
tor has argued that private attorneys might be appointed to serve as consult-
ants to the court in proceedings deemed to require some adversarial
presentation."'
We do not claim expertise in matters of national security and have little to
add to the policy debate over the wisdom of introducing an adversary process
to improve decision making at the FISC. We simply suggest that the FISC's
role in hearing warrant applications on an ex parte basis seems to fit comforta-
bly within the scope of federal judicial power over matters of non-contentious
jurisdiction. The FISA process calls for the court to determine that the gov-
ernment has complied with various statutory elements that regulate access to
intelligence surveillance."s 9 The resulting decisions by the FISC serve as final
decisions on the issues at hand: the government's compliance with the statute
and entitlement to conduct the surveillance in question. While the targets of
such surveillance can contest various aspects of the proceedings that yielded the
evidence introduced at their trials, courts hearing those trials treat the FISC's
determination as conclusive on the issue of the legality of the surveillance.56 °
Even if the courts were to reopen the FISA decision and reevaluate the show-
ings, such judicial revision would not raise doubts about the judicial finality of
the initial decision. To be sure, federal officials may not always discharge their
duties of candor to the FISC and may exceed the scope of the warrant's author-
of the National Security Division at the Department of Justice should be assigned an adver-
sary role in the process).
556. Steve Vladeck, Making FISC More Adversarial: A Brief Response to Orin Kerr, LAwFARE (July
8, 2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o7/making-fisc-more-adversarial-a
-brief-response-to-orin-kerr [http://perma.cc/Q28V-NB57].
557. See, e.g., Ensuring Adversarial Process in the FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. (2013)
(granting authority to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to "appoint attorneys
to serve as public interest advocates in proceedings before the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court, a judge of the petition review pool, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review, and the Supreme Court").
558. See Kris, supra note 471, at 37 n.151.
559. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2012).
56o. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the district court's
conclusions that "all of the requirements of FISA were satisfied" and that "each of the FISA
surveillances was authorized by a FISA Court order that complied with the statutory re-
quirements for such orders and was supported by the statements and certifications required
by the statute").
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ity in carrying out the surveillance in question. Remedies should be available in
such cases (just as they were in the nineteenth century when officers exceeded
the scope of their warrants). But the possibility of executive branch missteps,
while legitimate matters of litigation and policy concern, do not deprive the ju-
dicial process of its character as such.
5. Administrative and Judicial Classification
The growth of the Article III judiciary has spawned remarkable growth in
the administrative infrastructure supporting the judicial function.s6' Federal
courts have faced nettlesome questions about the nature of specific proceed-
ings, whether judges can participate, and whether, if they do, the proceedings
qualify as cases subject to appellate review. For example, everyone agrees that
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) does not exercise
the "judicial power" of the United States within the meaning of Article III. But
problems of characterization remain, as the Supreme Court's decision in Mis-
tretta v. United Statess62 confirms. In the course of upholding the power of Con-
gress to create the United States Sentencing Commission within the judicial
branch, the Court allowed Congress to offer administrative and legislative
chores to Article III judges ,6' The Mistretta Court held that, so long as the fed-
eral judges remain free to refuse the work, and so long as the work does not in-
terfere with or encroach upon their other judicial duties, no Article III violation
occurs when federal judges take on administrative or legislative work. 
6
,
561. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), headquartered in Washington,
D.C., provides staff support to the third branch, succeeding to an administrative role that
the Department of Justice had previously played. Thus, the AO prepares budgets for the
federal judiciary; prepares reports and responds to congressional inquiries about judicial de-
velopments; oversees the collection of information about judicial dockets and dispositions;
supports the magistrate, bankruptcy, probation, and federal defender functions; and pro-
vides staff support to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Committees of the Judi-
cial Conference, including the Rules Advisory Committee, led by Article III judges, enjoy
substantial staff support from the AO. See PETER G. FISH, T1E POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION (1973); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
the Meaning ofArticle III, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924 (2000).
562. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
563. Id. at 385. While the Court reaffirmed as a "general principle" that "executive or administra-
tive duties of a non-judicial nature may not be imposed" on Article III judges, the Court
nonetheless permitted federal judges to participate in the legislative/administrative task of
developing sentencing guidelines for use in federal criminal cases. Id.
564. Id. at 386-89, 405-07. The Court viewed both the traditionally judicial quality of rulemaking
and the individual judge's power to refuse appointment to the Commission as crucial to the
decision that no improper encroachments occurred. Id.
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Mistretta works well enough when the administrative task at hand, such as
rulemaking or the formulation of sentencing guidelines, does not call for appel-
late review in the Article III judiciary, 6' But ambiguities arise when judges per-
form administrative work that directly and adversely affects the rights of indi-
viduals. In such cases, the individuals may seek review within the Article III
hierarchy only to find that the administrative characterization of the initial de-
cision casts doubt on the availability of appellate review. We explore three such
situations in this section: Judge Stephen S. Chandler's effort to secure review
of an adverse judicial council order; the often unsuccessful attempts of individ-
uals to secure review of the denial of ex parte petitions addressed to a district
judge; and the fascinating classification problem that divided the Justices in
Printz v. United States.566 We think the construct of non-contentious jurisdic-
tion helps to clarify the line between administrative work that lies outside of
Article III, on the one hand, and that which forms part of the judicial power
and can be reviewed in the ordinary course at the appropriate level in the ap-
pellate hierarchy, on the other.
a. Circuit Judicial Councils and Docket Assignments
In addition to creating the AO, Congress has established circuit judicial
councils to oversee the judicial work in each regional judicial circuit. These
councils, which are chaired by the Chief Judge of each circuit, perform a range
of administrative chores in tandem with the circuit administrator.567 Among
other tasks, the circuit judicial councils exercise control over charges of judicial
misconduct and have the power to reassign cases among the district judges of
565. Mistretta characterized such assignments as if they lay outside the scope of the judicial pow-
er, but were nonetheless permissible:
Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do
not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to
the central mission of the Judiciary. Following this approach, we specifically have
upheld not only Congress' power to confer on the Judicial Branch the rulemaking
authority contemplated in the various enabling Acts, but also to vest in judicial
councils authority to "make 'all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts."'
Id. at 388 (quoting Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7
(1970)). Read literally, the Court's formulation does not necessarily present problems for
the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction. Ex parte and other non-contentious matters
could be regarded as non-adjudicatory in the sense that they do not call for the adjudication
of a dispute.
566. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
567. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
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the circuit s68 One district judge subject to such a reassignment, Judge Chan-
dler, challenged the action of the judicial council by filing a petition for man-
damus and prohibition review in the Supreme Court.56 ' The majority essen-
tially dodged the question, concluding that Judge Chandler had failed to make
out a case for intervention on the merits." It therefore left undecided the na-
ture of the proceeding below and the power of the Court itself to review such
proceedings. s1
Concurring, Justice Harlan squarely confronted the character of the reas-
signment proceeding in the course of concluding that it was a proper task for
the Article III judiciary. 2 He first analyzed the work of the councils, finding
that Congress had intended them "to act as judicial bodies in supervising the
district judges.""73 While Justice Harlan acknowledged that the constitutional
separation of powers could block the placement of this authority in a nonjudi-
cial body, he treated the councils as judicial tribunals made up of Article III
judges with the power to conduct their oversight duties "as a judicial func-
tion."' 4 Having concluded that the task at the council level was properly judi-
cial, Justice Harlan had "little difficulty" in determining that the petition for
mandamus and prohibition review should be regarded as a "case or controver-
sy" within Article III judicial power.' When "the purpose and effect of the or-
der are to restrict the judge's performance of judicial tasks, and he alleges ille-
gal interference with the exercise of his office, his petition presents a cognizable
case or controversy just as does a petition for review of the disbarment of an
attorney."5
6
Our conception of non-contentious jurisdiction confirms the wisdom of
Justice Harlan's approach. Although the initial decision at the council level may
emerge from a process that does not resemble a traditional dispute, case man-
568. For an account, see Peter Graham Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial
Administration, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970).
S69. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. at 75-76.
57o. Id. at 88-89.
571. Id. at 86.
572. Id. at 89-129 (Harlan, J., concurring).
s73. Id. at 104.
574. Id. at 1o5.
575. Id. at 1o6 n.9.
576. Id. On disbarment proceedings, see Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883); Ex parte Robinson,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874); Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1869). Justice Harlan
also suggested that a litigant who considered himself "aggrieved" by a Council order could
mount a justiciable challenge to the decision, although he recognized that the "manner" of
review might raise questions.Judicial Council, 398 U.S. at io6 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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agement certainly represents (as Justice Harlan observeds7 ) a traditional judi-
cial function that calls for the exercise of judicial judgment in the application of
law to fact. What's more, the decree reassigning cases may have the finality
necessary to support appellate review. s8 By treating the matter as one appro-
priate for the exercise of judicial power, Justice Harlan's approach preserves the
prospect of judicial review for substantial claims of right (even though he re-
jected Judge Chandler's claim on the merits). Far better, we think, to preserve
the prospect of review through the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction
than to characterize the work as non-judicial and raise questions about the
availability of review. Confronted with similar questions, the judiciary should
follow Justice Harlan's lead, rather than the potentially confusing lead of Mis-
tretta, which suggests that all administrative work falls outside of Article III.
b. Administrative Management of Fee Petitions
A series of recent decisions about appellate review of fee petitions offers a
good illustration of the problems that arise from the improper characterization
of judicial matters. The appellate courts have consistently taken the view that
the ex parte fee decisions of the district courts should be regarded as merely
administrative and thus beyond the scope of appellate jurisdiction. 9 The
question has arisen when individual lawyers seek review of the denial of an ex
parte fee application under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) and when members
of the press seek review of the denial of applications to district courts for waiv-
er of the fees otherwise associated with access to the database known as PAC-
ER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) .581 In both instances, federal
law assigns the power to pass on the petition to the district court, but says
nothing specifically about appellate review of the district court's decisionsS1
Access to federal review thus turns on the meaning of the statute that generally
confers appellate jurisdiction over the "final decisions" of the district courts.5s2
Although the federal appellate courts correctly recognize that Congress's use of
M. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. at loS (Harlan, J., concurring).
578. See id. at OO (citing legislative history).
579- See i5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o, at § 3903.
580. See, e.g., In re Application for Exemption from Elec. Pub. Access Fees by Jennifer Gollan and
Shane Shifflett, 728 F.3 d 1033, 1035-36 (9 th Cir. 2013).
581. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3oo6A (2012); 28 U.S.C. 5 1914 (2012); In re Application for Exemption, 728
F.3d at 1o34 (discussing applicable federal law and guidelines set out by the Judicial Confer-
ence (citing Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule of Apr. 1, 2012)).
582. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
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the term "decisions" in 1948 encompassed all "cases" in the district courts,
they nonetheless hold that the term does not apply to administrative mattersi s.
As a result, the district courts often exercise final and unreviewable authority,
absent mandamus review by the Supreme Court, over PACER applications,
CJA fee requests, and perhaps other ex parte applications .
5
We have no quibble with the general principle that the appellate courts
should not review the administrative chores of the district judges. An appellate
court would, for example, rightly refuse to review the law clerk hiring decisions
of the district court. But the appellate courts have defined the ambit of admin-
istrative work too broadly and have done so in good measure because they lack
an appreciation of the role of non-contentious jurisdiction. In both the PACER
and CJA decisions, the appellate courts relied on the ex parte character of the
proceedings below, along with the fact that they began with an original sub-
mission and could not be characterized as ancillary to a pending proceeding.
s8 6
As a result, the courts found that the petitions lacked the adverse quality need-
ed to make the proceeding a "case" within the meaning of the judicial power.
(Such an approach assumes that federal courts lack "original" jurisdiction over
non-contentious proceedings, an assumption with which we obviously disa-
gree.)
A moment's reflection reveals the error of these decisions. As we have seen,
ex parte applications to district courts for final decisions on claims of federal
right are "cases" within the original non-contentious jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary and within the appellate jurisdiction of superior courts in the Article
III hierarchy. That was the lasting lesson of Tutun. The key to accurate identi-
fication of matters within the non-contentious jurisdiction of the district court
(and the appellate courts) lies not in the ex parte character of the proceeding,
but in the functional quality of the judicial judgment being exercised. Both the
PACER and CJA application processes call for the district court to apply estab-
lished law to the facts revealed in the petition and in the court's own investiga-
tion of the matter. Both situations differ from the clerkship application process,
which turns on the judge's personal conception of what sort of clerk will best
583. See, e.g., In re Applicationfor Exemption, 728 F. 3d at 1038-39.
584. See In re Marcum L.L.P., 67o F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Stone, 53
F.3 d 141, 143 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We agree with the Federal, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Elev-
enth Circuits and hold that S 3oo6A fee determinations are not appealable orders.").
58s. See 15A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16o, at 5 3903.
586. See In re Application for Exemption, 728 F.3d at 1039-41; see also In re Carlyle, 644 F.3d 694,
699 (8th Cir. 2011) (non-adversarial proceeding); United States v. Walton (In re Baker),
693 F.2d 925, 927 (9 th Cir. 1982) (same). For a description of the cases, see Matthew Heins,
Note, An Appeal to Common Sense: Why "Unappealable" District Court Decisions Should Be
Subject to Appellate Review, 1o9 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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serve the judge's needs. One can easily conclude that the ministerial or admin-
istrative work of hiring a law clerk lies outside the scope of the judge's judicial
jurisdiction and outside the scope of appellate review. But that need not imply
that the district judge's exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction should similar-
ly evade appellate review.
c. The Classification Debate in Printz v. United States
The conflicting views of the Justices in Printz present a slightly different
perspective on the classification of judicial and administrative work, but one on
which non-contentious jurisdiction may shed some light. Holding that Con-
gress may not commandeer state officials to administer a federal law requiring
background checks for firearm purchases, s8 7 Printz was a decision about feder-
alism. But it occasioned an exchange between Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, and Justice Stevens, in dissent, about the nature of functions previ-
ously assigned to state courts by the federal government. 8 8 In refuting an ar-
gument by the government that the First Congress had assigned administrative
tasks, such as the naturalization of citizens, to state courts, Justice Scalia char-
acterized the task of "determining whether applicants for citizenship met the
requisite qualifications" for naturalization under federal law as "quintessential-
ly adjudicative," though he added the unexplained caveat that "the line be-
tween [executive and judicial functions in the context of state judiciaries] is not
necessarily identical with the line established by the Constitution for federal
separation-of-power purposes." ss9 In response, Justice Stevens argued that the
"evaluation of applications for citizenship ... [is] hard to characterize as the
sort of adversarial proceedings to which common-law courts are accustomed"
and that "[a]ctivities of this sort, although they may bear some resemblance to
traditional common-law adjudication, are far afield from the classical model of
adversarial litigation." 9 ' Although neither Justice attempted to connect his
discussion of the distinction between administrative and judicial functions with
the judicial power granted by Article III-Justice Scalia was, indeed, careful to
avoid any such connection 9 ' - an animating feature of the arguments of both
Justices was that such a distinction existed and was significant for defining the
scope of judicial activity.
592
587. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
588. See id. at 9o6-o8 (majority opinion); id. at 948-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
589. Id. at 9o8 n.2 (majority opinion).
sso. Id. at 952 n.1l (Stevens, J., dissenting).
591. See id. at 9o8 n.2 (majority opinion).
592. See id.; id. at 950-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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We do not believe that one can draw a sharp boundary line between the
two functions. The example on which the Justices focused, naturalization pro-
ceedings,593 could rationally be assigned to judicial or administrative tribunals.
From the perspective of a theory of non-contentious jurisdiction, the key lies in
determining whether the court must exercise judicial judgment, or what Justice
Scalia characterized as the "adjudicative" functions of "determining whether
applicants for citizenship met the requisite qualifications."594 As long as the de-
termination calls for the exercise of such judgment and the other elements of
non-contentious jurisdiction are present, federal courts can do the work, and
the classification decision ultimately belongs to Congress.
CONCLUSION
History plays an important but contested role in debates over the justicia-
bility rules derived from Article III. Many scholars, following the lead of Justice
Felix Frankfurter, 95 focus on judicial practice in the early Republic for insight
into the Framers' conception of the judicial power. The canonical treatment of
federal justiciability law in Hart and Wechsler's famous casebook, for example,
prominently featured the lessons of such historical landmarks as Hayburn's
Case, the Correspondence of the Justices, and the practice of naturalization later
validated in Tutun. 96 Later scholars have continued to emphasize early prac-
tice, both because it sheds light on the original understanding of Article III and
because it may represent an early liquidation of the meaning of the debatable
terms of Article Ill."' Even if one does not subscribe to the so-called First
Congress canon of construction, which holds that practices adopted in the im-
mediate aftermath of the ratification have special force as early explications of
593. Id. at 906-07 (majority opinion); id. at 950 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
594. Id. at 908 n.2 (majority opinion).
s95. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
596. See HART &WECHSLtER 6th, supra note 21, at 49-96 (discussing the judicial power problems
of finality, proper parties, advisory opinions, and legislative and executive revision through
the lens of early cases).
S97. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969) (questioning the standing rule on historical grounds); Pushaw, su-
pra note 218 (same); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371. 1374 (1988) (arguing that the Framers did not understand
Article III to impose standing limits on the invocation of judicial power but that the limits
emerged in the twentieth century and later hardened into constitutional dogma). For an ar-
gument for deference to congressional applications that liquidate or "fix" the meaning of the
Constitution, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv.
519 (2003).
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constitutional meaning,598 a thorough knowledge of historical practice may
have value. After all, history may help to explain how contested practices arose
and why they remain a part of our constitutional tradition centuries later, long
after their original justification has slipped from view.
Some scholars take the position that the early willingness of the federal
courts to take on ex parte chores, such as naturalization petitions, does not de-
serve much weight in constitutional analysis. 99 One form of the argument ap-
pears in the work of Michael Morley, who argues against the power of Article
III courts to entertain uncontested applications for the entry of consent de-
crees.600 For Morley, early practice has little to offer a body of constitutional
law that did not emerge in the decisional law of the Supreme Court until the
twentieth century.61 Many scholars take a similar view, dismissing early prac-
tice as isolated or anomalous, or suggesting that early practice was a pragmatic
adaptation to conditions in the early Republic but has few lessons to teach us
about justiciability law today.6°2 A subtler version of the argument appears in
the latest edition of the Hart and Wechsler casebook. After calling attention to
the practice of naturalization upheld in Tutun and questioning its legitimacy,
the authors ask, "When, if ever, should a deep historical pedigree sustain a
practice if the Court would otherwise find it unconstitutional?" 6,3 One can see
this question as an effort to downplay the significance of early precedents on
the grounds that they are unprincipled, anomalous, or products of a different
age. On this view, case-or-controversy rules that the Court has promulgated in
the last several decades respond to practical problems of administrative gov-
ernance - problems that may not have been present in the early days.
598. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) ("This court has
repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporary legislative exposition of the Consti-
tution when the founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively
participating in public affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provi-
sions."); see also Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court's Use of
History, 94 CALuF. L. REv. 1745 (20o6) (describing and analyzing the use of the First Con-
gress Canon).
599. See Morley, supra note 18, at 669-70; Redish & Kastanek, supra note 16, at 587 n.157;
Wheeler, supra note 17, at 132-36; cf Avery, supra note 18, at 417-18 n.137; Richard Re, Rela-
tive Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014) (arguing that modern standing law renders its
.eighteenth century British pedigree (or lack thereof)" "largely beside the point").
6oo. See Morley, supra note 18, at 669-70.
6o. Id. at 674-75.
6o2. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 17, at 132-36 (describing early instances of non-contentious ju-
risdiction as anomalous "extrajudicial" activities that took place outside the context of cases
and controversies).
603. HART&WECHSLER 6th, supra note 21, at 84-85.
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We do not question the pragmatic instinct that underlies these arguments.
The meaning of the Constitution will inevitably change, and a deep historical
pedigree, standing alone, does not provide an airtight assurance of constitu-
tional validity. We simply disagree on the point that ex parte practice should be
consigned to the dustbin of history's anomalies. Non-contentious jurisdiction
began in ancient Rome; was received into the civil- and canon-law procedure
of Europe and England; took root in the courts of admiralty and equity; and
made its way across the Atlantic to the new world. Early Congresses included
non-contentious matters among those they assigned to the federal courts, and
early definitions of the term "case" in Article III were phrased in terms suffi-
ciently broad to encompass ex parte proceedings. The now-familiar linkage be-
tween "cases" and "controversies" was apparently proposed in the late nine-
teenth century as a way to introduce an adverse-party norm into language that
had not been previously read to convey such a meaning. The Court has invari-
ably upheld individual instances of non-contentious jurisdiction against chal-
lenges predicated on the absence of adverse parties. And the construct of non-
contentious jurisdiction can help to solve a surprisingly broad range of puzzles
in the management of the federal judicial power today. We think, in brief, that
the practice of non-contentious jurisdiction remains a vital feature of the daily
work of the Article III courts.
We do not mean to praise all of the practices outlined in this Article; in-
deed, we believe Congress should think twice before expanding non-
contentious jurisdiction, and federal courts might improve the way they man-
age their non-contentious work. But we do suggest that the theory of non-
contentious jurisdiction explains much that was previously inexplicable or
anomalous. Non-contentious jurisdiction, properly understood, enables the
federal courts to entertain a range of uncontested and ex parte applications for
the grant of a legal right or the entry of a judgment or as a threshold require-
ment before the government may institute certain proceedings against an indi-
vidual. Properly limited, non-contentious jurisdiction should not pose a threat
to the dominant role of the federal courts in resolving contested disputes and
explicating the meaning of federal law. Indeed, by calling for the recognition of
both contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction, we have expressed a prefer-
ence for the preservation of many of the adverse-party rules that emerged in
the last century. We have also suggested that federal courts should proceed
cautiously when asked to make bold pronouncements in the context of an ex
parte submission. Still, the federal courts provide a unique institution among
administrative bodies; their independent judges offer a more meaningful check
on executive branch activities than courts created within and beholden to the
administrative state. While Congress should not assign administrative matters
to the Article III judiciary that the agencies can handle more efficiently, we
think Congress retains broad power to define the sort of "cases" that will make
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up the work of the lower federal courts. On accepting such non-contentious as-
signments as a legitimate part of the judicial power, moreover, federal courts
may come to view their inquisitorial duties as an important complement to
their role in dispute resolution on the contentious side of their dockets.
I~I
